


JPRS-TND-94-006

16 March 1994



**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

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# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Proliferation Issues**

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# PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-94-006

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16 March 1994

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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## SOUTH AFRICA

### De Klerk Not Telling 'Full Truth' About Nuclear Program

MB1102124194 Johannesburg WEEKLY MAIL & GUARDIAN in English 11-17 Feb 94 p 2

[Report by Paul Stober]

[Text] The MAIL & GUARDIAN is this week able to print the details of a court case the government has kept hidden for five years, revealing that President F.W. de Klerk was not telling the full truth when he revealed South Africa's nuclear weapons programme last year.

The court records of the trial of Brigadier Johann Blaauw in 1989 show that De Klerk's statement to parliament contained three direct lies about South Africa's collaboration with other countries in the nuclear programme. It also indicates that he underplayed the extent of the programme when he told of the existence of no more than six crude atomic bombs. The record also puts on display the level of corruption in the government in the 1980's, allowing former minister of mines Fanie Botha, a perpetual insolvent, to sit in parliament and the cabinet and even serve as leader of the House. Judge J. Friedman said that in order to hide his state of affairs Botha was "prepared to commit perjury, fraud and deceit; he was prepared to become involved in political chicanery of the most despicable kind ... he was prepared to lie to the prosecutor ... he was prepared to lie deliberately under oath ... no reliance can be placed on his evidence."

Botha was later jailed for one year. Transcripts of the trial confirm South Africa and Israel collaborated on the development of nuclear weapons—and prove De Klerk lied on three counts:

- He stated South Africa had not acquired nuclear weapons technology or material from another country.
- He stated that South Africa had never provided material to another country.
- He stated that South Africa had never co-operated with another country in this regard.

The September 1989 Supreme Court judgment, in the "in camera" case of former South African Air Force [SAAF] Brigadier Blaauw, reveals startling details of South African-Israeli swaps of nuclear weapon technology and material and extensive collaboration between the two. Until now reporting on the judgment has been banned under the Nuclear Energy Act and the Criminal Procedure Act. As recently as last week, the government tried to block the story threatening the SUNDAY TIMES with an interdict if it printed it.

In October 1987, Blaauw was charged with attempting to extort mining concessions from Botha, by threatening to reveal that he was financially bankrupt. During the trial it emerged that Blaauw had in fact shored up Botha's finances with the help of the Israelis and brokered many of the key nuclear deals between South Africa and Israel. Blaauw was found not guilty on all charges.

After his retirement from the SAAF in 1975, Blaauw acted as a go-between for Israel and South Africa on military matters. In 1976, he was approached by a member of an Israeli council involved in the clandestine purchase of nuclear materials and asked to obtain South African "yellow cake" for Israel. Yellow cake is an uranium oxide which, when enriched, can be used for the production of nuclear weapons.

Blaauw got agreement for the sale of 50 [metric] tons of yellow cake from the then prime minister B.J. Vorster, and the former head of the Bureau of State security, Hendrik van den Bergh, despite resistance from the then minister of mines, Piet Koornhof. Koornhof was replaced by Botha who was instructed to ensure the deal went through. Blaauw arranged a tour of Israeli military installations for Botha and the Israelis quickly struck up a good relationship with Botha.

Said the judgment: "Blaauw testified that there was, at that stage, a high degree of confidence developing between the South African and Israeli governments which involved the exchange of military technology, joint aeronautic ventures and the supply of 'knowhow' by Israel to South Africa in regard to the manufacture of weaponry."

After the yellow cake deal went through, Blaauw was asked by Van den Bergh to see if Israel would supply tritium to South Africa. Tritium boosts the explosion of a nuclear bomb. The Israelis agreed to supply 30g of tritium to South Africa—enough for 12 atomic bombs. In exchange, South Africa delivered two more consignments of yellow cake, of 50 [metric] tons and 500 [metric] tons, to Israel.

Details of the transactions are recorded in CRITICAL MASS, a recently published book by William Burrows and Robert Windrem, which investigates the proliferation of nuclear weapons among developing countries. While the deals were going through, Botha slid into bankruptcy and his political career was threatened by a R[and]1.7-million overdraft he owed Volkskas. But help was at hand.

Said the judgment: "The Israelis were interested in keeping Botha in the portfolio of mines because the yellow cake transactions had not yet fully materialised. There was every possibility of Botha becoming the minister of defence and they would have preferred Botha to hold that portfolio."

The Israelis gave Blaauw \$1-million—then worth R800,000—as a "gift for what I had done for them." With the money, Blaauw gave Botha cash transfusions and kept him financially and politically alive. Blaauw and Botha fell out after Botha failed to deliver valuable mining concessions promised to Blaauw as a reward for his services to South Africa's nuclear programme, in July 1979.

In court, Botha alleged Blaauw attempted to force him to hand over the concessions by threatening to reveal details of Botha's illegal attempts to get evidence of corruption from his rivals in the struggle for the leadership of the National Party, after the fall of Vorster in 1979.

In his speech to parliament in March last year, when he announced he had ordered the dismantling of South

Africa's nuclear arsenal, De Klerk baldly stated: "I wish to emphasise that at no time did South Africa acquire nuclear weapons technology or materials from another country, nor has it provided any to any other country, or co-operated with another country in this regard."

When confronted with the court records by the international London based magazine, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, which first broke the story, the office of the state president replied: "South Africa did not acquire nuclear weapons technology from another country. Although tritium may be used in initiators of nuclear explosive devices, (although not in the devices produced by South

Africa) it has many other commercial uses. South Africa has been active in the commercial exploitation of tritium for some time and has procured this material from various sources in the past."

Despite De Klerk's 1992 announcement, details of South Africa's nuclear programme remain shrouded in secrecy. Said ANC [African National Congress] science and technology head Roger Jardine: "They are prepared to give a tour of the complex but have never given details of the programme. A senior official once offered to tell me everything—but only if I signed the Official Secrets Act."

**Missile, Astronautics Journal Starts Publication**

*HK1502140894 Beijing GUANGMING RIBAO  
in Chinese 7 Feb 94 p 2*

[Report by An Bo (1344 0590): "ZHONGGUO  
DAODAN YU HANGTIAN WENZHAI Published"]

[Text] With the approval of the State Science and Technology Commission, the first journal of specialized indexes on missile and astronautics—ZHONGGUO DAODAN YU HANGTIAN WENZHAI [CHINA MISSILE AND ASTRONAUTICS DIGEST]—began publication at the end of January. The journal is compiled and published in both Chinese and English, the first domestic journal of its kind to do so.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

**Dailies Comment on North Korean Nuclear Issue**  
*SK1502115494*

[Editorial Report] Local vernacular dailies on 15 February carry articles discussing the North Korean stance in connection with its nuclear issue with the 21 February International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] Board of Governors meeting approaching, which reportedly would lead to referring the issue to the UN Security Council and then to sanctions on North Korea by the UN Security Council.

The conservative CHOSON ILBO on 15 February carries on page 4 a 1,000-word article by Ottawa-based correspondent Pak Tu-sik entitled "North Korean Nuclear Issue Heading for the UN Security Council—China and Japan Openly Revealing Their Intention of Seeking Practical Profit." The article refers to the remark made by Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa at the U.S.-Japanese summit talks held in Washington on 11 February. He is quoted as saying: "If the North Korean nuclear issue is referred to the UN Security Council, Japan will cooperate with the United Nations within the scope that our local laws permit." The article notes that Japan's attitude in attaching a string to the issue suggests that Japan is seeking a reward for its cooperation with the United Nations in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. The article then notes the Chinese position of delaying the UN Security Council's moves toward resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and says, "China makes it clear that China does not want the UN Security Council to take up the issue directly. China may not want the North Korean nuclear issue to be referred to the United Nations, which may well create a crisis near China and expose the Chinese position to the judgment of the international arena. Meanwhile, it is also true that China regards the present situation as a golden opportunity to expand its influence on the Sino-U.S. relations and on the Korean peninsula."

The moderate HANGUK ILBO on 15 February carries on page 2 a 600-word article dispatched by reporter Chong Pyong-chin from Washington in the "Reporter's Eye" column entitled "Facsimile Dispatched by Ho Chong." The article notes two different pieces of North Korean reactions reaching the ROK Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu's Washington field camp dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue around noon on 13 February [EST], one being the North Korean NODONG SINMUN and Central Broadcast's bellicose warning "We will regard any sanctions and pressure on Korea as an act of war provocation," and the North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman's negotiation-seeking comment "The U.S. Government should make clear its correct position toward the third round of the DPRK-U.S. talks." The article notes that Ho Chong, North Korean representative to the United Nations, sent facsimile of the latter, namely, the North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman's comment, to the news agencies and even to the residences of correspondents from around the world in Washington. The article notes that North Korea did not show such a kindness for the former, namely, the NODONG SINMUN and the

Central Broadcast's warning. The article concludes, "We may be able to discern the North Korean 'nuclear strategy' from the behavior of the North Korean UN mission distributing door to door the 'proposal aimed at negotiation,' instead of the 'warning,' with the deadline for the UN Security Council decision on sanctions approaching only several days away, timing it with the ROK foreign minister's visit to the United States."

The moderate HANGUK ILBO on 15 February carries on page 5 a 1,300-word article by Ottawa-based correspondent Chong Pyong-chin entitled "What Is the True Intention of the North Korean Foreign Ministry Spokesman's Comment—North Korea Tries To Get Open Confirmation of Its Behind-the-Scenes Agreement With the United States." The article notes the meaning of the North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman's comment issued on 12 February and says: "the ROK and the United States regard it as the North Korean proposal that the United States confirm the secretive and intermittent exchange of views between the United States and North Korea." The article goes on to note the remarks by an ROK Government official who accompanied Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu on his visit to the United States, who is quoted as saying: "We think that North Korea openly asked for the card which the ROK and the United States was going to present. This seems to be the North Korean intention of leading the situation positively rather than negatively." The article then notes, "North Korea is, in fact, asking the United States to help North Korea establish its justification for its own people at home, in allowing the IAEA inspection team to visit North Korea, that the inspection team could come to North Korea because of its own good will" rather than being forced by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligations. The article also notes that North Korea wants to have the U.S.-North Korean behind-the-scenes exchange of views notarized so that it can secure the anticipated fruits if the third round of U.S.-North Korean talks are held."

The moderate HANGUK ILBO on 15 February carries on page 5 a 900-word article by reporter Yu Sung-u entitled "Why Is North Korea So Indecisive Between Hardline and Dialogue?—Hardline and Moderate Negotiation Strategy Utilizing Time Before International Sanctions." The article notes the background behind North Korea's sending two different messages one after the other in connection with its nuclear issue, that is, while it maintained a stiff stance for some time on the nuclear inspection by the IAEA, North Korea hinted on the possibility of resolving the issue through dialogue at the last minute. The article notes, "Some North Korean watchers believe that North Korea takes this position because it thinks there is still some time left before actual sanctions are taken." The article then notes the opinion of another group of watchers that says that "North Korean President Kim Il-song may have tentatively taken back the authority on diplomacy and economy from his son Kim Chong-il to institute the authority himself. This may have caused the issuance of the apparently conflicting messages." The article notes the opinion of yet another group of watchers that says "North Korea is trying to fully use the time before the actual

sanctions are taken," because it could still use the double tactic of negotiation of hawk and dove before the sanctions can actually produce effects.

The moderate TONG-A ILBO publishes on page 4 an 800-word article entitled "The Last U.S. Persuasion To the North" by correspondent Nam Chan-sun from Washington.

The article reports that the United States is making its final persuasive move through the North Korean mission in the United Nations and the PRC is also doing everything possible to join the effort to persuade North Korea. The article reports that such persuasive efforts are based on the analysis that North Korea values the clue for dialogue [taehwau pulssi] as has been revealed through the remarks of a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman on 12 February.

The article notes the fact that most conditions except one or two were agreed upon between North Korea and the IAEA and that the ROK foreign minister's "appeal" during his recent U.S. visit encouraged the United States to continue to be persuasive.

The article notes that "persuasion does not mean any more concession but is focused on having North Korea realize the situation after the nuclear issue is referred to the UN Security Council."

The article reports that the ROK Government is criticized for having weakened the "stick character" of the persuasion by announcing that it will continue dialogue with Pyongyang even after the North Korean nuclear issue is referred to the UN Security Council.

The pro-government SEOUL SINMUN publishes on page 4 a 1,200-word article by correspondent Yang Sung-hyon from Ottawa.

Comparing the two communications made by North Korea on 12 February—the hard-line toned NODONG SINMUN commentary and the moderate remarks of a Foreign Ministry spokesman—the article reports that the government analyzes the former as "for domestic use" targeting the hard-liners and public opinion inside North Korea, and the latter as a message to the international community.

The article analyzes that "ROK Foreign Minister Han's visit to the United States provided North Korea with a pretext for changing its direction" and adds that government officials believe there is a great possibility that North Korean working-level officials reported such moves of the ROK and the United States as an "achievement of the Republic's demand."

The article notes that it is still too early to be optimistic because the United States and the IAEA have yet to assess North Korea's true intentions and North Korea has to confirm with the IAEA if the IAEA's expression of "inspections for the continuity of safeguards" coincides with North Korea's demands.

The moderate KYONGHYANG SINMUN publishes on page 3 a 700-word article entitled "Attention on North Korea's Last Nuclear Card" by correspondent Yi Sung-chol from Ottawa.

The article notes that ROK and U.S. officials agree that North Korea will soon suggest the resumption of dialogue with the United States and that the attention is focused on when and what the contents will be.

The article quotes an ROK Government official as saying: "analyzing the 12 February remarks of the North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman, North Korea is focusing on facilitating pretexts rather than insisting on their demands."

The article reports the official also added that North Korea has finally realized that it is impossible for the United States to pressure IAEA more to ease inspection conditions.

The article reports the ROK and U.S. authorities are discussing the optimum level of pretexts available to the expected demands from North Korea.

As to the timing, the article reports that related officials expect North Korea will request the United States to hold a dialogue on 19 February at the latest and that a high-ranking ROK Government official expects that the IAEA's resolution to refer the North Korean nuclear issue to the UN Security Council will be adopted on 23 February.

The article reports the ROK and U.S. Governments are studying countermeasures based on three assumptions before 19 February: First, when North Korea expresses its willingness to accept nuclear inspections; Second, when the nuclear inspections begin; Third, when no agreement is reached.

The article reports that an ROK Government authority said if North Korea agrees to accept nuclear inspection, there is a great possibility that the United Nations will adopt a resolution to impose sanctions with a deadline for nuclear inspections.

#### **ROK Papers on DPRK Acceptance of Inspection** *SK1802100894*

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation from 17 February ROK vernacular newspapers on reactions to North Korea's acceptance of nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and prospects for future developments in this issue. This topic is covered extensively by the vernacular press with The CHOSON ILBO, TONG-A ILBO, HANGUK ILBO, KYONGHYANG SINMUN, SEOUL SINMUN, and HANGYORE SINMUN all carrying responsive editorials and articles analyzing future development prospects.

#### **Reactions**

The moderate CHOSON ILBO, TONG-A ILBO, and HANGUK ILBO newspapers carry 800-word editorials on page 3 welcoming North Korea's acceptance of IAEA nuclear inspections but caution that although the emergency atmosphere has dissipated on the Korean peninsula

due to North Korea's acceptance of nuclear inspection, it is too early in the negotiation process to expect too much from North Korea.

Pointing out that "the nuclear issue began with the IAEA's demand for special inspections [tukpyol sachal]," the CHOSON ILBO editorial entitled "No More Nuclear Games," says that "ad hoc and ordinary inspections [imsi mit tongsang sachal] on seven declared facilities are meaningless" and that "the developments in the nuclear issue will only be possible following special inspections." The editorial warns that if North Korea accepted the inspections to avoid UN Security Council's sanctions, it will only add to its image of being "an impossible country to deal with" and urges North Korea to keep in mind the "economic benefits" that are to be gained from the resolution of the nuclear issue. The editorial concludes by telling readers to wait until North Korea accepts special and mutual inspections [sangho sachal] between the North and the South.

The moderate TONG-A ILBO editorial entitled "Still A Long Way To Go To Resolve North Korea's Nuclear Issue" chimes in with CHOSON ILBO by saying that "real negotiations begin when the issues of special inspection on two undeclared facilities and mutual inspections [sangho sachal] between the North and the South are discussed at the third round of the U.S.-North Korea talks," but adds that developments prove that North Korea only takes action when faced with "resolute measures [tanohan taecho]."

The moderate HANGUK ILBO editorial entitled "While Catastrophe Has Been Avoided on the North Korean Nuclear Issue" says that "although North Korea's avoidance of catastrophe and economic sanctions is to be praised, ... this does not mean a complete resolution of the nuclear issue." The editorial urges the government to be fully prepared for North Korea's tricks as the sudden change is part of a "meticulous, premeditated plan."

HANGUK ILBO's 800-word article by Paris correspondent Han Ki-pong on page 2, in analyzing the implications of the long drawn-out negotiations process, says that "no progress has been made from the starting point of negotiations a year ago," but that the resolution of conflict between North Korea and the international community is important in and of itself.

HANGUK ILBO carries an 800-word article by Choe Kyu-sik on page 4 on the ROK Government's view on North Korea's acceptance of nuclear inspections. While finding North Korea's decision "fortunate and welcoming," the government expressed its position that it is too early to be optimistic. The article says that the government hopes to have meaningful development in working-level contacts concerning the exchange of special envoys and to lead North Korea to completely return to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] system following a successful third round of U.S.-North Korea talks regarding the special inspections [tukpyol sachal] of the two undeclared facilities. While the government does not interpret North

Korea's acceptance of inspections to mean complete abandonment of nuclear development, it is not being interpreted as "a temporary step" to get out of the recent emergency situation, but as one official put it, "a meaningful breakthrough." This official is said to have noted that "it is a considerable development that North Korea accepted ad hoc inspections [imsi sachal] on two facilities when it had only allowed replacement of batteries and films."

On page 5, HANGUK ILBO carries a 700-word article by Yu Sung-u noting the two interpretations among relevant government officials on North Korea's acceptance of inspections: One, that it is part of a long-term negotiation strategy, and two, that there has been a sudden change in power structure within North Korea. Supporters of the former theory feel that North Korea's concession was planned to prevent the resumption of Team Spirit and that "it may be short-sighted to analyze that North Korea changed its attitude because it felt pressured by the 21 February deadline." Those who support the latter view note that while the declaration to withdraw from the NPT and the proclamation of a semi-war state in North Korea were done in Kim Chong-il's name, measures to settle the situation have been done in Kim Il-song's name. The article speculates that Kim Il-song may have chosen to involve himself in the settlement process after judging Kim Chong-il's management of diplomatic and economic affairs to have failed and concludes by saying that the issue of succession of power remains uncertain.

The moderate KYONGHYANG SINMUN in Korean publishes on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "The Problem of Inspections on North Korea's Nuclear Facilities Starts Now." The editorial welcomes North Korea's acceptance of IAEA nuclear inspections as evidence that North Korea wants to avoid serious confrontation with international society due to the nuclear issue. The editorial reports, however, that "the problem is how sincerely North Korea will accept IAEA inspections in the future," noting that there have been differences of opinion between the IAEA and North Korea regarding procedural matters on inspections, including its form and scope.

Noting that North Korea's acceptance of IAEA nuclear inspections is "nothing but a beginning" and "it is no more than returning to the situation one year ago when North Korea declared its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, NPT," the editorial stresses that "in a sense, North Korea's acceptance has no new, special meaning other than just the start of discussions on the North Korean nuclear issue."

The editorial urges North Korea to allow the IAEA to inspect all nuclear facilities, including undeclared sites in Yongbyon and, at the same time, stresses the need for the United States and the IAEA to continue negotiations with Pyongyang "with a consistent principle." The editorial concludes that "the government should realize that if it continues its policy toward North Korea and its nuclear policy with an irresolute and inconsistent attitude, the people's unrest will intensify."

The pro-government SEOUL SINMUN in Korean publishes on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled: "North-South Dialogue Should Also Be Resumed." While defining North Korea's acceptance of nuclear inspections this time and the IAEA's announcement to send its inspection team to Pyongyang soon as "a dramatic solution," the editorial notes that North Korea failed to mention if the two undeclared sites in Yongbyon—which are under suspicion of storing liquid and solid nuclear fuel—will be inspected this time. The editorial analyzes that North Korea's acceptance does not mean a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, but means a start to its solution, stressing that success of the issue depends entirely on North Korea's attitude.

The editorial notes that "now that North Korea has agreed to IAEA full-scope inspection, the only remaining problem is to resume a meaningful dialogue between North and South Korea to discuss mutual inspections between the North and the South to confirm denuclearization of the Korean peninsula."

The editorial concludes that North Korea, which has thus far adhered to dialogue with the United States, should correctly understand the need for North-South dialogue, adding that "North Korea should be aware that the improvement of its relations with the United States cannot be achieved without South Korea's consent."

The left-leaning HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean publishes on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled: "The North Korean Nuclear Issue Has Passed the Crisis Stage." The editorial notes that North Korea's decision on 16 February to accept the IAEA demand for nuclear inspections is a "blitzkrieg" decision and that "with this the North Korean nuclear issue, which was heading toward a crisis stage, was defused for a while."

Enumerating the ominous moves of the recent months in connection with the North Korean nuclear issue—such as tense North Korean-IAEA relations, the dispatch of a U.S. national intelligence team to South Korea, the announcement of U.S. plans to deploy Patriot missiles and Apache helicopters to South Korea, the plan to resume the Team Spirit exercise, the preparations for referring the North Korean nuclear issue to the UN Security Council, and North Korea's reactions to these moves—the editorial notes that "these were indeed shocking moves for those directly related to the nuclear issue and who live in the southern part of the peninsula." The editorial then appraises our government's efforts to prevent a crisis of war on the peninsula, indicating Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu's recent meetings with U.S. Government officials. The editorial expresses the hope for a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue.

HANGYORE SINMUN publishes on page 2 a 900-word article by Kim Tae-ho analyzing the prospects for the North Korean nuclear issue in the wake of North Korea's acceptance of IAEA inspections. Quoting an official concerned at the National Unification Board, NUB, as commenting that "now the first button has been fastened," the article reports that the NUB official's comment has two

implications: One is that negotiations for the nuclear issue as a whole will be smoother in the future and the other is that North Korea's acceptance is just a new start.

The article stresses that the resumption of North-South dialogue depends on whether the Team Spirit exercise is suspended. The article also analyzes that North Korea will probably demand not only the suspension of the exercise, but also the renouncement of the international cooperative system against North Korea in connection with the nuclear issue in return for the realization of exchanges of North-South special envoys. The article stresses the need not to persistently adhere to a solution of the nuclear issue as we see it today, but to first promote economic and personnel exchanges between the North and the South.

#### Prospects

The moderate HANGUK ILBO in Korean carries on page 4 a 1,000-word article by Yi Sung-u on prospects for North-South relations following North Korea's acceptance of nuclear inspections. Noting that the POK Government is busy preparing necessary actions for resumption of North-South contacts, the article reports the government is optimistic that contacts will be resumed and yet assumes a prudent attitude that no significant progress will be made soon.

The article notes that as North Korea employed a foot-dragging tactic, the government assumed a flexible attitude in accordance with North Korea's reactions. Recalling that unification-related ministers met on 25 January and confirmed the government position that the nuclear impasse will be broken only when the North fully returns to the NPT, accepts substantial inspections by the IAEA, and basically agrees on South-North mutual nuclear inspections, the article predicts "chances are high that the government will flexibly readjust its stance in accordance with how IAEA inspections and North Korean-U.S. contacts will proceed."

The moderate HANGUK ILBO in Korean on page 3 carries a 1,000-word article by Washington-based correspondent Chong Chin-sok on prospects for North Korean-U.S. relations. The article reports "North Korea's acceptance of nuclear inspections does not mean that nuclear transparency has been guaranteed. However, the North Korean nuclear issue has entered a new stage in which chances for a crisis on the Korean peninsula have been diminished to some extent and the safety-valve of the nuclear issue has been sealed."

The article reports that there are numerous diplomatic, political, and legal obstacles that should be overcome for the promotion of North Korean-U.S. relations. The article predicts that even if high-level U.S.-North Korean dialogue is resumed, there is a great possibility that relatively slow progress will be made in the issues of suspending the Team Spirit exercise and promoting ties because the nuclear issue has not been cleared from the agenda.

The moderate CHOSON ILBO carries on page 3 a 1,200-word article by Pak Tu-sik entitled "How Things Will Turn Out After North Korea's Acceptance of Nuclear

Inspections." Noting that North Korea has defused the crisis over the nuclear issue by accepting IAEA inspections, the article predicts that North Korean-U.S. negotiations or North Korean-Japanese negotiations will start in the first half of this year if progress is made at the third round of U.S.-North Korean talks.

The article questions if inter-Korean contacts for the exchange of special envoys can take place smoothly. The article points out that the "two sides should lower the level of their demands."

The moderate TONG-A ILBO in Korean carries on page 2 an 1,200-word article by Nam Chan-chong entitled: "How the Third U.S.-DPRK Talks Will Evolve."

Noting the future obstacles of U.S.-DPRK talks, the article reports that "to remove these obstacles, North Korea must allow the IAEA inspection team to inspect thoroughly its seven reported nuclear facilities and the exchange of special envoys between the North and South must be carried out."

The article reports that "the ROK and the United States will announce the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise this weekend when the IAEA inspection team arrives in Pyongyang," noting an agreement reached between North Korea and the United States at their 18th working-level contact held in New York on 29 December 1993.

Referring to the U.S. deployment of Patriot missiles to South Korea as a new agenda item in the negotiations between North Korea and the United States, the article reports: "Although the United States says that it will deploy Patriot missiles to South Korea for defensive purposes, Pyongyang will make it a issue at the meeting with the U.S. side." Noting the possibility of the U.S. cancellation of its plan to deploy the Patriots, the article reports that "Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu has said that the ROK and the United States decided to discuss it after 21 February."

TONG-A ILBO carries on page 3 an 1,000-word article by Pak Che-kyun entitled: "The Situation After North Korea's Acceptance of Nuclear Inspection." Referring to the ROK role in North Korean-U.S. talks and in North Korean-IAEA contacts, the article reports: "The resumption of North-South dialogue is getting closer as the IAEA inspection team is allowed to travel to North Korea this weekend."

Referring to the need to settle the simultaneous North-South inspection issue by the North and South themselves after IAEA special inspections are conducted, the article urges the government to actively strengthen cooperation with the United States to make North Korea aware of the importance of the improvement of North-South relations in order to improve U.S.-North Korean relations. The article continues that "some government officials say that the government must show its new negotiating card, such as the North-South economic cooperation card, to realize North-South dialogue."

TONG-A ILBO carries on page 3 a 900-word article by Kim Cha-su entitled: "The Background and Prospects of

North Korea's Acceptance of Nuclear Inspections." The article reports: "It is very successful to confirm North Korea's attitude to resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue," referring to the government's preparations to respond to North Korea's acceptance of nuclear inspections. Noting the background of North Korea's acceptance of the nuclear inspections, the article reports that "North Korea accepted the inspections a day before Kim Chong-il's birthday, and that this is intended to attract international recognition of the Kim Chong-il power system by creating an atmosphere in which North Korea gives a gift to the international community."

TONG-A ILBO carries on page 4 a 400-word article by Yi Chin-yong entitled: "The Prospects for IAEA Nuclear Inspection of North Korea." Referring to the need to inspect the two undeclared nuclear facilities in Yongbyon to clearly dispel the suspicion of North Korea's nuclear weapon development, the article reports that "this issue is likely to be discussed at the upcoming U.S.-DPRK high-level talks." Noting the background of North Korea's refusal to accept IAEA inspections and its decision to withdraw from the NPT, the article concludes that "it will take a long time to even confirm the result of the inspections. Therefore, it is too early to be optimistic over the North Korean nuclear issue."

The leftist-leaning HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean carries on page 3 an 1,000-word article by Pak Chong-mun entitled: "North Korea, South Korea, and the United States Stopped at the Edge of a Precipice." Referring to Vice Foreign Minister Hong Sun-yong's remarks that "North Korea's acceptance of the IAEA nuclear inspection is only the beginning to the resolution of the nuclear issue," the article points out several complicated problems in the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue.

Referring to the IAEA upcoming inspections as an opportunity for maintaining the continuity of nuclear safeguards and for guaranteeing the transparency of future nuclear inspection activities, the article predicts that "North Korea will cooperate with the IAEA inspection team in order to improve relations with the United States in the future."

#### **ROK Daily Reacts to North Korea's Acceptance of Inspections**

SK1602114494

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of an editorial and articles published on the moderate vernacular daily CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean on 16 February on North Korea's "lightning acceptance" of nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The paper publishes on page 3 a 2,300-word article by Vienna-based correspondent Yu Chae-sik, entitled "Strategic Concession Fearing International Pressure—Also Can Be Intentional Delay Tactic To Gain 'a Lot.'" Noting that North Korea on 15 February informed the IAEA of its decision to "accept nuclear inspections" in a "lightning manner," the article says that with this, tensions regarding

"the crisis of a war breaking," which has been openly talked about by the people, have now been "calmed down for a while."

The article points out several observations made by relevant IAEA officials in Vienna concerning the background of "North Korea's abrupt turn around" from the position of refusal of inspections. First, North Korea "yielded to the tough pressure" of the international community, of the United States, in particular. Explaining the process of the past contacts between the United States and North Korea on the inspection issue, the article says that an agreement was reached between the two sides but there was no "progress" in the six contacts held between North Korea and IAEA owing to differences in positions on the scope of the inspections. The IAEA declared that if normal inspections of "seven nuclear facilities" are not accepted, it will not dispatch an inspection team to North Korea. Prompted by this, "voices for sanctions on North Korea" and "criticism" of the Clinton Administration's "moderate policy" began to "surge." Pointing to the U.S. Defense Department's announcement of its operational plan to "occupy Pyongyang" and to the U.S. "final notice" on referring the issue to the UN Security Council, the article notes that this situation has driven North Korea to keenly realize that it can "no longer endure" the situation and that it may "loose" even what it has already gained. North Korea is also clearly aware that the United States has become the only "superpower" of the world which will "put its decision into practice without fail" once it decides to do so.

Second, the acceptance of inspections at the "final stage" is North Korea's "original strategy." In other words, even after North Korea agreed to accept inspections of "seven facilities," it is attempting to "gain some more" during negotiations with the United States. Judging that nothing can be obtained from "seven declared facilities," North Korea made a "strategic concession" in order to prepare itself for high-level talks with the United States while continuing the dialogue.

The article says that another observation which should not be overlooked is that North Korea agreed on inspections because the IAEA made "a certain concession," as revealed by North Korean Councilor Yun Ho-chin. If this is true, the article says, the IAEA might have decided to apply special regulations only to North Korea, not the "general regulation" which is applied to all IAEA members, thus leaving room for "making an issue" among its member states.

The article stresses that North Korea's acceptance of inspections is significant because it "halted the two trains dashing toward each other" but it is only the "beginning" of the North Korean nuclear issue because more thoroughgoing negotiations should be held between North Korea and the United States and between North Korea and the IAEA in order to ensure "transparency" of the North Korean nuclear issue through "special inspections" of two undeclared facilities in Yongbyon.

The paper publishes on page 3 a 1,300-word article by Washington-based correspondent Chin Chang-uk entitled "The United States Is Embarrassed by the Entanglement of Its Policy on North Korea." The article says that although the United States "immediately" announced a statement on 15 February "welcoming" North Korea's acceptance of nuclear inspections, it cannot conceal its "embarrassment" for the "abrupt entanglement" of its policies on North Korea, noting that the United States, judging that North Korea would not accept inspections until the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on 21 February, worked out "concrete measures" for economic sanctions against North Korea by referring the inspection issue to the UN Security Council.

The article says that the U.S. embarrassment is shown by its difficulty in deciding whether it would deploy Patriot missiles to the ROK or not and it has stated that an "urgent revision to the plan" to stage the 1994 Team Spirit joint military exercise is "necessary" in the event that the IAEA inspection team visits North Korea in the future. The article says that the United States should also make a "difficult diplomatic reversal" of its discussions with permanent member states of the UN Security Council because it had already discussed with them "sanctions against North Korea."

On the other hand, the article goes on to say that the U.S. Government believes that a series of such "hardline measures" have had the effect of making North Korea accept nuclear inspections. However, it also thinks that a "drastic revision" in the direction of its policies toward North Korea will be necessary. The article notes that it is likely that the United States will strongly demand that North Korea accept the inspection of "two undeclared nuclear facilities" in addition to the issue of exchanging special envoys between North and South Korea. The article says that whether the United States will deploy Patriot missiles to the Korean peninsula or not, even after North Korea accepts nuclear inspection, will become "a point of contention" between the United States and North Korea.

The paper published on page 3 a 1,000-word editorial entitled "The North's Acceptance of Nuclear Inspection Is Only the Beginning." Noting North Korea's acceptance of inspections as "fortunate," the editorial says that this is only a "clue" to the solution of the problem and that North Korea will demand discussions of "economic assistance and improved relations" by holding the third round of high-level U.S.-North Korea talks. The paper stresses that a "satisfactory result" should be brought about by the IAEA inspection and "peaceful use" of North Korean nuclear facilities must be "confirmed." The editorial also emphasizes that "practical dialogue" between the North and the South should be held before the issues of suspending the Team Spirit exercise and of holding high-level U.S.-North Korea talks are discussed.

#### **ROK Papers Comment on Future of DPRK Nuclear Issue**

SK1402094894

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of articles and editorials from ROK vernacular newspapers published on 14 February on the future of the North Korean

nuclear issue following the remarks made by a spokesman of the North Korean Foreign Ministry on 12 February and ROK Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu's recent visit to the United States.

The moderate CHOSON ILBO in Korean publishes on page 3 a 1,200-word article by correspondent Pak Tu-sik from Washington on the possibility of a new turn in the North Korean nuclear issue.

Reviewing the contents point by point, the article analyzes that the North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman's 12 February comment implies another new turn in the North Korean nuclear issue, which has been aggravated since a statement was issued by a spokesman of North Korean Foreign Ministry on 31 January.

The article says that although it cannot be expected that the North Korean nuclear issue will be resolved through dialogue by 21 February, it notes: "it has been confirmed that North Korea does want a breakthrough of the current situation which could only result in UN Security Council's measures."

The article notes North Korea's sudden assertion that it received "new facts" that the United States is willing to continue dialogue and that the inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] are purely for the continuity of safeguards—while the two conditions are not new at all—are to "accumulate pretexts for internal reporting procedures."

The article concludes that the behind-the-scenes communications between the United States and North Korea in the remainder of the week will be noteworthy.

The moderate CHOSON ILBO in Korean publishes on page 3 an 800-word editorial on the follow-up measures on the nuclear issue.

The editorial says "if it is inevitable to seek resolutions in the frame of sanctions instead of negotiations, the government should clearly convey to North Korea that the sanctions are not threats but a reality, and should be prepared to clearly interpret North Korea's response."

Therefore, the editorial urges that a communications channel is established to quickly communicate our decision to the top decision maker in North Korea in order to prevent a crisis resulting from delayed communications.

If this does not work out, the editorial says crisis management measures should be sought at this stage. The editorial stresses that the most important thing at this stage is to cautiously manage the domestic systems in the ROK and the United States so that a prudent countermeasure to minimize the crisis can be carried out with a national consensus of opinion.

The moderate TONG-A ILBO in Korean publishes on page 2 a 600-word article by correspondent Nam Chang-sun from Washington entitled "Main Role and Supporting Role in Handling the North Korean Nuclear Issue."

Noting that there had been frequent contacts between South and North Korea a year ago for the denuclearization

of the Korean peninsula, the article regrets that now the nuclear issue has become an issue to be resolved between North Korea and the United States or the IAEA.

The article analyzes that North Korea succeeded to exclude South Korea from the issue because "it was aware of the effects and limits of South Korea's carrots and sticks and disregarded them."

The article says Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu's hasty visit to the United States to pull back the Clinton Administration from rushing into a hard-line position and to "confirm" that the U.S. policy on the North Korean nuclear issue was the same as ours, vividly shows the ROK's supporting role.

The article asserts that we should seek a way to play the main role in the North Korean nuclear issue because it is directly linked with our destiny.

The moderate KYONGHYANG SINMUN in Korean publishes on page 3 a 1,400-word article by correspondent Yi Sung-chol from Washington analyzing the possibility of a breakthrough in the North Korean nuclear issue.

The article notes that the comment made by a spokesman of North Korean Foreign Ministry was announced on the same day NODONG SINMUN carried a hard-line commentary that any sanctions will be regarded as a proclamation of war, and quotes an ROK Government official as saying: "the NODONG SINMUN commentary and Foreign Ministry spokesman's comment can be analyzed as a fake operation."

The article reports North Korea seemed to have put considerable emphasis on the Foreign Ministry spokesman's comment because it even distributed copies of the contents to ROK and Western correspondents in the United States.

The article analyzes that "such a move of change resulted from the North Korean leaders' crisis awareness" as well as "the ROK Foreign Minister's efforts during his recent visit to the United States to create an atmosphere for North Korea's change."

The article worries that optimism can be destroyed at any moment if the real emphasis was on the NODONG SINMUN commentary and the other comment was a harassing tactic noting that no changes were seen in North Korea's contact with the United States in New York or with the IAEA in Vienna.

The article reports the ROK and U.S. Governments are establishing phased countermeasures while analyzing North Korea's real intent.

## JAPAN

### Hosokawa Says Japan Not To Go Nuclear

OW1103120094 Tokyo KYODO in English 1146 GMT  
11 Mar 94

[Text] Tokyo, March 11 KYODO—Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa on Friday [11 March] brushed aside speculation that Japan will arm itself with nuclear weapons, a Foreign Ministry official said.

"We wish to contribute to peace and security in the (Northeast Asian) region while maintaining the set-up under the Japan-U.S. security arrangements," the official quoted Hosokawa as saying in an interview with the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS).

"It is impossible for us to go nuclear in light of the nuclear allergy of our people," he reportedly said, explaining Tokyo's strictly defensive national security policy under its war-renouncing Constitution.

The interview, held at Hosokawa's official residence, will be broadcast on the evening of March 22 in a prime-time special KBS program on the premier ahead of South Korean President Kim Yong-sam's visit to Japan from March 24 through 26.

Hosokawa, who visited South Korea for a summit with Kim last November, voiced hope the two leaders will reaffirm the need for future-oriented Tokyo-Seoul ties, the official said.

Expressing deep concern about North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons development program, the premier called for cooperation among Japan, South Korea and the United States in resolving the issue, the official said.

On bilateral economic relations, Hosokawa noted that the transfer of high technology from Japan to South Korea and the bilateral trade imbalance in favor of Japan will be brought up in discussion of a soon-to-be-created intergovernmental forum for new economic partnership, the official said.

Hosokawa was also quoted as saying both Japan and the U.S. should "take cool and sensible steps" to resolve their brewing trade spat, the official said.

#### **Russian Scientist on Tokyo's Ability to Build Bomb**

LD1702121394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1129 GMT 17 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Kutakhov]

[Text] Tokyo February 17 TASS—Japan is quite capable of building its own nuclear bomb, like any other country with similar potential and nuclear power engineering industry, but Russian scientists are not apprehensive, according to Professor Viktor Murogov, director of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry's Institute of Physics and Energy. Professor Murogov was speaking upon return from Tokyo, where he attended an international roundtable conference on the use of plutonium.

"Tokyo is clearly orientated towards the solution of energy-supply problems. More, the country announced that it renounced nuclear weapons," the scientist said.

Japan's ability to produce nuclear weapons within a brief period of time became a subject of speculations after the SUNDAY TIMES published at the end of January excerpts from a confidential British Government report on the matter.

"In the development of its nuclear power engineering Tokyo is oriented to advanced technologies in the field of plutonium and the development of reactors of fast neutrons, although the Japanese do not yet have such reactors," Murogov said.

He said Japan is lagging behind Russia in this respect and added that the lag amounted to some 10 years. "Japan buys technologies we developed earlier, which brings us good returns in hard currency".

Murogov said no brain drain has been reported from Russia to Japan, although Russian nuclear specialists regularly visit Japan, as they do the United States and Western Europe.

### **NORTH KOREA**

#### **New Ground-to-Ground Missiles Reportedly Under Development**

SK1203013894 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean  
12 Mar 94 p 2

[Text] It was confirmed on 11 March that North Korea is developing two new types of long-distance ground-to-ground missiles with a longer range than Nodong-1 (whose range is 1,000 km).

Regarding foreign papers' recent reports that North Korea is developing new types of missiles with a range of either 2,000 km or 3,500 km (tentatively named Taepodong 1 and 2), a government intelligence source said: The contents of the reports are generally true. U.S. intelligence authorities notified ROK authorities early this year about this development. Intelligence authorities of the two countries have thereby been keeping careful watch.

#### **Russian Defense Official Says Pyongyang 'Has Nuclear Weapons'**

AU1402145894 Paris AFP in English 1441 GMT  
14 Feb 94

[Excerpt] Moscow, Feb 14 (AFP)—North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, a senior Russian national defence institute official said Monday [14 February].

Vladimir Kumachev, of Russia's Institute of National Security and Strategic Research, told AFP that "according to information we have received, North Korea has nuclear warheads."

Pyongyang also had launch vehicles "which had been perfected by the North Koreans themselves to give a longer range" to their missiles, added Kumachev, who is an adviser to the director of the institute, which was set up in 1991 with the backing of the defence and foreign ministries.

"We know they have carried out tests in certain African countries under totalitarian regimes," he said.

Kumachev said the then Soviet Union learned as early as 1985 that North Korea was starting to develop nuclear weapons, prompting Moscow to recall most of its specialists stationed in the country.

Kumachev added: "We established that the Koreans were enriching their uranium more than was necessary for non-military purposes, and we learned that secret underground bases had been set up in the mountains."

At the end of the 1970's the Soviet Union sent about 10 conventional missiles to North Korea "to protect its frontiers with South Korea," while further missile deliveries were made via third countries, including Iraq, he said.

"We still retain around 15 experts in North Korea to keep us up to date with and to monitor its nuclear programme," Kumachev said, adding that all now worked exclusively in the civil nuclear industry sector.

"Our specialists obviously do not have access to all the essential information, but they file regular reports on their activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)."

Kumachev's comments followed a report earlier Monday by Japan's JIJI PRESS that Pyongyang has developed a nuclear bomb with the help of Russian nuclear experts.

Russian researchers told JIJI that the former Soviet Union was engaged in a joint plan with North Korea to build a nuclear bomb until 1985, and that Russian scientists continued to provide clandestine assistance to Pyongyang.

If confirmed, the reports would provide the first proof that North Korea has nuclear weapons. [page omitted]

#### **Information on Country's Nuclear Weapons Reported**

SK1902052094 Seoul YONHAP in English 0500 GMT 19 Feb 94

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 19 (YONHAP)—China has recently disclosed that North Korea may already possess one or more nuclear bombs, the JIJI news agency reported in a dispatch from Washington on Saturday. Beijing has in the past opposed Pyongyang's acquisition of nuclear arms.

Quoting a U.S. military source, JIJI said the United States had on many occasions contacted China, a staunch ally of North Korea, to determine whether Pyongyang possessed nuclear weapons. The answer from China had always been negative on such a possibility, the report said.

JIJI said the American source based his view on North Korea's arsenal on information obtained from China in the recent past. When a U.S. War College delegation called at the Chinese defense college during a visit to Beijing last January, Chinese officials said, "North Korea may already possess nuclear arms," JIJI quoted the source as saying.

The report said the U.S. source believes that China now virtually recognizes that North Korea has nuclear weapons based on tips from Pyongyang officials during military exchanges between the two allies. The source added that there is no way to know how many nuclear bombs North Korea may now have, but the number could be one or two, according to the JIJI report.

## **SOUTH KOREA**

### **Announcement: Nuclear Safety White Paper Available**

[Text] A special issue of the JPRS Series SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY/KOREA entitled 'White Paper on Nuclear Energy Safety' (JPRS-KST-93-001, 22 Dec 93) Published by the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Ministry of Science and Technology presents information on Korea's nuclear energy safety management system. The report also provides the status of selected Korean R&D projects in the field of nuclear energy technology for 1991. This is the premier issue of a new FBIS report covering Korean Science and Technology Issues. Consumers not already receiving copies may call (703)-733-6346.

### **Papers Evaluate Foreign Minister's Visit to U.S.** SK1402084994

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of articles published in Seoul vernacular daily newspapers on 14 February in connection with Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu's current visit to the United States to tune the ROK-U.S. policy on the nuclear issue.

The pro-government SEOUL SINMUN in Korean carries on page 5 a 1,600-word article by Washington-based correspondent Yang Sung-hyon summing up Foreign Minister Han's visit to the United States.

Recalling that North Korea begins to show signs of change through its 12 February Foreign Ministry statement while Foreign Minister Han's U.S. visit was close to an end, the article analyzes that Foreign Minister Han attempted to deliver three different messages to North Korea through his U.S. visit.

The article says the first message is "the invariable efforts to settle the nuclear matter through dialogue." The article notes that the ROK and the United States, through in-depth discussions, were able to tug out an agreement to "open a dialogue channel to the last moment for the solution of nuclear problem."

The second message, the article maintains, is connected with "the reports on a crisis on the Korean peninsula and the United States preparing stern measures against North Korea." The article interprets Han's expression of mild gestures as a move to avoid the current situation on the Korean peninsula being termed as a crisis. Citing the ROK-U.S. agreement that if the North Korean issue was referred to the Security Council, U.N. action against Pyongyang should be taken in stages rather than through immediate sanctions, the article says Han made clear that "the ROK and the United States have no intention of driving North Korea to an extreme situation."

The third message, the article notes, is "an expression of firm will to use a stick if North Korea continues to hold out to the end." The article says that the ROK and U.S. Governments try to deliver a warning to North Korea that unless North Korea accepts inspections by the end of

February, sanctions by the international community against North Korea will be "out of our hands."

The article sees that North Korea reacted to Han's such messages through its 12 February Foreign Ministry statement and concludes that "in this perspective, Han's visit can be evaluated as successful."

The moderate HANGUK ILBO carries on page 3 a 1,400-word article by Washington-based correspondent Chong Pyong-chin on Foreign Minister Han's achievements during his U.S. visit.

Citing press reports focusing on possible military scenarios in case of war on the Korean peninsula, the article says Han, in connection with this, has calmed down the U.S. media's aggravated reports by pointing out detailed points.

The article continues that "the purpose of Han's U.S. visit is to narrow the differences in opinions for the solution of the nuclear problem and to make correct diagnosis of the reports on a crisis on the Korean peninsula by going into the epicenter of the reports."

The article then adds that "President Kim's personal letter to President Clinton also firmly reaffirmed ROK-U.S. cooperation over the nuclear issue and expressed "concern and unpleasantness" over the U.S. media's reports on a crisis on the Korean peninsula.

The article concludes by saying that Han reassured the U.S. media that the current military movements on the Korean peninsula—including the recent reports on concentration of North Korean troops near the DMZ, deployment of the Patriot missiles, and resumption of Team Spirit exercise—are not something new aimed at preparing steps to countermeasure a possible crisis.

## MALAYSIA

### Nuclear Weapons Not Part of Armed Forces Modernization

BK0303143394 Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 2 Mar 94 p 7

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Tues—Defense Minister Datuk Sri Najib Tun Razak says there is a need to boost the capabilities of the armed forces to ensure political stability and economic development.

He said today the government had set aside funds to modernise the armed forces to deter any prospective aggressor.

"With the armed forces' improved capabilities, an aggressor will think twice about testing our defence," he added.

Najib said this when interviewed on the TV3's inaugural Malaysia Hari Ini [Malaysia Today] morning talk show.

He also said the government was reviewing the national defense policy to keep it in line with the changes and challenges facing the armed forces.

He said the higher defense spending should not be seen as an attempt by Malaysia to join the arms race.

However, this was to keep up with developments in defense technology to ensure the armed forces had modern equipment and for continuous economic development.

During the special programme, Najib also answered public enquiries and suggestions through the toll-free telephone lines.

To a caller's question, Najib said the armed forces did not plan to include nuclear arms as part of its modernization programme.

There was no need for such weapons in the region since the end of the Cold War had removed superpower rivalry in the region, he explained.

To another question, Najib said Malaysian troops were safe in Bosnia despite the Serb forces' recent threat to retaliate against the air strike threat by NATO.

NATO had threatened to carry out air strikes if the Serb forces did not pull back their heavy guns from the hills around Sarajevo.

## THAILAND

### 'Uranium' Smuggling Near Cambodian Border Reported

#### Suspects Arrested

BK1202095994 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 12 Feb 94 p 1

[Text] Aranyaprathet—Three men were arrested in this Thai-Cambodian border district yesterday for allegedly smuggling dangerous goods, suspected to be uranium, into the country.

A combined unit of police and military officers arrested Narong Foitakhu, 48, T'awon Plangkamon, 46, and Khian Phongsi, 60, near a market in Ban Khlong Luk and seized a tin box suspected to contain the radioactive substance.

The rusty box, which is 28 cms long, 21 cms wide, and 6 cms tall, and weighing about 4.2 kgs, is imprinted with a danger sign and a phrase in English which reads: "1974-1994 Uranium 999X Made in USA 2350827."

The police said they have not yet opened the box as they fear that the contents inside might be dangerous. The box would be sent to either the Mineral Resources Department or the Army's Chemical Department for inspection.

According to the police, the suspects confessed that they were hired to bring the box from Cambodia to a customer in Bangkok. The suspects reportedly said that Cambodian people told them the substance inside the box was a mineral that could "eat iron" since nails or metal scrap placed on the box decomposed very quickly.

The three have been charged with violating the Customs Act by importing and possessing prohibited articles.

**Presence of Uranium Still Unconfirmed**

*BK1902095294 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English  
19 Feb 94 p 3*

[Text] The Burapha Special Task Force has urged the Army's Scientific Department to immediately identify the substance contained in a tin box seized by a combined unit of police and military officers from three men last week.

The deputy commander of the Aranyaprathet task force unit, Col. Itsara Watcharapraphip, said senior Army officers in Bangkok showed high interest in the box suspected to contain uranium.

The rusty box, which is 28 cms long, 21 cms wide and 6 cms deep and weighs about 4.2 kgs, bears a danger sign and a phrase in English which reads "1974-1994 Uranum 999x Made in USA 2350827".

Col. Itsara said he received an order from his superior to closely monitor the reported smuggling dangerous goods, suspected to be radioactive substances, and to try to prevent them entering the country.

He said he had an intelligence report that at least 10 similar boxes weighing from one to five kgs were smuggled into Thailand and were sold to junk dealers for 200,000 to 1,000,000 baht.

**Agency Allays Fears Over Recent Radioactive Cases**

*BK2302030694 Bangkok THE NATION in English  
23 Feb 94 p A2*

[Text] The head of the atomic energy authority issued a press release yesterday urging the public not to be alarmed over recent cases involving radioactive material.

Suchat Mongkhonphan, secretary-general of the Office of Atomic Energy for Peace (OAEP), said the quantities and types of uranium involved meant they were not dangerous to public health.

But the release also suggests that the eight barrels of hazardous waste imported last year by a Thai company may have contained small quantities of the uranium isotope—Uranium-235—considered most dangerous.

It was revealed last week that Thai Tantalum Co Ltd had imported from the United States nearly 3,000 kgs of toxic sludge contaminated by radioactivity. Officials from the Department of Industrial Works later announced that the company's import licence would be revoked.

Last June, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission had sent a letter to Suchat's office via the Thai Embassy in Washington warning that the waste contained radioactive substances. But the OAEP has not been able to locate any records acknowledging the letter's receipt.

Thai Tantalum claimed that tests run on the sludge showed with a 90 percent certainty that it contains less than 0.2 percent (or roughly 5.5 kgs) of thorium and uranium, two highly radioactive substances.

"The company has donated the sludge to the OAEP and we now have it in possession," Suchat announced.

"There is uranium contamination, but very little in quantity and most of it is Uranium-238.

"The level of radioactivity is not considered dangerous for anyone. Its concentration is below the standard set by the Atomic Energy for Peace Act of 1960."

The press release did not mention the exact amount of radioactive material in the sludge. According to an amendment to the law, those importing material containing 15 percent or more of uranium or thorium must obtain a licence from the Atomic Energy Commission.

The press release explained that 99.28 percent of uranium found in nature is Uranium-238. Uranium-235, which makes up only 0.71 percent of the isotopes found naturally, is the type that is used in nuclear reactors and to make bombs. The other uranium isotope found in nature is Uranium-234, it said.

It had not previously been known that isotopes other than Uranium-238 were present in the sludge.

"The office will use the material for research," the report explained.

Suchat also asserted that the uranium boxes reportedly being smuggled into Thailand from Cambodia are not dangerous.

"From our experience—we have come across this kind of box twice before—we have found they contain depleted uranium [Uranium-238] and have very low radioactivity," Suchat maintained.

He also explained that when Uranium-235 (or enriched uranium) is extracted for use from natural uranium, the remainder is called depleted uranium. It is considered very cheap, he said.

**Waste Company To Lose Import License**

*BK1802054394 Bangkok THE NATION in English  
18 Feb 94 p A2*

[Text] Government officials announced yesterday that they will revoke the import licence granted to a firm which has brought in nearly 3,000 kg of hazardous waste contaminated by radioactivity from the US.

The amount of radioactivity released by the materials already imported has not actually been measured but both company and state officials believe the concentrations of radioactive elements are so low as to pose no danger to public health.

However, for safety's sake, the materials will reportedly be transported to Bangkok today to be used by the Office of Atomic Energy for Peace (OAEP).

Thai Tantalum Co Ltd imported the waste last year as raw material for the extraction of tantalum pentoxide and columbium pentoxide—used to make electronic capacitors—at its factory in the Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate.

But company president Yut Eamsa-at said it was only a "free sample" and had not been used because it was low-grade. He agreed yesterday not to import any more of the substance.

Officials from the Department of Industrial Works' Office of Hazardous Substances (OHS) were informed about the shipment and issued Thai Tantalum an import licence. But they were not told that it contained radioactive substances, or that it came from a hazardous waste site.

"We believe Thai Tantalum was just looking for cheap raw materials and they are not interested in importing any more of the waste," OHS Director Virah Mavichak said yesterday. "The amount of radioactivity is believed to be low, but we are unhappy that it came from a waste site. So we will revoke the import licence."

According to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) documents, the shipment originated from a hazardous waste site in Muskogee, Oklahoma which contains roughly 21 tonnes of thorium and nine tonnes of uranium, both highly radioactive substances. The waste site belongs to Fansteel Inc, a former producer of tantalum and columbium products which now supplies Thai Tantalum with technical expertise.

Thai Tantalum officials yesterday could not say for sure how much radioactive material was in the waste brought into Thailand. According to Jim Hill, a former employee of Fansteel now working as Thai Tantalum's lab manager, the thorium and uranium were unevenly distributed through Fansteel's sludge ponds, which were "the size of a football field" and contained 13.4 million kg of mostly solid waste.

An X-ray analysis of the imported materials carried out by Hill revealed with "90 percent certainty" that uranium and thorium made up less than 0.2 percent of the sludge, or 5.5 kg. He said some of the standards needed to carry out the analysis were lacking.

However, Thai Tantalum has never actually measured the radioactivity of the imported materials, or of the estimated 60 kg of radioactive materials it puts in its state-of-the-art landfill every day, because it does not have a geiger counter.

But Yut sought to assure the public that the low concentrations of radioactive material, combined with the factory's hi-tech waste treatment system, meant that the area was safe. The company's former plant in Phuket was burned to the ground in 1986 by protestors afraid of being exposed to radioactivity.

**BRAZIL****Government Agrees To Comply With Missile Control Pact***PY1502133794 Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL in Portuguese 12 Feb 94 p 3**[Article by Raquel Stenzel from Brasilia]*

[Text] The Brazilian Government is willing to comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines. In an official document, the government admitted that the implementation of the MTCR guidelines does not imply any sort of limitation on special national programs or harm international cooperation in such programs. In addition, the government commits itself to complying with export control rules compatible with the MTCR guidelines as soon as draft bill No. 2535/92 takes effect.

This decision, which was announced 11 February, befits the efforts made by the Brazilian Government in the last few weeks to show the international community that the country is contributing to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and that its nuclear and aerospace programs have strictly peaceful objectives. Thus, the government believes it has taken one more step toward obtaining sensitive technology.

**Complexity of Nuclear Accord Approval Viewed***PY1102203394 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 9 Feb 94 Section 1 p 3*

[Article by Senator Dirceu Carneiro, Brazilian Social Democracy Party-Santa Catarina State, who coordinated the nuclear safeguards bill and is the Budget Committee's second vice president]

[Text] The executive branch's position regarding nuclear safeguards has been causing controversy in the national media, which has been unable, so far, to supply society with useful and clarifying information on the issue. The nuclear safeguards are being examined by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, but it is a complex matter and demands that the Foreign Ministry hold exhaustive negotiations at the international level.

The consequences of signing this sort of treaty are, theoretically, permanent in the history of a country. Before signing it, therefore, society must meditate and debate the issue and the government must disseminate information on it. In such cases, the legislative branch digests all the information and assigns to it the period of political and social time required to allow all areas of society to give their opinion on the issue. It is legitimate that the legislative branch does so: It is its right and duty.

Brazil did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (TNP), and will not do it in the future either, considering it discriminatory and unfair. The Brazilian Constitution, however, forbids the construction of atomic bombs, and I believe Brazil is the only country to have done so. Nonetheless, the international community conveniently included Brazil in the group of countries that did not sign the TNP because they do not have the bomb, side by side

with India, Pakistan, and Israel. It thus punished the country and made it difficult for us to have access to sensitive technologies.

To overcome this discrimination, Brazil and Argentina created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC), which is a regional agency similar to the EC's Euratom. The establishment of ABACC and the signature of the Quadripartite Accord by Brazil, Argentina, ABACC, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reduced foreign pressure on Brazil and allowed it to join the international community.

To comply with these agreements, we must offer guarantees to the safeguards but we also can prevent foreign organizations, which comprise more than 85 countries and have differing interests, from using the "special surveys" argument and harming our country. These agreements may be used as tools to exert political pressure over matters absolutely unrelated to nuclear energy. This is what we want to prevent by better analyzing the text of the safeguards agreement.

So far, we have corrected certain vague parts of the text of the Supplement Adjustments to the Quadripartite Accord on control of nuclear energy use. All the Senate has to do now is approve the agreement, and it probably will do it without difficulties.

Anyway, the world already expected Brazil to adopt the safeguards. This is why I deem absurd the news reported by the press, which I believe to be fake news proposed by a lobby [preceding word in English], that Germany plans to break the nuclear agreement signed with Brazil and oppose our participation in the UN Security Council, unless we approve the Quadripartite Accord and the Tlatelolco Treaty.

Our agreement with the Germans, which is independent, already contemplates safeguards with Germany. The Germans have no relation whatsoever with the Tlatelolco Treaty, which is a regional agreement. The Quadripartite Accord, however, is a claim by the entire developed world that, through the news of an alleged threat by the Germans, seems to be interested in exerting pressure on Brazil to transform it into a captive market.

Nowadays, there is a basic problem that must be solved before the safeguards are voted on. Otherwise, we may take from Brazil its right to sovereignty. We must eliminate an amendment to the Tlatelolco Treaty that forbids the construction and use of atomic weapons in Latin America because it clashes with one of the objectives Brazil sought to maintain in the text of the Quadripartite Accord, i.e., the prohibition on conducting special surveys based on charges made in the national territory. The amendment that must be eliminated allows this sort of survey.

Through this amendment, the IAEA experts could come to Brazil to survey any facility, reported or not to IAEA, and take possession of industrial information that could be used to stop our development. Learning about progress in a specific research project, the developed countries could harm Brazil by failing to transfer technology to us that

would allow us to advance in that research and begin manufacturing the same products they do. As a result of commercial interests and other sorts of interests, these countries would struggle to maintain international preservation of their products.

These concerns, which are known to all Brazilians, have been guiding the Brazilian Foreign Affairs Committee's analysis of the issue.

The first positive result of this position was Brazil's obtaining the approval of the Supplemental Adjustments even before ratification of the quadripartite agreement. This gave acknowledged, obvious benefits to Brazil.

Other results were the formal statements by the IAEA and the Organization to Ban Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), confirming that the supplemental adjustments of the quadripartite agreement apply to the Tlatelolco Treaty. The text of the Tlatelolco Treaty, unlike that of the quadripartite agreement, permits inspections in any country under suspicion. After the Persian Gulf war, this instrument became a dangerous tool used by the IAEA, especially for inspections prompted by the pressing of charges, a method that is unacceptable to Brazil.

The responsibility of Congress is to obtain the best for Brazil. Despite the desires of some government officials, who are efficiently lobbying through the press, we will not deliberate before the matter is fully clarified. Ratifying the treaty—which has already been signed—one week earlier or one week later will make no difference. Consequently, the Brazilian position has been clearly outlined to the international community; it is a fact. Within this context, ratifying and adjusting are mere details.

#### Missile Expert Piva's Return Viewed

PY1902181894 Sao Paulo ISTOE in Portuguese  
16 Feb 94 pp 58, 59

[Article written by Jayme Brener with the cooperation of Helio Contreiras in Rio de Janeiro and Otto Sarkis in Brasilia: "Dr. Von Braun's Return"]

[Text] H.O.P. are three letters that stand for pure dynamite. They are the initials of Lieutenant Brigadier Hugo de Oliveira Piva, the father of the Brazilian space program and of half a dozen domestic missile projects. His name stirred a great deal of controversy in the 1980's when he went to work for Iraq's Saddam Husayn with Brasilia's concurrence, although such concurrence was never fully assumed. Well, the man behind these three letters is back. At 67, and retired since 1987, Piva is quietly serving as an informal adviser—although without pay—for two of his old projects, which were resuscitated in recent months through new doses of government funds. These projects are the MAA-1 Piranha (an air-to-air missile) and the MSS 1.2 (surface-to-surface missile).

Piva knows that his name, or just his initials, has been at the center of one of the worst controversies in the history of Brazilian-U.S. relations. The fact is that Uncle Sam has never forgiven him for his cooperation with Saddam Husayn, who was thrashed in 1991 during the Gulf war on

an initiative of the White House. To avoid further friction, "the brigadier"—Piva's nickname—has not put his signature on any of these projects and, officially, he continues to work as an international dealer of a large number of products ranging from black pepper to machine tools. This is a rather sad job for someone having two doctorate degrees—in aeronautics and applied mathematics—from foreign universities and who had become known as "Brazil's Dr. Von Braun," in reference to German scientist Wernher von Braun, the pioneer of aerospace research in the United States. Yet, Piva's dream is to be able to come back through the front door to the field of arms manufacturing or to the Brazilian aerospace program. Speaking to ISTOE, he said that he might be able to do that during the next government "if it is favorable to resuming the material, aeronautics, and nuclear industries given their role in promoting development and national sovereignty."

Piva said: "I view the resumption of Brazilian missile projects with satisfaction and reassurance because these projects will promote advanced technology—which is essential for the progress of any nation—in every area." He added: "After all, I regard these projects as my children whom I used to hold on my lap." To a certain extent, he still holds them. The Aeronautics Ministry has entrusted the development of the Piranha project—under an \$8.8 million contract—to the Mectron Engineering Company, which is based in Sao Jose dos Campos [Sao Paulo State], without a prior bidding process in light of its being highly specialized in the field. Working for Mectron are Piva's "scientific children," that is, a handful of researchers who worked with him after graduating from the tough Aeronautical Technology Institute (ITA) and participated in the early stages of the Piranha project. They followed the brigadier to two missile factories: Orbita, a mixed company, and Avibras [Avibras Aerospace Industry, Inc.] a private company. Then, in 1989, they left for Iraq. Their mission was to develop an air-to-air missile. Those who turned to the dictionary to look up the word for piranha in Arabic—if there is one—made the right move. They all had a humiliating return to Brazil as the Brazilian Government was aligned with the anti-Saddam alliance and denied any responsibility concerning the work of the scientists. Piva said: "The Collor de Mello government was dominated by foreign interests and needed a scapegoat."

Following the Iraqi affair, the leading members of the team of researchers created Mectron while Piva announced his retirement. In 1992, Mectron obtained a contract with the Army to complete the MSS 1.2 surface-to-surface missile, which is now being tested. Piva helped them secretly. Now, Mectron—which has a little more than 30 employees—is grabbing a slice of the Piranha project. Mectron Technical Director Renato Zanetta declines to comment on his ties with his mentor. According to Major Brigadier Nelson Taveira, director of the Aerospace Technical Center (CTA), "Piva has nothing to do with this project." Yet, the man whose initials are H.O.P. has given Mectron—in addition to his expert advice—papers, sketches, and diagrams of the Iraqi Al-Piranha. All this was done secretly because Hugo de Oliveira Piva, a retired lieutenant brigadier earning the equivalent of \$1,400 monthly, continues

to quietly run his company Spaceplus from an office located above a lingerie store in downtown Sao Jose.

The award of contracts to Mectron, a company that is very close to Piva's heart, would then be a well-earned acknowledgement of the work of somebody who has been racking his brain to produce missiles, wouldn't it? This is what the majority of the military involved in the project believe. But insiders in the military hardware industry, who are already "hot-tempered" by nature, are even more troubled. The sharpest thrusts come from Avibras, at present the only manufacturer of rockets in the country, also located in Sao Jose. Avibras Vice President Rubens Porto contends that "our advice has not been sought for the development of the Piranha missile, but if we were consulted we would have alternative projects." Major Brigadier Jose Marcone, deputy chairman of the Brazilian Commission of Space Activities, adds that "Avibras was not interested in the Piranha." An engineer satirizes: "The truth is that Avibras was never able to recover from the killing off of scientists made by Piva there."

Piva and Avibras have not been on speaking terms for a long time. In 1991, when the company entered into composition with its creditors, Piva was hired by a bank to make an estimation of the equipment offered by the company as collateral for the payment of its debts. When Piva went to the Avibras' facilities, which have very strict security control, he presented himself as "engineer Hugo de Oliveira." When Avibras managers saw their rival on the premises they got the fright of their life. From there to pressing charges of industrial espionage there was only one step.

Piva smiles when talking about this incident. His smile vanishes when he recalls that in spite of being the father of the renaissance in the Brazilian missile industry, the latter is far from being the apple of his eye. His real pet answers to the name of V.L.S., satellite launching vehicle, a project that goes back to the 1970's but that was hamstrung by lack of funds. Last year, however, the project was revived because the government promised to invest \$40 million in the sector in the next three years. It is estimated that the V.L.S. will be launched in 1995 carrying a satellite that will also be of Brazilian make.

The only thing is that the acronym V.L.S.—as well as the initials H.O.P.—is tantamount to having problems with the United States because Brazil is not a signatory to the

international treaty on the control of missile production. The Brazilian Government guarantees that the V.L.S. project—which is being developed by the newly set up Bahia Space Agency since the end of January—is a purely civilian endeavor—green and yellow [the colors of the Brazilian flag] and not olive green. Notwithstanding this, the White House mistrusts Brazil given the fact that whoever has the know-how for launching satellites may very well launch a military missile having a range of 1,000 km. The United States is also suspicious of all the other countries that have refused to sign the aforementioned treaty, namely India, Pakistan, South Africa, and Iraq itself. U.S. military have gone as far as hinting that Piva may have used the V.L.S. technology to upgrade Iraq's Scud missiles. By using its clout, the U.S. Government did its utmost to delay the Brazilian aerospace project. Its last bid for delaying it was to ban Brazil from having access to inertial platforms, the devices that guide the rocket. Piva and Brigadier Taveira from the CTA argue that the problem has already been overcome. A CTA official notes, in a state of euphoria that "we have even managed to buy a computer for the rocket from the United Kingdom, a faithful ally of the United States." "We thought that they were not going to deliver it," he added. The most skeptical ones, however, contend that the satellite launcher still has many shortcomings and that the frequently claimed self-sufficiency is all but designed to lure possible suppliers of the necessary equipment.

If the Brazilian aerospace program is already facing difficulties, one can very well imagine how it fared after Piva's signature. Even though he has many friends and disciples at the CTA of Sao Jose dos Campos, Piva tries to avoid even coming close to the center. As a friend of his notes, "his face shines when he talks about the V.L.S." As soon as he starts working on exportation and importation, Piva's thoughts wander to what is in store for him. He does not rule out the possibility of wearing a researcher's overall. H.O.P. says he does not support any candidacy in particular, but concedes that "Lula's [Luis Inacio da Silva] PT [Workers Party] has supported the development of the military hardware industry, which is precisely what I have always defended." In conclusion, he says: "I could go back to that area if I were asked to do so by a government that follows those guidelines, whether it represented the PT or any other party."

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Committee on Weapons-Free Middle East Opens Meetings

NC2002181794 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1540 GMT  
20 Feb 94

[Text] Cairo, 20 Feb (MENA)—An Arab League committee discussing means of turning the Middle East to an area free from weapons of mass destruction began its meetings at the Arab League today.

Dr. Nu'man Jalal, chairman of the committee and Egypt's permanent delegate to the Arab League, said that the committee has prepared a paper that it will present to the next session of the Arab League Council, due to be held on 27 March. The paper contains a plan to coordinate Arab efforts through various international forums with a view to stressing the importance of creating a zone that is free from mass destruction weapons in the Middle East.

Dr. Jalal said that the plan incorporates various elements in the Arab position, foremost of which is the desire to end the arms race in the region and its security and economic repercussions. Resources currently used to stockpile arms should be diverted to boost economic development programs and modernize the region's economies, Dr. Jalal stated.

Dr. Jalal added that the committee stressed the need for all the countries in the region to be treated equally, with no exceptions made for any.

### Former Indian AEC Chief Downplays Pakistan Nuclear Capability

BK1802100394 Delhi INDIAN EXPRESS in English  
11 Feb 94 p 9

[Article by Kamendra Kanwar]

[Text] Bombay—Former Atomic Energy Commission [AEC] chairman Homi N. Sethna has described a "absolute hogwash" recent reports that Pakistan has acquired nuclear weapon capability and that the Indian subcontinent was "a screwdriver's turn" away from a nuclear holocaust twice in the last seven years.

In an interview with INDIAN EXPRESS Sethna who was AEC chief from 1972 to 1983 during which time the country exploded an experimental nuclear device at Pokhran in Rajasthan said contrary to Pakistan's claims, it had not been able to achieve more than 60 per cent uranium enrichment with the centrifuge technology that it had acquired.

The enrichment required for gas to be converted into bombgrade heavy metal was at least 90 per cent, he pointed out.

Besides, it had never seriously taken the plutonium path whereas India had started reprocessing plutonium way back in 1967-68.

Sethna said the Americans were given to exaggeration and it suited Pakistan to be seen as a burgeoning nuclear power in the region for domestic political reasons.

While contending that India was way ahead of Pakistan in the nuclear field he denied that it ever had aggressive intentions. Reacting to the reported claim by an American journalist William E. Burrows in his book Critical Mass that Indira Gandhi had made elaborate plans to bomb Pakistan's Kahuta enrichment plant before she was assassinated in 1984 he said this was a blatant lie.

Being in a vantage position in the AEC and the Government there was no way such a plan could have escaped his attention, he added.

Asked how he felt now about the 1974 Pokhran blast as he looked back, Sethna said he was confused as to what purpose was served in exploding a device and then not following it up. "We should have gone flat out, acquired the status of a nuclear power and bargained for a place in the Security Council," he said with authority.

Reacting to a question on how secure Bombay's nuclear installations were from enemy air attacks, Sethna said the Cyrus and Dhruva reactors as also the plutonium reprocessing facilities were well protected. However, the radio metallurgy and radio chemistry labs in the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre were vulnerable.

Queried about the possibility of a nuclear arms race in Asia in the wake of North Korea's acquisition of nuclear capability he said American attempts to bring the North Koreans to heel were in order.

However, reports about US plans to supply Scud missiles to South Korea were disturbing.

The Scuds were proved ineffective during the Gulf War and any effort to arm South Korea with them would fuel suspicions that the US is pandering to its strong arms suppliers lobby.

## INDIA

### Report Says Agni Missile Test Met All Objectives

BK2102061294 Delhi Doordarshan Television Network  
in English 1630 GMT 20 Feb 94

[Text] The Defense Research and Development Organization has described yesterday's successful test firing of the Agni missile as a technology achievement. It said the indigenously developed surface-to-surface intermediate-range missile, which was launched from Chandipur in Orissa yesterday evening, met all the test objectives. A report issued on the flight today said the third flight of the Agni validated the innovative indigenous design feature aimed at testing the longer range and advanced maneuverability during the reentry phase. The flight tested the high thermal and structural capability of the vehicle which undergoes great stress at the reentry stage while moving at a hypersonic speed. The reentry stage takes place at about 30 km above the earth surface and the outside of the vehicle gets heated to about 3,000 degree Celsius. However, the inside temperature of the vehicle is maintained at

40 degree Celsius. The Defense Ministry release said that the Agni payload performed to the design specifications with great accuracy. It was a fiery spectacle as it hit the target. The successful test reaffirmed the country's capability in advanced technology.

#### **Capabilities, Advantage of Prithvi Missile Noted**

*94WP0064C Madras THE HINDU in English  
27 Jan 94 p 6*

[Text] New Delhi, Jan. 26—A new dimension has been added to the defence and technological capabilities with the induction of the Prithvi missile in the country's arsenal.

Integrated in the regiment of artillery three months ago, the missile was for the first time on display at the Republic Day parade here. Operational control of the Prithvi will be shared by the Army and the Air Force.

Developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in the teeth of Western opposition, this achievement is all the more striking. The United States has led the campaign against India's missile programme and its 'concerns' on Indian missilery including the Prithvi were clearly stated during the visit to the United States in August by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. J.N. Dixit.

With accuracy being one of its key features, the Prithvi can strike assigned targets deep inside enemy territory. The missile's range is restricted to 150 kms while carrying a heavier warhead. But, when the maximum load of one tonne is halved, it can strike at 250 km.

With the minimum weight of a nuclear warhead estimated at 500 kg, India can thus, theoretically, deliver a nuclear strike. But with a national decision not to develop nuclear weapons, the missile is expected to be used only in a conventional conflict. The missile's high accuracy is meant to deliver conventional explosives effectively.

However, the country is far from obtaining a permanent military edge over nations such as Pakistan. Without integrating other missile systems (it is now developing the 2,000 km Agni IRBM along with the Akash, Trishul, and Nag missiles), India will have to contend with a formidable Pakistani missile arsenal.

Aided by China and France in the past, Pakistan is actively developing its own missile armoury. In the Hatf series of Pakistani missiles, the Hatf-2 is nearing completion. When deploying a conventional warhead, the missile has the capacity of reaching Delhi. Progress on the Hatf-3 adds to India's worry. Capable of reaching distances up to 800 km, it can deliver a nuclear warhead. Hatf-3 may be in Pakistani arsenals by 1995. The transfer of Chinese M-11 missiles to Pakistan reinforces India's apprehensions. With a range of 290 km the nuclear missile can release a 800 kg warhead.

**New technology:** Developed by the Integrated Guided Missile Development Board since 1983, the Prithvi possesses important new technologies. The originality of the missile's design and packages are evident for there are few

similarities with other contemporary delivery systems. Its success may help to finetune the Agni systems.

Aimed at providing strength without making the missile heavy, the Prithvi's frame is made from locally developed light aluminium alloys and magnesium alloys are used for the wings. Light aluminium alloys go into the making of the propellant tanks. Once the propellants are filled the tanks can be sealed.

With focus initially on testing the reliability and guidance of the missile, the first trials began in 1988. An on-board computer carries out the task of the Prithvi's guidance and flight control. It also checks out sequences before and after the launch. Related to accuracy, the missile's guidance was continuously tested.

But when the missile strayed from its flight path in one of the tests, its aerodynamic controls were critically reviewed. Later tests were carried out to ensure that the correction was made fool-proof.

Powered by two rocket motors, the missile's engine also assist providing forward, lateral and roll motion to the missile. Hydraulic actuators provide the force to the engines and tail fins facilitating aerodynamic control. Developed and integrated by the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL), the development of the software packages is considered a major national achievement.

Proving its mobility, some of the later tests saw the missile being successfully fired from a eight-wheeled truck.

#### **Article Views Capability of Pechora Missile**

*BK1602141694 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES  
in English 12 Feb 94 p 5*

[Text] New Delhi, Feb. 11—The 'life-line' of air defence is Pechora missile and the No. 7 Base Repair Depot at Tughlaqabad keeps the missile system at optimal operational capability by carrying out regular maintenance, according to Air Commodore P.K. Ghosh, Air Officer Commanding, Tughlaqabad Air Force base.

Explaining the working of the base to a group of journalists who were taken round the depot here today, he said, "In the present geopolitical scenario missiles are of paramount importance".

The one-ton, six-metre long Pechora missile which is the most sophisticated is completely stripped to its individual parts along with the launcher and the missile guidance radar (MGR) as also the instruments in its control cabin.

About 750 personnel of the 1,200 at the base work on the different parts which are divided into as many as 300 sub-assemblies each having thousands of parts.

The guided missile can look onto the enemy aircraft and going at the speed of Mach-4 (four times the speed of sound) around 13200 metre per second destroys enemy aircraft within 11 to 17 kilometre.

The life of the missile is 49 second and if it does not hit the target within that time it goes straight up and destroys itself.

The launchers are so synchronised that the radar and the missile simultaneously point towards the direction of the enemy aircraft.

As the target (hostile aircraft) is tracked by the MGR, the missile is automatically pointed towards the target. The entire operations being controlled from the control cabin of MGR where one can spot the hostile aircraft as a 'blip' as soon as it comes within the range of the radar. After tracking the aircraft the missiles electronically home on to the target.

The missile's range is 25 kilometre but generally the hit is made at a distance of 11 to 17 kilometre.

Once the missile homes on to the target then a kind of electronic relationship is established between the missile and the target and the movement of the missile continues to be guided by that of the aircraft automatically by a command guidance system. So the question of the enemy aircraft manoeuvring and escaping does not arise, as the missile remains continuously latched on to it.

The decision to launch the missile is taken by the alert IAF [Indian Air Force] officers depending on the combat considerations and the 'launch' button is pressed when the aircraft is well within the kill zone.

At a time when the radio signals being received from the aircraft by the missile become very high crossing a pre-determined threshold (showing the missile is close to the target) the missile automatically explodes its warhead which consists of metal pieces.

The explosion which is caused about 300 metre away from the aircraft forms a kind of spherical cloudburst of metallic pieces which the aircraft cannot avoid and goes straight into it. Being hit by the shrapnels at supersonic speeds the aircraft is usually destroyed or severely damaged.

The kill probability of hostile aircraft is of the order of 100 per cent.

The MGR has been provided with necessary anti-jamming protection to effectively function even when jammed.

Two generators supply the power to the missile system so that if one fails the system can function without disruption.

The radar also has a television camera which can visually track the aircraft even at distance of 25 kilometre and supply visual data on a television screen inside the MGR so that if for some reason the radars don't give the signals automatically then manually trackers can track the aircraft with the visual input and fire the missile.

First and second line maintenance is carried out by the Squadron in the field and the third and fourth line repair (medium repair) as well as defect repairs beyond the squadrons capabilities are carried out here.

On induction equipment is stripped, examined by specialist tradesmen at the production wings under close

supervision of specialist officers and quality assurance inspectors to access the quantum of deterioration and the quantum of work spares required to carry out the medium repair as per schedule of repair technology prepared by the manufacturers. The logistics support wing caters for the timely provisions of the spares/materials to undertake repairs by production shops.

The components of stripped down equipment pass through a series of medium repair operation, which include cleaning, washing, painting, cabin repairs, repair of electrical and electronic components, replacement of mandatory items and defective components, assembly of panel and checks against standard equipment (Stand Tuning), assembly of main equipment, functional test for serviceability, and endurance test for reliability of the equipment.

On completion of all the operations, all self-systems of the Pechora Missile System is connected together and comprehensive test of the system as a whole is carried out. On successful completion of this comprehensive test, Directorate of Air Staff Inspection carry out a thorough functional check of the complete Missile System as it would be deployed and used in a Squadron and it declares it fit to operational use.

As the missile is of Soviet origin, efforts are also being made to procure spares of Indian origin.

#### **Further Reportage on Cryogenic Rocket Deal With Russia**

##### **Rao Remarks to Press**

*94WP0066A Hyderabad DECCAN CHRONICLE in English 28 Jan 94 p 12*

[Text] Bangalore, Jan 27 (UNI)—The chairman of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Prof U.R. Rao, said on Thursday that Russia had expressed its inability to go ahead with the transfer of technology on the controversial cryogenic rocket engines.

Talking to newsmen at the inauguration of a private company set up for manufacturing hybrid micro devices which could find application in the realm of space, Prof Rao said discussions were on between the Russian Space Agency, Glavkosmos, and the ISRO on the cryogenic engines deal, and that something had to be evolved to the satisfaction of all. Asked if he was satisfied with the discussions, Prof Rao said if he was happy, he would have said so.

The ISRO chief said efforts were on to build the cryogenic engines indigenously and added that he was confident that the Indian engines would be ready by 1998.

ISRO had already built a one tonne sub-scale cryogenic engine at its Mahendragiri facility.

Facilities for testing the cryogenic engines were being readied, he added.

Prof. Rao said ISRO would not pay a rupee more than Rs 235 crore to Glavkosmos for the cryogenic engine deal,

whatever may be the outcome of discussions now underway. Nothing will stop us from building our own facilities, he asserted.

Prof Rao said ISRO had not approached the General Dynamics Inc. (of the United States), the Arianespace or the Glavkosmos for the knowhow on cryogenic engines. These organisations had contacted the ISRO and the Russian offer was accepted when the Arianespace bid was about to be placed before the Union Cabinet.

He said the technology embargo slapped by the United States on the ISRO (for alleged violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime) was nothing new, for such "unpronounced embargos" existed much before the cryo-deal was struck with Russia.

### Questions About Deal

94WP0066B Madras *THE HINDU* in English 7 Jan 94  
p 6

[Text] Thiruvananthapuram, Jan. 6—Amid reports that Russia has offered India two additional cryogenic stages, but not the technology, for its next generation Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV), there are questions about how far such a renegotiated contract would benefit India.

The Rs. 235-crore contract signed by the Indian Space Research Organisation with Glavkosmos of Russia in January 1991 had been for the supply of two cryogenic stages and transfer of technology. The United States objected to the deal, insisting that it violated the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and in May 1992 imposed a two-year embargo on the ISRO and Glavkosmos. Under the U.S. pressure, Russia invoked the force majeure clause and informed the Government of India in July last year that Glavkosmos would not transfer cryogenic technology or production equipment.

In a press interview at the time, the ISRO Chairman, Prof U.R. Rao, had asserted that India was not interested in mere engines. The sale of engines without the accompanying transfer of technology was meaningless, he said. When a Glavkosmos team, led by its head, Mr. Alexander Dunayev, was in Bangalore last month to renegotiate the deal, there were reports doing the rounds in ISRO circles that India would get additional cryogenic engines, but not the technology. Official ISRO sources had refused to confirm or deny these reports.

But a recent agency report from Moscow, quoting Mr. Yuri Koptev, head of the Russian Space Agency, said cryogenic technology would not be transferred and India could get two additional cryogenic stages instead. This report has since been confirmed by highly reliable ISRO sources.

**Russian interests:** If these new terms are agreed to—the renegotiated deal is reportedly yet to be finalised—Russia would have effectively safeguarded its interests. Russia has completed a considerable part of the development of the cryogenic engine and stage, and is said to have received Rs. 102 crores from India. Had India decided to cancel the deal, this development effort would have been wasted and

Russia might have had to pay compensation as well. The new deal would allow Russia to salvage the contract in return for two additional stages.

The ISRO's acceptance of additional cryogenic stages, in lieu of technology appears motivated by a desire to avoid delays in developing cryogenic technology indigenously. The initial GSLVs would be launched with Russian cryogenic stages and indigenous development pursued alongside. The indigenous cryogenic stage could be ready in five years if there were no hitches, said one senior ISRO expert. But he also agreed that such hitches were common in cryogenic engine development and that other countries had taken twice as long. There is also said to be a provision for India to buy more cryogenic stages from Russia if indigenous development was not completed in time.

**Cost factor:** An important issue that will have to be considered is the cost. Under the earlier contract, the Rs.235 crores would have got India two stages as well as the technology to make the cryogenic engines and stages. The same money would now get India four stages. That works out to nearly Rs. 60 crores for each stage, the cost of an entire Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV). If more stages have to be bought, as they very well might be, that would push up the bill still further. There is no information available as yet on how much these cryogenic stages would cost. In addition, the ISRO will have to find the money to fund its own indigenous effort, which could cost Rs. 500 crores or more.

A crucial assumption appears to be that the GSLV can be launched, as earlier planned, in 1995-96. But with last year's failure of the PSLV as well as delays in the GSLV development programme, it is more likely that the GSLV will fly only by 1998, according to ISRO experts themselves. If the indigenous cryogenic engine can be developed in five years as the ISRO claims, it should be possible to wait one more year and launch an entirely indigenous GSLV. The Russian cryogenic stages would then not be needed at all.

### Self-Sufficiency in Nuclear Fuel Rod Production Achieved

BK1302102894 Delhi *Doordarshan Television Network* in English 1630 GMT 13 Feb 94

[Text] The Hyderabad-based nuclear fuel complex has achieved a record production of 100,000 nuclear fuel rods. India is the fourth country in the world to have this capability.

[Begin correspondent Sanjiv Thomas recording] India has achieved self-sufficiency in the manufacture of nuclear fuel rods for power reactors. The Hyderabad-based nuclear fuel complex has to date produced 100,000 of these fuel bundles. These rods are made from uranium oxide, a zirconium alloy [as heard]. They are used for producing power in pressurized heavy water reactors. India is the fourth country to achieve this capability. The monthly production of these rods is about 1,200, but it will soon touch 1,500. These rods are used at a rate of 2,000 per year at each nuclear reactor. India has seven running reactors

and five are under construction. The nuclear fuel complex chairman, Dr. C. Ramrao, today released 100,000 nuclear fuel bundles at a function at Hyderabad this afternoon. [end recording]

### **Nuclear Reactor Operation, Plans Reviewed**

94WP0064F Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA  
in English 15 Jan 94 p 10

[Text] Bombay, January 14—The first research reactor, Apsara, commissioned in 1956 and operating satisfactorily, will be converted into a heavy water reflected core reactor to improve its utility.

This will also give the reactor a new lease of life and serve as technology stimulation for the design of a 510 MWt multi-purpose research reactor which has been developed by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre recently, according to Dr. R. Chidambaram, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

In his inaugural speech to the three-day, first annual symposium on "Ageing management of nuclear facilities" here today, he said the enormous cost of addition of new capacity and the lack of cleared sites for new nuclear power plants had made planners think of extending the operation of existing nuclear power plants and pilot plant studies had been initiated in a big way abroad.

Continued operation of the existing nuclear power plants as long as it was safe and economical to do so should be an important element in any nation's energy strategy to meet their growing need for electrical power, he said. (His speech was read out in his absence.)

He said the second research reactor, Cirus, (40MWt) would be shut down for about one year for execution of refurbishing programme as during recent years excessive maintenance efforts were needed on some of the components due to ageing-related degradation. It was commissioned in 1960. With refurbishing, its useful life was expected to be extended by 10 to 15 years, or even more.

The Tarapur atomic power station (TAPS) commissioned in 1969 had not yet run its normal full course of design life. Dr. Chidambaram said studies should be undertaken to understand the ageing mechanism of critical components of this nuclear plant and methods of assessing the residual life which will be based on vigorous inspections being carried out.

Referring to stoppage of fuel supply from abroad along with the embargo put earlier on the supply of critical spares for TAPS, as it completes 25 years, the AEC chairman said the problems were being tackled by way of development of Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel to continue operation and also by undertaking development of certain critical spares with the help of Indian industries as also in-house development work in DAE establishments. Results of studies had shown that TAPS could be operated for up to 40 full power years.

As regards ageing management of TAPS was concerned, critical components and ageing mechanisms to which each was subjected to had been categorised. A criteria had been

evolved to categorise a component as critical, based on its potential to cause spreading of radiation within the site and beyond the plant boundaries, if it were to fail abruptly.

Incorporation of special design features in new plants was being considered towards easy replacement of such critical components. The reactor vessel was the main critical component.

Components of the pressurised heavy water reactors were also being studied.

Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan, chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, delivering the topical address, outlined the technical requirements for safety assessment of ageing nuclear power stations and steps to identify the critical structures and components.

He lauded the R&D efforts at BARC and the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research at Kalpakkam in bringing about an understanding of complex phenomena associated with ageing of nuclear facilities and in the development of tools and techniques to measure and mitigate these effects. AREB would like the department of atomic energy to promote increased involvement of academic institutions, national research institutes and industry to accelerate the progress of such work.

Mr. A.N. Prasad, director, BARC, noted that more than 400 nuclear power reactors were operational in the world, producing nearly 16 per cent of the total electricity generated globally.

By the turn of the century, 160 to 170 nuclear power reactors of different designs would have reached a service life of 25 years, or more. A very large number of research reactors would also have reached the end of their service life by then, awaiting decommissioning.

He said ageing related issues were under critical examination in the R&D studies of several organisations. BARC had undertaken a systematic study of identification of critical materials, components and systems of the pressurised heavy water reactors as well as the severity of operating and environmental stresses. Several techniques and software had been developed and were being applied for condition monitoring notable among them being current signatures for motor-operated valves in the emergency core cooling system and vibration signatures for the pumps in the coolant circuits and surface temperature of electrical systems to mention a few.

Mr. S.K. Chatterjee, managing director of Nuclear Power Corporation, said the safety levels of nuclear power plants were not deteriorating with age because of the continued monitoring and assessment being made and the required level of safety met at all times. He, however, said while dealing with the issue of ageing management of nuclear plant one had to keep in mind the fact that public acceptance was likely to play a significant role in plant life cycle decision-making.

Internationally, the ageing issue especially of nuclear power plants was assuming a great importance. The nuclear energy agency of the Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development had created an international expert working group on plant life management to achieve a systematic and higher level collaboration among its member countries in Europe on these issues.

## IRAN

### Deputy Foreign Minister Addresses UN Disarmament Institute

LD1602112094 Tehran IRNA in English 1029 GMT  
16 Feb 94

[Text] Tehran, Feb. 16, IRNA—A morning daily here Wednesday quoted a senior Iranian official as saying that it is contention of the Persian Gulf countries that a peace process as distinguished from a process of force, intimidation, suppression, submission and surrender has never been embarked upon in the region.

The English daily TERHAN TIMES quoted Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif who addressed the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva Tuesday.

Referring to "a few" countries succumbing to the will of the big powers, Zarif said such actions instead of leading to peace and stability will only entrench the same threat perceptions which will lead to "further insecurity and instability."

The "past erroneous approaches and perceptions" deter the common attempts "towards a better world order", the daily quoted Zarif as saying.

He proposed the creation of a forum by Persian Gulf countries to discuss "security issues, threat perceptions and other concerns", the paper added.

Zarif deliberated on the fundamental issues related to regional security and to the long-term peace prospects, the daily noted.

The paper concluded by saying that he mainly discussed the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, specially nuclear, and advocated the creation of a zone free of such weapons.

**Tehran Said Inflaming Regional Armament Rush**  
94WC0023A Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI 10 Dec 93  
p 31

[Article by Military Affairs editor]

[Text] Since the end of the Gulf war, Iran has turned into the most dangerous country in the area by virtue of its pursuit of a massive rearmament policy encompassing conventional, chemical and nuclear weaponry, to the degree that all of the classified military reports warn continually of the Iranian threat looming over the Gulf. The situation has prompted a return of the arms race to the countries of the region, which have sought to obtain defensive systems. Dubai's recent airshow is a reflection of this anxiety-driven climate, wherein all weapons-manufacturing countries [exhibitions] had crowds. What is

the true nature of the Iranian threat, and how should the countries of the region confront it?

Weeks after the end of the Gulf war, the major industrialized countries called for the imposition of an embargo on weapons exports to the developing nations. In the opinion of the "majors," advanced weaponry in the hands of the "minors" would necessarily lead to the flare-up of wars, in contrast to the situation among the former. Rearmament among the majors has a deterrent goal; in essence, the availability of effective weaponry to a given state leads to other states' fearing to attack it. This logic underlay the formation of the "nuclear strike force" in France during the reign of General Charles de Gaulle. The rationale was that the existence of such a formidable force in France, in the first and last instance, would be a deterrent to others against launching a war against France, and not that France would launch a nuclear attack against the enemy. All nuclear nations adopted this Gaullist nuclear logic, and none deviated from it except for Russia, recently. A fortnight ago, the Russian minister of defense stated that his country would respond with nuclear weapons to any attack on its territory using conventional weapons.

Addressing members of Congress in March 1991, one week after the end of the Gulf war, former U.S. President George Bush expressed his fear of the smaller countries' arming, especially those of the Middle East. "It is catastrophic, now that the war is over, for Middle Eastern and Arab Gulf countries to enter a new arms race."

Bush failed in the U.S. presidential elections, and with him fell the theory of arms limitation (in the Middle East and elsewhere), because the weapons-manufacturing lobby has the ability to find any justification for selling weapons, and even for participating in the escalation of regional crises and tensions in order that the volume of sales not be affected.

What has survived is merely the theory of the prevention of the deployment of (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons of mass destruction.

Dubai's recent airshow witnessed the largest gathering of producers of civilian and military aircraft, missiles, electronics, and radars, not to mention radar jamming equipment.

Russia staged an aerial demonstration of the "Sukhoi 35," its latest aircraft. Besides its aircraft, Britain dispatched Crown Prince Charles to carry out public relations for the British aircraft manufacturers. France sent its minister of defense and industry, who doubles as the minister of foreign trade.

Warplane manufacturers' mouths watered when the UAE [United Arab Emirates] announced its desire to purchase 80 advanced fighter aircraft at a cost of no less than \$10 billion. Experts have estimated the cost of arms purchases in the Gulf area for the remainder of the century at \$65 billion.

There is competition between the United States and France for the arms market, with the United States ahead by leagues. Since 1990, [the United States] has sold \$39

billion worth of weapons to the countries of the region. As for France, do not forget that it was Iraq's primary arms supplier prior to the Gulf war. Thirty percent of its military exports in the years 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985 were to Iraq alone (13 billion French francs per year), and 70 percent of its military sales were to Middle Eastern and North African countries. France has succeeded in striking large deals in at least three Gulf countries, the most significant of which is the provision of 436 large LeClerc tanks to the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.

In addition to the United States and France, Russia (which dominated the advanced countries' markets in the region during the Soviet Union era), Italy, Britain and Germany were represented, not to mention new countries such as South Africa and the Czech Republic, in addition to China and North Korea.

Prior to the Gulf war, Iraqi leaders were under the impression that their country had become the primary regional military power following the end of the Iraqi-Iranian war in mid-1988.

#### **Iranian Arsenal**

Following the Gulf war and the defeat of the Iraqi Army, Iran once again stood out as a regional military power. The rulers of Tehran drafted a large rearmament program based on a declared annual military outlay of \$8 billion. This vast sum drained the Iranian budget and overburdened the Iranian economy and is the reason for the inflation now extant in Iran, as well as the poor exchange rate of the Iranian currency.

The focus of Iran's military programs was its naval fleet. The prevailing view is that Iran has purchased three "Kilo"-class Russian submarines, taken delivery of two of them, and is awaiting delivery of the last one at the start of next year. However, it has recently been revealed that the "Kilo" submarine deal signed by Iran with Russia involves seven, not three, submarines.

Each "Kilo" submarine is capable of carrying 18 torpedoes or 36 naval mines, and is equipped with four surface-to-air "SAM-16" missiles. In early 1993, Iran received an estimated 1,800 "Kilo"-compatible naval mines.

The most important development in the rearmament of Iran, however, has been its formation of a squadron of "Sukhoi 24" strike fighters. In the opinion of American military experts in the region, the threat to shipping in the Gulf that is posed by these aircraft is greater than that posed by the "Kilo" submarines.

Negotiations are in their advanced states between Iran and China on the supply to Iran of 10 "Hegu" fast boats equipped with "Ying-Ji" antiship missiles with a range of 40 km.

A report entitled "The Strategic Plan for the Intelligence World in the Nineties," submitted by CIA Director James Woolsey to the U.S. Congress, states that Iran most probably will be the first country to obtain the 1000-km-range North-Korean-manufactured "Nodong" missile, and that

within six years it will be capable of manufacturing the "Scud-B" and "Scud-C" short-range missiles, in addition to the "Nodong" missile.

#### **Defensive Measures**

In the face of the Iranian threat to control navigation in the waters of the Arab Gulf, Arab Gulf countries undertook effective defensive measures to counter the Iranian mines. The minesweeper deals concluded by three Gulf countries fall under this category. Also, the Gulf cruisers and fast missile boats are a practical response to the Iranian cruisers and boats. Gulf Cooperation Council countries enjoy close military cooperation, and in most of them there is in place an integrated air defense, monitoring and early warning system. The Saudi "Peace Shield" system operates during peacetime at the same level of total efficiency as did "Desert Storm" during wartime. Gulf countries enjoy greater material capabilities and capacity for defensive provisioning than does Iran. Thus, Iran's policy of "muscle-flexing" remains limited and indicative of short-sightedness. It would have been more advantageous for the rulers of Tehran to have directed oil revenues to investments and developmental causes for the benefit of their people than to have utilized them for the purchase of arms and the impoverishment of their citizens.

### **IRAQ**

#### **Minister Says Country No Longer Has Mass Destruction Weapons**

JN1902202694 Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Network in Arabic 1900 GMT 19 Feb 94

[Text] Iraqi Foreign Minister Muhammad Sa'id al-Sahhaf has asserted that Iraq has complied with Security Council Resolution 687 on weapons of mass destruction and no longer has any of these weapons or the capacity to manufacture them.

In a statement to Qatari state television last night, he said that although Iraq implemented the provisions of that resolution, it is repeatedly accused of failure to abide by international resolutions for political reasons and to maintain the blockade imposed on it.

He added that U.S.-led foreign parties in the Security Council have political purposes unrelated to the [Gulf] crisis.

This is the second time the Qatari television has held an interview with Iraqi officials. A week ago, it aired a report on the unjust blockade, including an interview with Trade Minister Muhammad Mahdi Salih.

#### **Chemical, Biological Weapons Said Hidden in Oil Pipelines**

NC1302151494 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi People in Arabic 1400 GMT 13 Feb 94

[Text] To hide them from the eyes of international inspectors, the regime of tyrant Saddam Husayn has been transferring its remaining chemical and biological weapons from one place to another. According to people who

recently arrived in Amman, the dictatorial regime began using the oil pipelines—out of operation because of the international embargo—in one last attempt to hide its banned weapons.

### IAEA Sets Up Monitoring Cameras at Nuclear Site

NC1102203994 Paris AFP in English 1948 GMT  
11 Feb 94

[Text] Manama, Feb 11 (AFP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency has set up two cameras at an Iraqi nuclear site under UN resolutions for the long-term monitoring of the country's arms program, an IAEA official said here Friday.

"Two close-circuit cameras have been installed and activated in an engineering facility at Um al-Ma'arik (Mother of All Battles), 20 minutes from Baghdad, with two film cameras as a back-up," said Gary Dillon, a Briton, about the site that was part of Iraq's enriched uranium production program.

"The work was carried out without a hitch and the Iraqis were cooperative," said Dillon about his seven-member IAEA team that just completed a week-long mission in Iraq.

On Feb 4, IAEA deputy chief Maurizio Zifferero said experts from his agency would remove the last batch of Iraq's irradiated fuel and start setting up cameras at former nuclear sites.

The team was to have arranged removal of the five kilograms (11 pounds) of fuel believed to be left in Iraq. Some 35 kilograms (77 pounds) were removed on December 5.

"The IAEA team will be back within two months to continue their work of installing surveillance cameras at maybe two or three more sites, where up to 20 cameras may be set up in total," Dillon said.

Another 11 chemical weapons experts, led by Horst Reeps from Germany, accompanied Dillon's team on Friday. It completed a 10-day mission to identify and collect equipment Iraq had used in producing chemical weapons.

"We completed our mission of identifying, tagging and filing 250 pieces of chemical production equipment of dual use nature. Part of these were used during the Iran-Iraq war," Reeps said.

"Our main aim was to get more information on the planned use of this equipment in the future. Iraq has said it intends to make use of them for the production of pesticides, pharmaceuticals and other chemicals," he said.

He said that some of the equipment was never used, some used on a regular basis and some would be the subject of new discussions with the Iraqis on their planned use.

In the hope of obtaining an end to a three-year embargo, Iraqi authorities are cooperating with efforts to dismantle

programs for making weapons of mass destruction which are banned under UN resolutions ending the 1991 Gulf war.

The embargo was imposed four days after Iraq's forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990.

### LIBYA

### Commentary Responds to British Statements on Country's Nukes

LD1902140294 Tripoli Great Jamahiriyyah Radio  
Network in Arabic 1230 GMT 19 Feb 94

[Commentary by "JANA's international affairs editor"]

[Text] The British defense minister announced that Britain is studying the development of its own defense system, claiming that countries such as Libya constitute a nuclear threat to Britain. The British newspaper THE DAILY EXPRESS reported this statement, coupling it by saying that Libya will be able to manufacture nuclear weapons within 10 years.

JANA's international affairs editor commented by saying: This British official statement is further proof that the Christians are attacking the Muslims within the framework of the Christian-Jewish alliance against Islam. The nuclear weapons that now exist include 200 nuclear warheads owned by the Jews who occupy Palestine, and they admit owning them despite their refusal to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty. No one has talked about these nuclear warheads. No one mentioned them or asked for their removal.

As for Libya, the peaceful country that neither has the capability to own nuclear weapons nor is interested in or thinking of owning nuclear weapons, and which is subject to the annual inspection by the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] because of its signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty, it is accused of this [constituting a danger] and other similar accusations, as if its signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty and the regular IAEA inspection are not sufficient. This shows that the reason for these and other accusations is the fact that the Libyan weapons are not directed against the Arabs. Since the Jewish weapons are directed against the Arabs and Muslims this is allowed and there are no objections to it.

Why? The answer is simply the fact that in the eyes of the Christians and Jews the Arabs are animals or a race that no one wants and should be annihilated.

The editor added: Through this statement the world can see the practices of terrorism against peaceful peoples. This statement, and the statements that preceded it by the U.S. President, saying that Libya constitutes an extraordinary danger, are in themselves real, unprecedented terrorism practiced by superpowers against a peaceful country.

The international affairs editor concluded his comment by saying:

These are the characteristics of the new world order to which they call: Terrorism, Jewish and Christian alliance against all non-Jewish religions such as Islam, Buddhism, and Confucianism, in order to establish Jewish and Christian control over the whole world.

## PAKISTAN

### U.S. Allegedly Spying on Nuclear Plant

BK1102135294 Karachi AKHBAR-E-JEHAN in Urdu  
7-13 Feb 94 pp 10, 74

[Article by Habibur Rahman: "U.S. Spy Planes' Flights Over Pakistan's Sensitive Regions?"; from the "Islamabad Diary" Column]

[Excerpt] A team comprising five U.S. experts is currently visiting Islamabad. These experts are the representatives of the U.S. agency which oversees arms control and nuclear nonproliferation matters. Their duties include, among other things, providing necessary information and advice to the U.S. secretary of state. During its talks with the Pakistani authorities, the U.S. team will discuss when and how the next step for rolling back Pakistan's nuclear program will be taken and what method needs to be adopted to verify Pakistan's compliance with the commitment it will make in this context. Pakistan's former caretaker Prime Minister Dr. Moin Qureshi announced on 24 September 1993 that Islamabad had frozen its nuclear program. After this announcement, the U.S. State Department issued a statement, saying that Washington is strongly opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the governments of the South Asian countries have been asked to halt their nuclear programs forthwith and eventually destroy all their weapons of mass annihilation. The U.S. Government also wants to settle all stages of rolling back Pakistan's nuclear program in a manner which could ensure the continued verification of the fact that Islamabad is winding up its nuclear program. The aforementioned U.S. experts, currently in Islamabad, would probably also like to know and see how far Washington's instructions have been complied with, when and how the next steps will be taken, and in what ways Washington can feel assured in this regard.

A U.S. aircraft has remained parked at the Chaklala airport in Rawalpindi since 5 January 1994. This is the plane that brought to Pakistan a troop of 150 U.S. military commandos who have apparently been sent to conduct joint exercises with the Pakistani Army commandos. Most of these exercises have been held in the Cherat region, where the headquarters of the Pakistani Army commandos is located. Recently, a letter was published in a Pakistani daily, in which the writer stated that the geographical features of Cherat region are largely similar to those of the Kahuta area, where Pakistan's nuclear laboratory is located, and which the U.S. has been eyeing. The writer of that letter had asked whether the U.S. commandos' exercise in the Cherat region is not a prelude to preparations for action against the Kahuta laboratory. The U.S. plane now standing at the Chaklala airport is called MC130-H in

air force jargon and is equipped with very sensitive equipment for photography. This equipment includes the capability of carrying out the most sophisticated spying work. With the help of this equipment, the aircraft can prepare any maps that are desired and freeze a radar system. Even total darkness cannot hamper its work. According to a published report, this U.S. reconnaissance plane has flown several times over Pakistan's northern areas, especially over Chitral, Swat, Chilas, Gilgit, Skardu, and Deosai, since 5 January 1994. The U.S. possesses only four planes of this type. The cost of each of these aircraft is stated to be \$96 million. During the rule of late President Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the United States was allowed to establish a base at (Badaber) near Peshawar to carry out aerial espionage against the former Soviet Union. The U.S. U-2 spy planes used to fly from this Pakistani base into the Soviet airspace. The Russians shot down one of these U-2 spy planes. After his arrest, the U.S. pilot of that spy plane confirmed the presence of a U.S. espionage base on Pakistani soil. Durrani, a managing director of the Pakistan International Airlines [PIA], was accused of cooperating with the United States in installing spying equipment on a PIA plane that used to fly over the People's Republic of China. That incident took place during the rule of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. During the regime of President General Mohammad Ziaul Haq, the U.S. CIA was given the facility to set up a base in Pakistan's northern areas to fight with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and in that way Pakistan was turned into the biggest CIA base. Now, the presence of the aforementioned U.S. spy plane at Chaklala airport in Rawalpindi and its activities tend to indicate that the U.S. has been given a free hand to use Pakistani soil to carry out spying on Pakistan itself, and the valiant United States has been making full use of this freedom. [passage omitted on Kashmir-related issues]

### General Beg Says 'Complete Nuclear Ability' Attained in 1989

BK2702125594 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
24 Feb 94 p 4

[Report by Javed Syed]

[Text] Lahore, Feb 23—Former Chief of the Army Staff [COAS], General (Retd) Mirza Aslam Beg has admitted that the decision for capping the nuclear programme had been taken in the meeting of trioka in January 1989.

But he explained the matter in a different way. He said Pakistan had attained complete nuclear ability including the development of delivery system of the bomb to its target alongwith the ability for manufacturing the required number of devices at the time of need.

Addressing a gathering of lawyers and journalists at a local hotel arranged by Manzoor Qadir Advocate, he said on the occasion of taking the decision for halting the nuclear programme, Pakistan had full knowledge of India's nuclear ability as well as the number of devices it had. He said at that time Pakistan was in a position to respond to India on atomic front.

He said the capping of nuclear programme meant that the manufacturing of the devices should be halted. But the development of nuclear technology and the delivery system should be continued.

Replying to a question, he said he had no knowledge that Benazir Bhutto had provided any help to Rajiv Gandhi during his tenure as COAS. Answering another question, he rejected the perception that Pakistan Army was involved in making and breaking the governments in the country.

He said the Opposition and ruling party politicians had been trying always to drag the Army into the politics for cover-up to their misdeeds. He pointed out that only General Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and General Zia had willingly interfered in politics. He said now the thinking of the Army had changed and the Armed Forces would never seize power in future.

He said if the politicians strengthened the democratic process in the country the little interference of Army into the political affairs would also come to an end.

He said he would soon decide to take part in politics. He said either he would float his own party or would join some political party of the country. However, he said he would make this announcement from Lahore. He said he would create a leadership from grass-roots level as the problems of 95 per cent of the poor and middle class could not be addressed by the privileged class in power.

He said the return of the representatives of the poor and middle class in the assemblies was necessary to resolve the acute problems of the country.

He said he wanted to see the people in power and that was why he had refused to take over the country in August 1988. He said if the present confrontation continued the people would soon get fed up with the politicians. He said the politicians lack vision necessary to run the government.

#### **Daily Supports Call For Achieving Nuclear Power Status**

*BK1102151894 Rawalpindi NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu  
9 Feb 94 p 10*

[Editorial: "Pakistan and India—the U.S. Double Standard and the Requirements of National Defense"]

[Text] According to a clarification by the U.S. State Department, the Pressler Amendment has been included in the foreign aid bill currently lying before the Congress and the previous restrictions against Pakistan have been retained, under which Pakistan will not be able to receive aid from the United States without abandoning its nuclear program nor can Islamabad purchase U.S. weapons through other sources. This can result in India taking a lead over Pakistan not only in the nuclear program but also in the field of conventional weapons, thereby causing difficulties for Pakistan's defense.

The discriminatory treatment meted out by the United States to Pakistan does not beggar description. In spite of

the fact that Pakistan has been tied up with the United States through a defense agreement since 1959, Washington never felt it necessary to maintain its friendship with Islamabad, except for a brief period during the Afghan war when the U.S. realized the danger that the advancement of the former Soviet Union toward the hot waters would have jeopardized the global power equilibrium. However, Washington turned its eyes away from Pakistan after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and its subsequent disintegration, and the same Pakistan, which was said to be a cornerstone of the U.S. foreign policy during the Afghan war, discovers itself being called a "fundamentalist," "terrorist" state and the standard bearer of the "Islamic bomb." The United States then not only stopped its own aid to Pakistan but also began efforts to persuade the entire world to follow suit. Japan, which has been the largest aid donor to Pakistan, also stopped providing assistance under the influence of the U.S. propaganda and pressure, and categorically stated to the then prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, in December 1992 that it would be difficult for Islamabad to receive any Japanese aid if it did not forgo its nuclear program, reduce military expenditure, and create a favorable atmosphere for the purpose. Two days ago, Japan once again reiterated its conditions and showed a red signal to the new Pakistani Government as well.

It is ironical that India has also openly declared itself to be a nuclear power in the Indian Subcontinent, but neither the United States nor Europe nor Japan has objected to India about this. New Delhi, actually, enjoys complete freedom in stockpiling enriched uranium, making advances in the development of delivery systems, and in amassing conventional weapons. Thus, deliberate attempts are being made to weaken Pakistan's defense, which is apparently aimed at leaving us on the mercy of New Delhi and forcing us to accept India's supremacy.

Pakistan's nuclear scientists Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan has said that weakness in any country's defense is tantamount to inviting enemy's aggression. He has suggested that we should manufacture our own weapons, so that we can become a nuclear power by achieving self-reliance in defense equipment and defend our sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The Pakistan Government should also urge the United States to forsake its discriminatory and biased attitude toward Pakistan and tell Washington that if it desires to help end the nuclear arms race in the Indian Subcontinent, then it should adopt a realistic and equitable policy and also pressure India, along with Pakistan, to roll back or freeze its nuclear program. It is the moral duty of the valiant United States to ensure the supply of F-16's and other equipment for which it has already received payments, so that Pakistan can be able to defend itself from India at least in the field of conventional weapons. Trade ethics also demand that we must get the items for which we have already made payments. We have been emphasizing in these columns that the country's real strength lies in its internal unity and national solidarity. We will have to turn ourselves into an impregnable (wall) to defeat the enemy. Our leadership should therefore pay attention to this issue as well.

## RUSSIA

### SS-24 ICBM Train Found Unguarded Near Perm

94WP0069A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY  
in Russian 15 Feb 94 p 14

[Article by Mikhail Lashch and Fedor Maksimov:  
"Abandoned Missile System Discovered. Armored Mis-  
sile Train Lost in Perm Forests"]

[Text] *An abandoned rail-based strategic missile system has been discovered on the railroad tracks near Perm. The discovery by the group of Perm journalists headed by the department chief of the oblast newspaper MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, Oleg Andriyashkin, was the result of an investigation they conducted: The reporters' attention was drawn to the fact that electronic equipment intended for "defense purposes" had begun to appear on the local market, and then they found the RS-22. After the journalists contacted the leaders of the missile forces, the six-car train was placed under guard. Yesterday the KOMMERSANT-DAILY editorial staff learned the details of the incident.*

The Perm journalists reported to the KOMMERSANT-DAILY editorial offices that at the Kurya Station of the Perm Railroad they had discovered a six-car train which, they thought, contained an RS-22 rail-based strategic missile system.

*The rail-based RS-22 strategic system is better known as the SS-24. It is usually "disguised" as passenger cars or refrigerated cars. One system contains up to 10 strategic missiles with a target radius of up to 10,000 km. These systems were produced in Ukraine in Dnepropetrovsk. They have now been removed from production. At the present time they are still on combat alert.*

As the Perm journalist Oleg Andriyashkin told a KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent, the reporters managed to freely enter two cars whose doors had been opened (nobody was guarding the equipment). The first of the cars was an electric power plant and the second was the main command post. The doors of the other four cars, which presumably contained missiles and missile fuel, were blocked. The journalists noted that there had been some looting of the equipment in the cars. Most likely it was not foreign spies who had found their way here but thrifty citizens of the country who were interested in the instruments, which contain gold and silver and other valuable metals. In Andriyashkin's opinion, saboteurs would not be able to use the missile system for its intended purpose. The danger came from the marauders, who could carelessly set one of the cars on fire.

As the deputy chief of the Perm Oblast administration, Yevgeniy Sapiro, told a KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent, the missile system that was discovered is now being used as a training facility of the Perm Higher Military School of Missile Forces. Representatives of the



OLEG ANDRIYASHKIN

Похожие вагоны встречаются на любом полустанке

Similar railcars are to be found in any railway stop.



От «электроник» в комплексе сегодня  
мало что осталось.

Today, little remains of the "electronics" aboard the train.

training institution refrained from commentary, alluding to a leadership conference that was taking place at that moment. In the press group of the Main Commissariat of Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) they said that they had no information on this question: "These missile systems are on combat alert and are guarded reliably enough."

A worker of the press service of the Federal Counterintelligence Service, Vladimir Murashkin, said that the Federal Counterintelligence Service knows about the military school's written-off training train located at the Kurya station of the Perm Railroad, which contains training missiles with the warheads removed. From the standpoint of state security the system is of no special interest to foreign intelligence services—the American military were familiarized with similar missile systems not very long ago.

#### CW Plant Behind Schedule; Environment Threat

PM1802113994 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
18 Feb 94 First Edition pp 1-2

[Unattributed report: "Chemical Weapons Threaten Volga Region. Deadline for Their Destruction May Not Be Met"]

[Text] Saratov Oblast—Around now a terminal was to have been built on the banks of the Volga in Saratov Oblast to strip out [peretarivaniye] chemical agents from their containers [yemkosti] and subsequently detoxify them. That at least is what the draft first stage of the state program for the destruction of chemical weapons envisages. However, local residents, worried by leaks at stores that have been here a long time, have sounded the alarm and are objecting to new installations with this kind of specialism.

Russia's president signed the Paris Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons a year ago, in January 1993. According to the Convention, the first installation for the destruction of chemical agents must be tested within two years at most. Half this time has already

elapsed and Russia still has no laws, no concept, no approved state program for chemical weapons destruction. Meanwhile leaks of poisonous substances from containers that have eroded have been recorded at the arsenal sited on the territory of Saratov Oblast.

The village of Gornyy, where 690 tonnes of mustard gas, 225 tonnes of lewisite, and 210 tonnes of their compounds are stored, is not far from the Volga. The chemical weapons that have been here for ages, packed in metal barrels and railroad tankers, pose a potential danger.

The strength of the harmful chemicals will be reduced by a factor of 1,000-10,000 when the chemical agents are stripped out at the new terminal. The plan is to reprocess the reactive matter obtained in Shikhany, 100 km from Gornyy, where the top-secret State Institute of Organic Synthesis Technology [SIOT], which developed chemical weapons in the recent past, is located.

Doctor of Sciences Aleksandr Kochergin, the institute's director, said that several technologies have been developed for the destruction of the stocks from the arsenal in Gornyy. Whereas the situation is clear with regard to the mustard gas, a choice has not yet been made with regard to the lewisite and its compounds. In the opinion of SIOT scientists, the most preferable option is for this kind of chemical agent to be recycled [utilizatsiya] since it contains costly arsenic used in microelectronics, laser technology, optics, and pharmaceuticals. In other words, the recycling technology presupposes not only expenditure on chemical weapons destruction but also considerable income from the reprocessing of chemical agents into particularly pure arsenic, which Russia does not currently produce.

This technology can also be used to recycle arsenic-containing adamsite—an irritant chemical agent produced early this century, which has been shipped to Shikhany from throughout the former Union—of which more than 8,000 tonnes have been buried straight in the ground at the testing range of the military institute next to SIOT. The huge Russian adamsite dump is a source of great worry not only to the public but also to scientists, who are voicing misgivings over the possible environmental contamination from these stocks.

It may seem to the uninitiated that there are no particular problems with the destruction of the Saratov arsenal. It is only the choice of technology and the construction of a terminal and recycling installations that are holding things up. However, one must not forget that we are talking about chemical weapons, which are to be destroyed in densely populated areas right next to the Volga. This is a very sensitive subject for the residents of the area since the environmental background here is unfavorable enough as it is. In the city of Volsk, for instance, which is no more than 5 km from Shikhany as the crow flies, the arsenic content in the soil is already several times in excess of the maximum permissible concentrations owing to three local cement plants using so-called pyrite cinders, which contain arsenic, in their manufacturing process.

People's disquiet is intensified by the constant rumors about the danger of radiological contamination of the area from the Balakovo nuclear electric power station 50 km from Volsk. Add to that atmospheric discharges by Balakovo's big

chemical giants and you will understand the public concern, which is threatening to develop into an organized protest against the siting of chemical weapons destruction facilities in these areas.

This disquiet is intensified by conjecture and speculation due to the utter secrecy surrounding the facilities at Shikhany. I visited them, spoke with scientists, and saw that there is no intention of building any more production units here, the former technology used for the synthesis of chemical agents has merely been reversed. According to the findings of a special environmental and medical monitoring laboratory, the air in Shikhany is considerably cleaner than in Volsk, people live longer and have fewer illnesses.

Choosing the technology is only part of the problem and by no means the most important part. Social and environmental questions are the main thing. Mikhail Yakovlev, Saratov Oblast Administration department head, briefed me on a Russian Government draft decree that the residents of the oblast have prepared on their own initiative. It enshrines their immediate demands without whose fulfillment the chemical weapons destruction process cannot be started. During the first quarter of this year the Committee for Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the Russian President and the Ministry of Defense, in conjunction with other departments, are asked to define a concept, prepare drafts of a basic law and a number of other legislative acts designed to form the legal base for the practical implementation of the Paris Convention, and guarantee safety, health, and social protection. According to civilized norms, the facilities for the storage and destruction of chemical weapons and the population centers around them should be given special status with all the concomitant guarantees, as is the case in the United States for instance.

The demand for regular environmental and medical monitoring is also natural. During the first stage, before the experimental installations begin work, the intention is to study the state of the environment and carry out a comprehensive screening process involving residents in Volskiy and Krasnopartizanskiy Rayons, which include Shikhany and Gornyy, in order to determine the consequences of the storage and testing of chemical weapons on the environment and the population's health.

The importance of the social and environmental aspects can be judged from the funding structure, where expenditure on monitoring and the social everyday sphere in Shikhany, Volsk, and Gornyy amounts to 67 billion rubles [R] of the R72 billion that the oblast administration deems it necessary to allocate for the entire first phase of the program, a phase culminating in the construction and testing of the experimental-industrial facility for the destruction and recycling of chemical agents and the creation of the requisite support infrastructure.

Nadezhda Saratovtseva, head of administration of the settlement of Shikhany, has a better knowledge of the whole set of problems than anyone else. She takes part without fail in all the meetings and talks on this topic and has even addressed parliamentary hearings.

"The state program for the destruction of chemical weapons has been in the process of being written and draft laws have been in the process of being harmonized since 1989," she said. "Presidents, governments, and parliaments have come and gone, but still there are no laws and no program. There is no concept and no funding. The SIOST has not been paid for three months and that unique institution is on the verge of stoppages. The social sphere—the burden of which is borne entirely by the institute—is going to pieces."

Judging by the center's unhurried approach, one can confidently assume today that the schedule proposed by the Saratov administration in its draft government decree will also be disrupted.

"You produced the chemical weapons, you destroy them," Saratovtseva was told by one highly-placed Moscow official.

Meanwhile the chemical bomb planted almost on the very banks of the Volga may spring its surprise at any minute. In that case it would not only be the residents of Saratov on the Volga who would suffer.

#### Scientist Fears Lethal Gas Will Fall in Terrorist Hands

BR1502131394 Paris LE POINT in French 12 Feb 94 pp 14-15

[Article by Virginie Coulloudon in Moscow: "Russia: Chemical Threat, The Terrible Secret"]

[Text] Is the Russian chemical bomb a state secret or is it an open secret? In Moscow, professor Vil Mirzayanov is paying with his freedom his attempt to break the sacrosanct laws of secrecy and reveal to the general public what the experts have known for a long time. This is a curious fate for this Doctor Strangelove-type character, yesterday an honored scientist and today sharing his cell with common murderers!

The scandal came from where it was least expected. For decades, a handful of scientists have been working to develop the most lethal neuromuscular gases that boast an effectiveness greater than that achieved by American experts. Guardians of the destructive formulae, they are now however threatening to reveal all in response to a sudden philanthropic impulse and the feeling that they have been conned and exploited by their superiors. The first revelation is that Russia has many more toxic substances than it officially admits to. At the Paris convention on chemical weapons signed last year, the Kremlin undertook to release the figures for its arsenal. It admitted to storing 40,000 tonnes of various substances, 32,000 tonnes of which were neuromuscular. Vladimir Uglev, one of the three protesting scientists and one of the fathers of the binary bomb, states, however, that Moscow has already produced 80,000 tonnes of mustard gas alone—the gas used for the first time at Ypres in Belgium and which was the terror of the infantrymen gassed by the Germans.

For these dissidents of military chemistry, the proof that Russia lied about the amount of chemical weapons it has is to be found at Chikhaniy, in the Saratov region not far from the Volga. Away from prying eyes, a constant stream of explosions releases thick clouds of toxic substances into the atmosphere. It is here that the army destroys its excess

of chemical weapons before Western observers can notice the deception. All this occurs to the detriment of the most basic safety rules.

It is claimed that whole vats of toxic substances are buried or burned without any safety measures taken whatsoever. No surprise then, that it is at Chikhaniy that the highest number of ophthalmic lesions and eye cancers are recorded—twice as many as in the rest of the country.

State secrecy means that medical information for the regions concerned also remains a closely guarded secret. However, we do know that a number of soldiers who took part in the destruction of mustard gas at the Kambark base in the sixties have since died of cancer. Near the Novocheboksaryi region of central Russia, almost 90 percent of the population suffers from various types of pathological illness. In 1993, the 12,000 children of Chikhaniy developed twice as many respiratory illnesses as in the previous year while the number of complications quadrupled....

In the east, the largest threat posed by the military chemical industry does not, however, lie simply in this half-truth. Russia has two powerful binary weapons capable of wiping out entire populations when their internal membrane splits to mix two individually inoffensive gases. The first of these weapons, named VX, is produced using chemical substances that are banned by the Paris convention and which should soon be destroyed. The second weapon, on the other hand, is the most fearful arm ever dreamed up in this domain—fearful because it is untouchable.

According to Vladimir Uglev, the developer of the gas code-named A-232, the weapon's originality lies in the simplicity of its components which are used in civilian industry and which cannot therefore be regulated by international experts. "We know that the chemical parameters of such a weapon cannot escape the clutches of the generals or terrorists for long," Vladimir Uglev accepts. "The question is whether to make its composition public knowledge and so demand strict international control, or else wait for a "leak" to occur, despite our vigilance."

By concealing the results obtained during the A-232 research and accusing the developers of these weapons of "violating state secrecy," the Kremlin seems to have opted for the latter solution.

#### **Nuclear Institute Uses Trains for Isotope Deliveries**

*LD2102203294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1911 GMT 21 Feb 94*

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Milov]

[Text] Ulyanovsk February 21 TASS—A man arrested in a passenger train with radioactive isotopes on Monday and believed to be a seller of illegal and dangerous merchandise turned out to be an official courier delivering the material to Moscow.

Director of the research institute of nuclear reactors in the city of Dmitrograd on the Volga Valentin Ivanov told

TASS that this is the usual way his institute transports radioactive sources to Moscow.

"We usually transport to the capital similar radioactive sources in ordinary passenger trains and we had never received any complaints because they pose no danger to human health", he said.

"Today the usual way of deliveries of sources of isotopes was disrupted for unknown reasons and was proclaimed criminal. This is an unpleasant misunderstanding", the director said hoping that his courier would be allowed to continue the trip.

#### **Detonation Suggested as Nuclear Waste Disposal Method**

*PM1502125794 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 15 Feb 94 p 2*

[Yuriy Lvov report: "Nuclear Waste Will Be Destroyed by Explosions"]

[Text] This news is not for those of a nervous disposition: It is possible that in the foreseeable future all Russia's radioactive waste and chemical weapons will be destroyed...by nuclear explosion. By several explosions, to be precise, which will be detonated deep within the permafrost of Russia's only nuclear test site on the island of Novaya Zemlya.

This program has been expounded by Major General Vladimir Loborev, academician and chief of the Ministry of Defense Central Physics and Technical Institute, and Aleksandr Chernyshev, deputy director of the Federal Nuclear Center (Arzamas-16), in reports to a closed scientific seminar held at the "Uran" Science and Production Association, which your KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent managed to attend. Representatives from our most important organizations in this field attended the seminar: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry, the Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Academy of Natural Sciences.

There are several ways of recycling radioactive waste. The idea of sending waste into space is the most utopian of these schemes, according to Vladimir Loborev. However, the most practical method is plunging the fatal waste into glass and burying it in "deep geological formations." The largest vitrification plant is located in France. It cost \$500 million to build.

According to Loborev, to destroy all of Russia's waste would require 20 such plants, each of which would have to operate continuously for 10 years. The Russian economy would be unable to bear costs of this magnitude. But the problem is becoming increasingly acute—obsolete ships with nuclear reactors that can neither be used nor scuttled are piling up at the piers of Severodvinsk and other ports....

A nuclear explosion would be far less costly. And the authors of the plan claim that after the explosion the waste

would be buried in accordance with all the regulations—the extremely high temperature would turn the rock and the radioactive waste housed in underground passageways into an large vitreous mass which would be covered by a thick layer of compacted soil and rubble. Thus embedded, the waste would never be able to “surface”; besides, all around there is permafrost which, according to the specialists, would present no threat for many centuries, even if a subtropical climate were to occur on Novaya Zemlya.

The chemical weapons situation is somewhat more complex. In Russia it is kept in seven large storage facilities, some of which are located near major cities. They must be destroyed as soon as possible in accordance with international conventions and following the dictates of common sense, but the technology to do this does not exist at the present time. Scientists believe that in this case the “nuclear explosion” method looks more promising, although it would require some extremely complex chemical calculations.

The authors of the plan assure us that the program is at the scientific development stage and will under no circumstances be implemented without thorough expert assessments, international monitoring, explanations to the population, and, of course, presidential and government approval. In order to obtain the last item on this list, the plan would have to do the rounds of a number of competent departments. The seminar decided that it would be submitted for examination by the recently established Scientific Council under the Russian Federation Security Council.

We can only hope that amid all the current confusion in Russia, these important “formalities” will not be forgotten. After all, we already possess experience of the unpredictable behavior of the peaceful atom in Russia.

#### **Krasnoyarsk Complex Workers Angry Over Unpaid Wages**

*PM1502154994 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
15 Feb 94 First Edition p 1*

[Aleksey Tarasov report: “Siberian Military Plants on the Brink of Upheavals. There Is No Money and No Work”]

[Text] Krasnoyarsk—The situation in the military-industrial complex’ Siberian domains is becoming explosive: The many-thousands-strong collective of one of the biggest production facilities in the Russian defense industry—the Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant, a state enterprise upon which an order has been conferred—is in a state of turmoil. The missile builders are taking a tough stand and demanding money and work.

On the last working day of last week around 500 people “besieged” the plant’s management, and by evening practically the entire shift at the Krasnoyarsk Machinebuilding Plant was participating in an emergency meeting. General Director V. Gupalov was taken to hospital for intensive care, suffering from an attack of angina pectoris. The disturbances spilled over from the territory of the secret

plant onto the streets; workers went off to see the governor in search of the truth, threatening to blockade the kray administration building and seal off the roads if he did not help immediately.

There was another meeting on Monday where, as the “Krasmach” directors informed IZVESTIYA, the collective by and large agreed with the proposals made by the plant’s leadership for stabilizing the situation. Gupalov flew to Moscow. It has been said that the government has allocated money. But this money has not appeared yet. So a new outburst of passions may occur at any moment.

“Krasmach’s” customer—the Ministry of Defense—has failed to pay the missile manufacturers 11.3 billion rubles [R] for the state order carried out last year. Wages have not been paid for four months, and there is no money for the absolute essentials.

Technical Director L. Kovrigin told IZVESTIYA that the plant leadership has appealed to the president, the premier, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Finance. At the end of December V. Chernomyrdin gave instructions for the debts to be paid off during January. Security Council Secretary O. Lobov reported that the president wrote the following resolution on the appeal from the missile manufacturers: For immediate and strict implementation. Nevertheless, the plant has not received the money.

The director’s order on the closure of the assembly shops as of 15 February for six weeks—as it stands at the moment—has added fuel to the flames. Those who have not taken enforced leave will work three days a week (until now the plant has had a four-day week). The point is that in recent years, the Ministry of Finance has not only not been in a hurry to settle its accounts, but even to conclude contracts with the plant. Under the law on the state order, “Krasmach” should obtain a contract two years before the manufacturing deadline, since the cycle of manufacture of the articles takes up more than one year. The plant was meant to have been given an advance by 1 February for the purchase of vital materials. The contract has still not been signed and the money has not been transferred. This practice has become the norm. Others would doubtless interpret it as the fact that their services are no longer needed. But “Krasmach” has continued to selflessly forge the motherland’s missile shield. The conversion of the leading brains in the military-industrial complex is a very difficult matter. Judging by his behavior, which is not consonant with the economic situation, the general director is continuing to be more worried about the Russian defense capability than about the fate of the labor collective entrusted to him. The director has remained a general, but has not become an entrepreneur. Which may be pleasant to the state, but not to the workers, the reserves of whose selfless devotion have run dry.

At the moment it is the local authorities who are settling up for the debts to the military-industrial complex. Governor V. Zubov has allocated 1 billion to the machine builders. This will be enough to pay October’s wages and part of November’s. The missile builders have received assistance

from the budget by dint of their strength, although the situation of other groups in the population is scarcely much better. Workers in high schools, colleges, and universities are in a state of combat readiness for mass protest actions. The list of enterprises in the kray which have come to a standstill or are working at half-strength is breathtaking. The ship-building plant has just stopped carrying out the military order, and its workers have been sent off on a three-week vacation. The trade union committee has, of course, put forward some demands... The professional guardians of the people are increasingly feeling that they are "in their element." The unforgettable appeal to the proletariat to unite is in use again. Communists are proposing to extend the spheres of influence of the strike committees, and the executive committee of the "Trudovoye Krasnoyarsk" movement is appealing for the formation of a united city strike committee.

The revolt at "Krasnash" has been brewing for a long time and seems to be entirely natural. At one time the empire of the missile builders had been divided into six plants, and in a single year of their free existence, matters took an upward turn for capable people. But in 1992, under pressure from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Industry, the State Committee for the Management of State Property scorned the laws, the opinion of the labor collectives, and economic expediency, and drove five plants into the stable of the military-industrial complex once again, thereby placing them under a single boss. Having glued together an unviable monster, the state has not nevertheless even determined whether it needs "the most important strategic output," on whose production "Krasnash" has the monopoly. No money is being found to pay for it. Well, if even the instructions of the president and the prime minister are not being carried out, should the basic production be carved up for scrap? After all, in principle it cannot respecialize. Or does Russia still need ballistic missiles for submarines and other complex military output? Why does the state allow chiefs of shops and workers and officials at local level to be tormented by these questions?

In the past we use to be called Upper Volta with missiles. I don't know about the Volta bit, although I suppose there is a similarity, but all the indications are that it may be tough as regards the missiles.

### **Nuclear Sub Reactors May Be Used as Energy Supply**

LD1502100194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
0904 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Eduard Popov]

[Text] Vladivostok February 15 TASS—In conditions of acute power shortage, the administration of the Primorye territory, the Russian Far East, decided to consider the possibility of using reactors of nuclear submarines of the Pacific Fleet to generate electricity for Vladivostok power supply.

Technical and economic aspects of this unusual method of conversion of military facilities to civilian uses were discussed by representatives of the territorial administration, the Pacific Fleet and scientific circles at a conference here on Tuesday. Experts believe that the quality of Russian technologies with a guaranteed maintenance system will ensure complete radiational and ecological safety for the population.

The use of the energy potential of one submarine can meet the needs in heating and electricity of no less than 50 houses with many apartments.

### **Independent Control Over Radioactive Substances Set Up**

WS1502101794 Kaliningrad KALININGRADSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 94 p 5

[Report by Y. Shebalkin under "There Is Such a Service" rubric: "Small Forces for Radiation"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Recently, a vessel was detained in Kaliningrad trade port a few hours before departure. It turned out that the cargo of the motor ship "Composer Musorgskiy" was posing a radioactive danger. This means that the lives of the people working there were threatened to a certain extent. Moreover, exports of radioactive substances (uranium) without relative documentation are forbidden. Eventually, the motor ship was sent to the place of its destination—St. Petersburg.

Here is another criminal fact. The Kaliningrad asphalt cement plant has devices which control the production of the mixture with sensors operating on radioisotopes. Some local dodgers kept an eye on those colorful "castings" and took the devices away despite the warning signs. The militia ran their feet off to find the culprits. Finally, the stolen devices were found. The thieves, most probably, had not found a customer, while someone must have stored, carried, and transported personal death for a long time. It is regrettable that the plant failed to ensure proper security for the radioactive devices.

Let us remember Chernobyl. We live thousands of kilometers away from the site of the tragedy, but we felt its effects. We will, probably, feel them for a long time.

That is why the Russian president issued a decree approving the resolution "On Federal Control Over Nuclear and Radioactive Security." This is a joint document of the president, the legislature, and the government. By the way, I will remind everyone that even Gorbachev tried to introduce such control back in 1985, because the former USSR is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Unfortunately, the project remained only a collection of good proposals for offices and officials. [passage omitted] Nevertheless, the key and supreme principle of control in any civilized country is its nondepartmental character, as well as responsibility before the coming generations. Until now, we have had administrative control—from the Atomic Ministry and the Ministries of Atomic Energy, Construction, and Defense. No one

washes one's dirty linen in public, as a rule. That is why the establishment of independent subunits in oblasts was an important event.

"The inspection supervises how organizations, enterprises, and military units of the garrison and the fleet observe the rules of storing and utilizing radioactive substances," says Dmitry Gennadyevich Sorokin, chief of the Kaliningrad Oblast inspection. "Our staff is small, there are three more people besides me, while the work load is quite impressive. Dozens of enterprises in the oblast use devices with radioactive substances. Furthermore, there is a large number of military units where there is more equipment with radioisotopes than one knows what to do with them."

"There are several problems that hamper the activities of our inspection. As any budget organization, it is experiencing financial difficulties today. We have no means of transport or the necessary equipment for qualitative analysis of radioactive materials. In the case of the motor ship "Composer Musorgskiy," by the way, we failed to establish the exact effect of the "evil" cargo on the environment." [passage omitted]

"I will dwell on the discussion concerning the possible construction of a nuclear power plant in our oblast."

"The rate of construction of atomic power stations is increasing around the world. Incidentally, our neighbors are also building them. Lithuania is the leader in terms of energy production at a nuclear station. Poland has its own stations, while Belarus has ordered a project for itself from Canada."

"My opinion is likely to be viewed as subjective, but it is the assessment of a competent specialist. A nuclear power station is less polluting than any coal station, while the energy produced there is the cheapest. However, the issue of constructing an atomic station in our region is a matter for energy specialists." [passage omitted]

#### **FIS Aide on Proliferation Threat in Neighboring States**

94WP0061A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 2, 17 Jan 94 p 10

[Interview with Gennadiy Yevstafyev, chief of FIS arms control and proliferation department, by Vladimir Orlov: "Nuclear Redivision"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Russia may soon find itself encircled by nuclear states. There is a growing threat of local conflicts with the use of weapons of mass destruction on our southern flanks. This seemingly pessimistic prognosis is shared today by many military practitioners.

Does the Russian leadership have information about real nuclear arsenals and programmes of "threshold" and "near-threshold" countries located on Russia's perimeter? This is the subject of an interview MN correspondent Vladimir Orlov had with Gennadiy Yevstafyev, head of the department of control over arms and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction of Russia's External Intelligence Service.

**MOSCOW NEWS correspondent:** Do you share concern about the "new nuclear encirclement of Russia?"

**Gennadiy Yevstafyev:** Only partially. Let me remind you that a conference for the prolongation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is scheduled to take place in 1995. I hope that it will be possible by that time to broaden by joint efforts the composition of the Treaty's participants and to prevent the appearance of new nuclear states, even in intermediary or temporary terms. But there still remain places in the world which give me cause for real worry...

**Correspondent:** Can you give examples? Name at least three of them, in the order of diminishing danger.

**Gennadiy Yevstafyev:** First, North Korea; second, Israel; third, India and Pakistan.

[Boxed item]

#### **MOSCOW NEWS File**

*According to the data of Western research centres Israel may possess nearly 200 nuclear warheads or material for their immediate manufacture; India has 60 nuclear warheads and Pakistan 15. North Korea is capable of manufacturing one or two nuclear bombs. Iran will be able to have nuclear weapons of its own after eight or ten years.*

[end boxed item]

**Correspondent:** Let us consider North Korea.

**Gennadiy Yevstafyev:** We agree with the common conclusion of international experts. The leadership of North Korea has been trying for a long time to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Delivery vehicles have also been developed successfully. One of the stages of this development were the recent tests of the improved Scud missile.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been actively pursuing an applied military programme in the nuclear sphere which is today, in the opinion of the External Intelligence Service, at an advanced state of development.

**Correspondent:** Why then has North Korea "frozen" its military nuclear programme?

**Gennadiy Yevstafyev:** There are two reasons. The first one is international pressure. The second is financial and technical difficulties within North Korea which is unable to carry the burden of the immense cost of the development of weapons of mass destruction.

I know that it is understood in Washington that the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] has not yet developed such weapons, and has not yet made real combat devices. Nor does Hans Blix, Director-General of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], believe that the DPRK has nuclear weapons. The External Intelligence Service also believes that the DPRK's nuclear

programme is now in a frozen state and that in certain conditions the North Koreans are evidently prepared to stop it altogether and open it fully to inspection. Pyongyang's recent consent to have "gas-graphite" reactors replaced with light-water ones is a sign that the DPRK is ready to suspend part of its military programmes.

But there is one point which requires explanation. The fact that the DPRK decided to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and sought to prevent control by IAEA inspectors has caused another knot to develop. Pyongyang has held up its withdrawal from the Treaty as a result of the dialogue between the DPRK and the United States and the monolithic position of the world community. But the interruption in IAEA control activity is not a point in favour of the North Korean leadership.

I would further like to note that the process of the transfer of power in the DPRK is still being completed. In these conditions everyone should display special caution and discretion in order not to fuel the situation which is already tense as it is.

The Americans display admirable firmness when they state to Pyongyang the view of the world community on the unacceptability of deviating from international treaties. At the same time it is no secret that the United States is fulfilling its own national foreign-policy interests in the region. The DPRK, on its part, plays for its own high stakes in its "nuclear dialogue" with the Americans. The conclusion follows that Russia, too, should proceed for its own interests in the matter of ensuring security in the Far East.

**Correspondent:** Israel is next on your list. It is no secret that it unofficially possesses nuclear weapons as well as advanced missile delivery vehicles...

**Gennady Yevstafyev:** Israelis themselves confirm this with pleasure in informal talks. Nuclear material of weapon purity is accumulated with the help of a heavy-water reactor and an installation for processing irradiated fuel (they are not controlled by IAEA). Their capacity is enough for manufacturing nuclear material for 5-10 warheads a year. A reactor of 26 megawatt capacity was commissioned in 1963 with the help of France and was modernized during the 70's. After its capacity was increased to 75-150 megawatts the production of weapon plutonium could have grown from 7-8 to 50 kilogrammes a year. The installation for the processing of irradiated fuel was also built with the help of a French firm. It can produce 15-40 kilogrammes of weapon plutonium a year.

In other words, Israel could have manufactured up to 20 warheads during the 70's-80's and now may possess as many as 200. These calculations can be corrected, of course, depending on the specific technical conditions. The high scientific and technological potential enables Israel to improve the designs of nuclear weapons, for instance, to develop small-size versions as well.

**Correspondent:** As far as I know Israel is now capable also of producing chemical weapons of all types, including nerve and blister agents and agents causing temporary disability...

**Gennady Yevstafyev:** Yes, Israel has highly developed chemical and petrochemical industries, qualified specialists and stocks of raw materials. Frankly speaking, this greatly complicates international processes of disarmament as a whole. In particular, Arab states have not signed the convention prohibiting chemical weapons and will evidently not sign it until Israel's position in the military-nuclear sphere clarifies.

**Correspondent:** The third place mentioned by you is Hindustan.

**Gennady Yevstafyev:** Let us begin with India. I would assess its technological possibilities as being very high. Though Pakistan's technical possibilities are somewhat lower they are also quite high. Besides that, Pakistan has good sources of financing, including foreign ones. About a year ago the External Intelligence Service prepared an open report where it pointed to Pakistan's possession of a nuclear potential.

**Correspondent:** But nuclear weapons are not the whole issue. There is also the problem of the proliferation of missile technologies.

**Gennady Yevstafyev:** The use of missile arms is evidently an inseparable part of strategic and operational plans in some countries. Among states which have made the greatest progress in this direction are (besides industrially advanced countries) Israel, Iran, Syria, India, Pakistan, the DPRK and Brazil.

It is well known that there are legal loopholes that pave the way for acquisition by Third World countries of necessary technical experience and technologies, such as the fulfilment of subcontracts of Western aerospace firms, the purchase of their shares, the setting up of joint or front companies, invitation of foreign specialists, the training of probationers, etc. Add to this the growth of industrial espionage. Incidentally the special commission of the UN Security Council on Iraq revealed the immense role which Western firms played illegally (or with the blessing of their governments?) in the development of Iraq's ramified missile complex.

But it is impermissible to deprive some countries of access to peaceful technologies on the pretext of strengthening control over missile technologies. Specialists (including those in the External Intelligence Service) keep a careful watch over Iran's missile intentions, including the direction of its purchases and its interest in technologies. But the talk about "Iran's strengthening" and "danger emanating from it" sometimes camouflages the striving to deprive that country of access to modern technologies for purposes of development of its peaceful industrial potential.

**Correspondent:** The open report of the External Intelligence Service published in 1993 says that about 100 countries now have an industrial base for making chemical weapons.

**Gennady Yevstafyev:** While the situation with nuclear weapons can be controlled (through combination of space

facilities with operational information), this is very difficult to do where chemical weapons are concerned. It is believed that the real requirement of chemical weapons amounts to only 100-200 tons even in a major and prolonged regional conflict. The stocks of chemical weapons are in practice greater than these figures. But it is practically impossible to detect 100 and even 500 tons of hidden chemical weapons. Chemical compounds and agents can be kept in containers smaller than an ordinary barrel.

#### MOSCOW NEWS Commentary

*It may be presumed that the highly placed Russian intelligence officer has made public only part of the data at his disposal. But the accents made by Gennady Yevstafyev show that the world will soon face a new military-political situation.*

This was ultimately the factor in Russia's official decision in Nov '93 to reject the thesis of being the first not to use nuclear weapons. The basic points of the military doctrine do not preclude the use of nuclear weapons against states which have not joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty. What is more, cases have been stipulated when Russia can use nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear participants in the Treaty. In the words of Valery Manilov, Deputy Secretary of Russia's Security Council, this approach was a result of "painful revision" of Russia's nuclear policy "at the highest level: each member of the Security Council has expressed his view on this matter."

The members of Russia's Security Council believe that nuclear weapons are above all an important political factor for Russia. "Having taken into account the growing number of countries which conceal their nuclear weapons, Russia has reconsidered its former approach," stated Valery Manilov.

Thus Russia's new nuclear concept is one of nuclear deterrence. It looks like the military-political leadership of Russia is increasingly less worried about the nuclear arsenals of the United States. It is new nuclear countries that become the subject of its closest attention.

#### Police Arrest Man With Radioactive Material

LD2102181194 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*  
1656 GMT 21 Feb 94

[Article by *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Nikolay Milov]

[Text] Ulyanovsk February 21 TASS—Police arrested on Monday a train passenger who, it said, was carrying an "isotope source of radioactivity" to Moscow for sale.

The train was bound for the Russian capital from the city of Dmitrovgrad on the Volga where a research institute of nuclear reactors is situated.

The man was arrested when the train arrived in the city of Ulyanovsk.

#### ESTONIA

##### Nuclear Fuel Will Be Removed From Paldiski 'As Planned'

WS1102212594 Tallinn *ETA in English* 1832 GMT  
11 Feb 94

["News Release"]

[Text] The removal of nuclear fuel from former Soviet submarine training base Paldiski in north west Estonia and its transport to Russia is expected to be carried out as planned and the work will be done in the spring and summer of 1994, Antti Vuorinen, head of the nuclear and radiation safety group of the Council of the Baltic Sea countries, told a news conference on Friday.

Dismantling of the training reactors depends on the essence of an agreement Estonia and Russia are to conclude this spring, Vuorinen said.

Problems might still spring up, Mark Sinisoo, the adviser to the Estonian Foreign Ministry, told the news conference. Russia wants to transport the fuel in containers TK 18 never used for that purpose before. This requires previous testing and a consent by GozAtomNadzor. Besides, Russia has no specific plans for the deposition of the nuclear waste, Sinisoo added. There is only a list of priorities which has to be approved by the Russian government.

##### Container With Radioactive Scrap Metal Discovered

WS1702152694 Tallinn *ETA in English* 0755 GMT  
17 Feb 94

[From "News Bulletin" No. 33/94]

[Text] The Customs Service discovered a container with radioactive scrap metal in a Tallinn commercial port storage yard on Tuesday [15 February]. The radiation level exceeds the maximum permitted level ten times. The Rescue Service is to remove the container today.

#### KAZAKHSTAN

##### State Adviser Counters Report on Nuclear Storage Dangers

LD1202180594 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*  
1708 GMT 12 Feb 94

[Article by *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Gennadiy Kulagin]

[Text] Almaty February 12 TASS—An *IZVESTIYA* newspaper report saying "Kazakh nuclear storages are on the verge of an accident" was estimated as "not corresponding to the reality" today by Kazakh state adviser Tulegen Zhukeyev.

Zhukeyev told a news conference in Almaty the report was "instigated by forces wishing to introduce additional difficulties in the beginning bilateral negotiations on nuclear

arms and a search for mutually acceptable decisions on an equal basis." [sentence as received]

"It seems the forces are dissatisfied with the Kazakh suspension of withdrawal of intercontinental ballistic missiles that has begun on Kazakh goodwill. A total of 12 missiles have been withdrawn. Now the work is stopped because of the unsettled problem of compensation for highly-enriched uranium half of which was extracted in Kazakhstan," said the official.

The report was published on the eve of a U.S. visit of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. This gives grounds to say the certain forces hope for a possibility of additional international pressure on Kazakhstan in the sphere of nuclear arms. "However, the problem can be settled only through civilized negotiations with due account of interests of all sides. Kazakhstan will not abandon its sovereign rights and interests," said Zhukeyev.

The Kazakh stand was taken with understanding by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev during his recent stay in Almaty.

As for the IZVESTIYA's concern over the danger-prone situation in nuclear arms storage allegedly created through the fault of Kazakhstan, the state adviser said "nuclear arms are completely safe and well-controlled. Kazakhstan has never hampered the delivery of spares, instruments and equipment for repairs and warranty service of nuclear warheads in contrast to the report's claims. It is also not interested in deteriorated position of Russian servicemen".

"We have repeatedly offered the Russian side to begin negotiations and settle all problems on a mutually acceptable basis. Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko timely responded to a letter of his Russian counterpart Viktor Chernomyrdin on the problem," stressed Zhukeyev. In his words, "the sides can achieve progress on the issue only with due account of their interests".

#### **Morale, Cash Problems Render Missile Bases Unsafe**

*PM1102172194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
12 Feb 94 First Edition p 1*

[Viktor Litovkin report: "Nuclear Magazines in Kazakhstan Are on the Verge of an Accident"]

[Text] While Kiev and Moscow are reaching agreement on the fate of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, a critical situation has taken shape in the nuclear magazines located on the territory of Kazakhstan. IZVESTIYA has been told this by informed sources at the Russian Ministry of Defense.

As is known, 104 SS-18 missiles—the heaviest in the world—each with 10 nuclear warheads, and also Tu-95MS strategic bombers with 240 cruise missiles with a nuclear payload are stationed in that state. The situation on the nuclear technical bases where these specialized munitions are stored is becoming threatening. Particularly in the

garrisons at Derzhavinsk in Turgay Oblast and at Zhangiz-Tobe in Semipalatinsk Oblast, where two missile divisions are stationed.

The number of nuclear munitions laid in store there is more than twice the permissible norms. The fire alarm system, the fire extinguishing equipment, and the electric wiring are literally on their last legs and virtually do not work. If, God forbid, some untoward situation were to arise, it would be problematic to get the nuclear warheads out of the building and also to extinguish the flames—the consequences do not bear thinking about. Things are no better in the shop in which operational checks on the reentry vehicles of strategic missiles are carried out. For several months now it has been in a precarious [avariynyy] state. The end wall has come away from the building, and if it collapses it will bury beneath itself both nuclear warheads and people.

I was told that there is no heating or water in the special premises of the missile technical bases. The technical contrivances for guarding these bases, the engineered structures—or more accurately, the wire entanglements—and the protection device along which high-tension current passes have been disconnected from the power supply network, and the mine fields and signal rockets are not activated when the perimeters of the guarded sectors are violated by wild animals and people. The guard subunits are not fully manned, and their training is at such a low level that you can only be amazed that no one has yet stolen a single atom bomb. Maybe this is only because it is so cold now in the steppes of Northern Kazakhstan and criminals do not feel like going after nuclear secrets.

There is, in principle, just one reason for all these disgraceful things, which specialists call by the abstruse term "gross violation of the explosion-and-fire-safety requirements"—the lack of an interstate agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan on the status of, and on the future fate of, the missile technical bases and the strategic missile troops stationed on the state's territory.

Although Almaty does not consider itself the owner of these specific weapons and has announced that the state has subscribed to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a country which does not possess them, according to information from the same source, its officials prohibit the Russian military from taking them outside the republic to manufacturing plants and, moreover, do not permit the delivery to the garrisons of the necessary spare parts and tools or the equipment for carrying out repair work or the warranty servicing of nuclear munitions.

The national bank of Kazakhstan does not have a ruble account to which Russia could transfer money to pay for the labor of its officers and ensigns or allocate funds for electricity or to ensure the garrisons' vital activity.

Owing to chronic nonpayments, the missilemen regularly have their electricity cut off, and this, so specialists say, could result in the unpredictable behavior of the entire nuclear missile complex.

"Things have reached the point," one of the officers who have arrived from Kazakhstan told me, "where our pay is smuggled over the border to us."

But there is nothing to buy in the garrison stores even with the money that the officers do get—they are completely empty. The mood among officers could not be worse. Virtually over half the nuclear specialists with top qualifications do not wish to sign contracts for military service here. Deserters have even appeared among officers, and 14 recent graduates of higher military schools went absent without leave from one of the divisions and have not turned up for service for several months now. Four of them are specialists on nuclear warheads.

According to the information which the editorial office has, repeated requests from the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense to Kazakhstani Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko to help to organize the normal functioning of the nuclear missile installations located in the country have not produced any results. Written requests have not even been answered. Maybe the visit to Almaty of Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev will get something moving. But the military is afraid that this process might drag on indefinitely. Nuclear weapons cannot wait endlessly.

## LATVIA

### Investigations of Nuclear Deals Reported

AU1502125594 Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG  
in German 15 Feb 94 p 7

["rzi"-attributed report: "New Rumors About Cessna Passengers"]

[Text] It seems that several intelligence agents of former East Bloc states were involved in the events, which ended, for the time being, on the evening of 24 January with the crash of a Cessna 425 private plane into Lake Constance, a crash which has led to many speculations. This is shown by files of the Latvian Public Prosecutor's Office, to which the Riga daily DIENA was able to gain access. According to latest findings by the Stuttgart Land Office of Criminal Investigations, in addition to pilot Rudolf Wirschen and the two Czechs, Iveta Ranetova and Alena Petrusova, Berlin building entrepreneur Josef Rimmele and his partner Klaus Eichler were aboard the plane. The latter two tried to make a deal with allegedly radioactive materials in the Latvian capital of Riga last autumn.

### Murky Water, Murky Figures

According to the files of the Latvian investigators, Rimmele and Eichler were high-ranking former employees of the GDR [German Democratic Republic] State Security Service; another wire puller of the deal and mediator of murky business contacts in the east, Klaus-Peter Nedwig, served as a lieutenant colonel in the GDR People's Police in the past. The interpreter for the Germans was Pawel Minarchik, formerly captain of the Czechoslovak intelligence service, who had infiltrated Radio Free Europe as an

employee during the years of the Cold War and was later sentenced to a prison term for trying to blow up the radio station.

According to the files of the Riga Public Prosecutor's Office, in spring 1993 Rimmele and Eichler met in Prague with Alexander Korisno, the owner of the Marketing Service company, which is registered in Latvia. Already at that time, they spoke of a deal with "rare metals." On 24 October 1993, Rimmele, Eichler, Ranetova, Petrusova, as well as Minarchik arrived in Riga. There, in the office of the Dimassko company in Valdemara Street 161, the men met with the so-far unknown sellers of 66 kg of rubidium and 6 kg cesium 133 (both metals are not radioactive). According to findings by the Latvian public prosecutor's office, at that time the goods were in the bonded warehouse at Zurich Kloten airport at the disposal of a company owned by Rimmele. The purpose of the trip to Riga reportedly was to settle payment modalities—\$2 million in cash were demanded. However, the fact that the two buyers had not yet found a customer for the allegedly "hot goods" and thus were not able to pay seems to have met with little understanding by the sellers, according to the files of the Latvian investigators.

### In the Hands of the Mafia

The further course of the events reportedly was as follows: When Rimmele, Eichler, and Minarchik left the office, they were attacked in front of the door by six to eight masked men, who pushed them into a small bus, threatening to use their weapons. The bus took them to a hiding place in a private building in Saremas Street 8. There the kidnappers demanded money. The above-mentioned address is well known to the local police: The building used to belong to Viktors Balulis, a gangster with a long police record, who had fled from the authorities and gone abroad.

According to the findings by the Latvian investigators, Rimmele and Minarchik were released soon afterwards, while Eichler—tied with hand-cuffs to a heater—remained in the basement of the building in Saremas Street. Minarchik and the two women were emphatically told not to leave Riga, while Rimmele flew back to Germany—probably to get money. On 27 October, he turned to the German Embassy in Riga, reporting that Eichler had been kidnapped the day before. However, Latvian Interior Minister Kristovskis was told by the Embassy about this matter as late as on 3 November.

### Goods From Moscow

When Rimmele returned to Riga on 10 November, Korisno, the above-mentioned owner of the Marketing Service company, demanded not only \$2.2 million as payment for the goods, but another \$17,000 for himself as a bonus. On the same day he was arrested by the police. During the subsequent interrogation, Korisno admitted to talks with Rimmele and Eichler about the purchase of "rare metals" and to several meetings with the two in Riga, but he claimed that he did not now where Eichler was. On 20 November, Eichler managed to flee despite the fact that

he was constantly watched. He immediately reported to the police and told them about the background of the kidnapping.

According to the current findings of the Riga Public Prosecutor's Office, the "rare metals" probably reached Switzerland from Latvia without any detours; only the juridical and financial part of the transaction took place in the Baltic republic. Clues point to a scientific production facility in Moscow as the actual seller. So far, the Latvian public prosecutor has issued indictments against five persons only for kidnapping.

#### **'Mysterious Case' of Possible Sale of Radioactive Elements**

*WS1102174094 Riga LETA in English 1416 GMT  
11 Feb 94*

[Text] Riga, February 11, LETA—The daily DIENA reported about certain aspects of the mysterious case involving the purchase of alkali metals and a plane-crash over the Bodensee in Germany. Initial reports of the German press claimed that the plane might contain radioactive materials bought in Riga. However, when the plane had been recovered neither bodies nor metals were found in it. Ilgvars Samins, a top official of the Latvian Prosecutors Office, said that by now there were no grounds to allege that the missing persons had bought rubidium and cesium in Riga. It is more likely that the metals have come from the East.

I. Ruemmele and K. Eichler, whose names appear in materials of the Latvian Prosecutors Office and German press, are the former employees of the East Germany's intelligence service while Pavel Minarzik, said to be an interpreter, actually was a former captain of the Czechoslovakia's secret service. For many years he had been working for the radio station "Free Europe" but later was convicted for the attempt to blow up the same radio station. Minarzik also was the author of the book titled "The Come-back of a Secret Service Man".

The name of a certain Klaus Peter Nedvig, the former colonel of Berlin Criminal Police, could also be found in the prosecutors files. On October 24 they were in Riga, negotiating a purchase of 66 kilograms of rubidium and 6 kilograms of cesium-133 for a price of \$2 million. Meantime the subject of the deal was stored at the airport of a Swiss town. The talks in Riga focused on the term of payment which the foreigners asked to postpone as the final customer for the metals had yet not been found.

Following the talks at the office the guests were rounded up by 6-8 masked and armed men. They were pushed into a minibus and whisked to a cottage on the outskirts of the city where the demands for money were put up to the victims. Eichler was left hand-cuffed to a radiator, but the rest of the captives were freed soon and given "advice" to leave Riga. After 10 days Eichler managed to escape. The mediator of the deal, a Riga resident named A. Korizno, who apart from \$2.2 million demanded extra \$17,000 for his services, was arrested. The Latvian Prosecutors Office

said that in Riga only laundering of money took place, therefore at present the case have been filed only for taking hostages.

## **LITHUANIA**

#### **'Nuclear Transit' Problem Blamed on Lack of Equipment**

*PM1702165394 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
17 Feb 94 First Edition p 3*

[Nikolay Lashkevich report: "Lithuania Is Unable To Stop Nuclear Smuggling"]

[Text] Vilnius—Lithuania cannot ensure complete control over the transportation of nuclear and radiative materials across its territory since it does not possess the necessary equipment that would make it possible to detect nuclear fuel being conveyed over the border.

Povilas Vaisnis, chief of the State Inspectorate for Nuclear Energy Safety, has indirectly confirmed the persistent rumors of Lithuania as a transit country for nuclear radiation. He did not refute or confirm the opinion of the German police that Vilnius and Kaunas are centers of nuclear smuggling, although the two largest Lithuanian cities can hardly aspire to such an "honorary" title. There is no doubt that, following the breakup of the USSR, Lithuania became a kind of transshipment base for various firms, groups, and clans engaged in transporting and selling dangerous freight to the West.

But what of Lithuania itself, which, thanks to the presence of the Ignalina Nuclear Electric Power Station [AES] on its territory, possesses nuclear fuel and materials? Is it not the source of the nuclear exports? Lithuanian nuclear specialists unanimously deny this. Povilas Vaisnis believes that, despite the lack of juridical regulation of the control and accounting system at the Ignalina AES, nuclear fuel is kept under reliable guard in special storehouses. And yet the optimism is clearly exaggerated. Everybody remembers last year's sensational business when a nuclear fuel cassette went missing from the Ignalina AES and has still not been found. AES engineers estimate that one such cassette containing fuel is worth approximately \$60,000 on the world market.

If it had not been for stocktaking, even now nobody would have learned of the disappearance of that cassette. The investigative group never arrived at an unequivocal conclusion—had it been removed from the territory of the AES, or had it simply "gotten lost" in the maze of nuclear bookkeeping?

Lithuania signed the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and pledged to keep nuclear materials safe. A special inspectorate is also keeping a careful eye on this. A significant leak of nuclear fuel or radioactive waste is ruled out here. But the transportation of nuclear materials across Lithuania is something really real.

"We are trying to close the route for the export of nuclear fuel," Povilas Vaisnis said, "but it is difficult for us. Not

only do we not have the necessary equipment and apparatus, we also don't have specialists in the border and customs services or such work skills in exposing smuggling."

Incidentally, local smugglers, for whom nuclear transit is a reliable means of making a fast buck, are perfectly well aware of these difficulties. Many have maintained links with the Russian market, and people in the know maintain that things go on at a very high level.

Entry to this sphere of business is prohibited to ordinary businessmen engaged, for example, in the "copper business" or unscrewing nuts from railroad tracks. As a rule, failures and unpleasantness await those who attempt to engage in amateur activities. This, for example, was what happened to one R. Urbonas, a resident of Panevezys, who decided to make money out of selling several kilograms of uranium conveyed from beyond the Urals. He was caught and arrested by the police but, when asked where the uranium was, he replied that he had thrown it into the Nevezis River. At the insistence of the city's residents the frightened police dug up the whole riverbed but never found anything. Either the nuclear businessman had managed to sell the uranium in time, or the police failed to display sufficient zeal.

Genuine nuclear slick operators do everything legally. They fall victim only to unforeseen circumstances. A graphic example is provided by the matter of a load of beryllium in containers given to the Lithuanian Joint-Stock Innovation Bank in Vilnius to store. The police stumbled across it by chance when checking a telephone report that a bomb had been planted. It is, however, possible that the call, far from being accidental, was a ploy [navodka] by rivals for the dangerous freight. It is curious that, according to documents, there was no contraband: The freight weighing four tonnes and worth approximately \$123 million had a certificate, an official import permit to Lithuania, a customs note....

## UKRAINE

### Consultative Council for Cooperation With IAEA Created

WS1602102694 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program  
Network in Ukrainian 0900 GMT 16 Feb 94

[Text] In order to conduct a systematic analysis of world experience in the development of nuclear power engineering and the utilization of nuclear power, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers has resolved to create the Interdepartmental Council for Cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. The Interdepartmental Council will be a consultative body operating on a public voluntary basis. It is headed by Umanets, chairman of the State Committee for Nuclear Energy [Derzhkomatom].

### ABB Official Discusses Nuclear Plant Safety With Kravchuk

WS2102212394 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program  
Network in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 21 Feb 94

[Text] Ukrainian President Kravchuk received today (Percy Barnevik), chief executive officer of ABB, a multinational concern. (Mr. Barnevik) came to Ukraine for the first time. The purpose of his visit is to expand cooperation with our country, first of all in the sphere of nuclear engineering. This cooperation was initiated last year, during President Kravchuk's visit to Switzerland. What can it bring for us? President Kravchuk and Mr. Barnevik talked about this with the journalists after their meeting.

[Begin Kravchuk recording] After we signed the tripartite agreement and the Supreme Council ratified START I and Article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol, the world's attitude toward Ukraine changed for the better. Last week, I had a telephone conversations with Bill Clinton, Mitterand, Kohl; and all of them, with no exception [words indistinct] heads of the state and governments said that the question is not whether assistance should be extended, but that it should be applied to specific programs. So, the task is to come up with specific programs. All those conversations had a common point: Our countries are ready to give you aid, but it is up to you to support your programs regarding their technical, technological, or legal aspects, and then submit them to those countries and the World Bank. So, ABB has a priority in this area, because we have been working with this concern for more than a year. I met with its president in Zurich last year in Switzerland. Since that time, we have been concentrating on the problems facing Ukraine. The concern has concrete proposals. They also include establishing an investment fund in nuclear engineering, and the Ukrainian engineering in general. The issue of hard currency investments is very important for us. Thus, the task of freeing Ukraine from dependency on energy is a leading priority. Another priority is agriculture. One should act very quickly here, but equipped with programs so that we could see things in perspective. To sum it up, I would like to say that such a powerful company as ABB can do very much for Ukraine. Following today's meeting, I am convinced that specific plans, programs, and intentions are on hand. [end recording]

[Ukrainian translation of Barnevik's words] I think that improvement of reliability at nuclear power plants is one of the prime tasks, because nuclear plants will help reduce dependency on oil and natural gas. This was the topic of our conversation with the Ukrainian president. We were discussing not only the technical side of this issue, but also the possibility of creating a special investment fund. We have some experience acquired by the first joint venture. Now, we are considering setting up several more similar ventures in Ukraine. Ukraine is one of the countries where we could do a lot.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

**Greeks Term Turkey's 'Secret' Nuclear Program 'Threat'***NC2202140394 Athens APOYEVMATINI in Greek  
21 Feb 94 p 8***[Report by Athanasios Dhrougos]**

[Excerpts] Turkey's secret nuclear program is a threat to Greece. According to extremely confidential APOYEV-MATINI information, YEETHA [National Defense General Staff] military officials have been particularly concerned.

According to these reports, "heading toward the year 2000 and facing a chaotic situation in the Balkans, Turkey in the next three or four years will be well along the path of developing nuclear forces, something that will make it particularly respected in the part of the world stretching from the Adriatic to Kazakhstan."

A nuclear program that aims to construct a nuclear bomb is under way. This program will be added to Ankara's already fast-developing arms programs for the Air Force and Navy. The same confidential analysis of Turkey's nuclear activities stresses that in the new geopolitical environment that followed the dissolution of the Soviet nuclear arsenal; Ukraine's acquisition of nuclear weapons; and the general instability in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, Turkey must prevent incidents from happening because the threat of small regional wars with nuclear weapons, such as between Pakistan and India, cannot be ruled out. [passage omitted]

To a great extent, Turkey satisfies the basic prerequisites for a nuclear country. It has uranium supplies and is strong in the sciences. If its cooperation with Pakistan, Argentina, and China proceeds, the Turkish nuclear bomb will become a reality. At the same time, Ankara is trying to exploit instability in the Middle East as well as the ambitions of many states in the area, such as Libya and Iran, for weapons of mass destruction (nuclear-chemical) by claiming that Iran or Iraq will threaten it in the future. Therefore, because of changes in NATO policies, it must have a nuclear bomb. [passage omitted]

Ankara is trying to acquire nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union's full and diverse arsenal but is concerned with U.S. and European reaction. All those unemployed scientists have been hired to various "special groups" on a yearly basis for \$2,300 per month. Their contracts may be renewed. Scientists from Kazakhstan who are experts on nuclear weapons teach at Istanbul University. [passage omitted]

The cost of making nuclear weapons is believed to be great but Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller and her staff are concerned with the new world that is being created. They attach particular importance to the country's nuclear infrastructure, which is now making progress and will show results in three or four years.

APOYEVMATINI knows that Turkey's nuclear program concerns the Greek military. It is a fact that in the next few years, Turkey's threat to Greece will include a nuclear element. Our side must adopt a strategy that will analyze in depth future threats, mainly by Turkey's many arms programs.

## FRANCE

**Country's Stance at 1995 NPT Talks Previewed***BR1402124394 Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE  
in French Feb 94 pp 83-100*

[Article by Admiral Marcel Duval, former chairman of our the National Defense Studies Committee and director of DEFENSE NATIONALE: "What Future for the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty?"]

[Excerpts] The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which covers a 25-year period, will expire in 1995. Negotiations will then be needed to set the terms for its renewal. Admiral Marcel Duval was kind enough to carry out an analysis of nonproliferation, of the treaty, of the concerns of different nuclear and nonnuclear states, and finally of the prospects for the future, particularly for our country. We are most grateful to him for this very complete study. [passage omitted]

**Future Prospects**

Having taken stock of nonproliferation, the term hitherto used to describe the totality of measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, let us now examine its future prospects on the eve of its expiry in 1995. As for the NPT itself, its indefinite renewal, which naturally is desired by the nuclear powers, would require an affirmative vote by 83 countries, since it is estimated that 165 countries will then be party to it. As the general assumption is that 45 positive votes are guaranteed, those of at least 38 developing countries will also have to be secured. The Conference of Nonaligned States, which met in 1992, set the following conditions for extending the treaty: the cessation of nuclear tests; an end to the production of nuclear weapons; implementation of the START treaties; and the total elimination of these weapons by a given deadline. Furthermore, during the conference to prepare the revision of the NPT, which took place in May 1993, it appeared that many nonnuclear states, not all of which were nonaligned states, will oppose indefinite extension and may even propose a two-year trial period, at the end of which their demands would have to be implemented through international treaties.

We have seen that the United States has now decided to meet most of these demands by proposing the conclusion of a treaty totally banning nuclear tests, and of another prohibiting the production of fissile materials for explosive use. For its part, the United States has already declared a moratorium on its tests until 1995, and stopped its production of fissile materials, while also accepting international monitoring of its stocks. In addition, it has ceased modernization of its nuclear arsenal, since, for the first time for 50 years, it is no longer running a nuclear program

now that it has ceased further work on its mobile strategic missile, and it canceled both its light strategic missile program and its programs for new nuclear warheads for its Trident submarine missiles and for new nuclear missiles for its B2 bombers. It has also undertaken the dismantling required by the START treaties, even though these have not yet been ratified by the other parties. In the face of this voluntary disarmament, some have wondered, analyzing statements by Americans in senior positions, whether this did not amount to a delegitimization by the United States of nuclear weapons so as to derive maximum advantage from its undisputed conventional superiority over any possible adversaries anywhere in the world.

Nevertheless, problems may still arise with other protagonists involved in the renewal of the NPT and the adoption of any other planned nonproliferation agreements linked to it. First, take the chaotic situation in the former Soviet Union, which particularly raises, as has been seen, the problem of Ukraine's adherence to the NPT. There will then remain the task of dismantling those nuclear weapons affected by the START treaty, which will take over 10 years and will require considerable financial assistance, not to mention the difficulties arising from the international monitoring of its implementation. To these concerns we should add, mindful of the Chernobyl catastrophe, those over the safety of nuclear plants for peaceful purposes and over the possibility of subjecting these plants to the controls which will inevitably be required by a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons use. Finally, it is obvious that the degree to which all these proposals are welcomed in 1995 will be primarily influenced by the actions taken before this expiry by China, the most "proliferating" state whose actions frequently differ from its statements and which has the right of veto. It will also depend on the behavior of the undeclared nuclear powers. In other words, it will depend on Iraq's respect for its commitment to accepting long-term monitoring of its disarmament; on the outcome of the present confrontation over monitoring North Korea's installations; regarding Israel and Iran, on the peace process presently under way in the Middle East; while it may be hoped that the mutual deterrence between India and Pakistan will prevent their dispute over Kashmir from degenerating into open war. History teaches us that disarmament of all kinds is far more often a consequence of peace than the necessary prerequisite for it. This means that the struggle to prevent proliferation is undoubtedly far more of a political process, particularly at a regional level, than a matter of preventive technocratic measures. This does not imply that the latter have no effect, even if it is only to do everything possible to avoid the use of nuclear weapons in haste or in error, since, once the "nuclear taboo" has been breached, they have failed in their peace-keeping purpose.

#### Consequences for France

We now have to consider the consequences of all the above for France, which for the past 35 years has based its defense policy on the peace-keeping effect of nuclear weapons, and has largely based its foreign policy on the

independence of its deterrent. Thus, the "French exception" in this area will be particularly challenged by the nonproliferation measures to be submitted in 1995 to the international community.

Of these, the major concern is obviously the total cessation of nuclear tests, since this not only poses both for ourselves and for others a threat to the safety of existing weapons, but would also prevent us from developing new programs, even though we presently have at least one major one under way, the M5, which, by considerably increasing both range and performance, is intended to give our "new generation" of nuclear-missile launching submarines (SNLE) "all-out" capabilities. To this technological constraint is added the psychological, and hence political one, which is bound to challenge the two super powers' previously-announced renunciation of mobile strategic missiles and multiple warheads, and of terrestrial and naval tactical nuclear weapons. In contrast, the cessation of production of fissile materials for explosive use would not appear to have any major consequences for our defense, at least over the medium term.

The increase in "denuclearized zones" would also seriously limit the freedom of action of our nuclear submarines, as they presently carry almost 90 percent of our nuclear deterrent capability. If this process were to extend to Europe, following the apparently conceivable withdrawal of U.S. airborne nuclear capacity still deployed there, then this would put an end to the possibility of eventually establishing a European deterrent. For this reason, and also to finally frame a common policy in this matter, it would be desirable to discuss all these nonproliferation measures within the European Union, or, failing this, on a Franco-British basis, as allowed by the recent establishment of a "Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine." At the national level, it would also appear desirable to reactivate the "Council on Exterior Nuclear Relations," set up in 1976 to respond to the concerns then beginning to be aroused here by proliferation.

The survival of our national deterrent, together with the need to consider establishing such a deterrent at the European level, must be justified in terms of the effectiveness to be expected of them in the face of threats which can be foreseen over a fairly long term. In this respect, the threat emanating from the still considerable nuclear arsenals located in the territory of the former Soviet Union has in no way disappeared, however unlikely any aggression by them appears at present. The greatest danger is probably that of the possibility of these nuclear weapons falling into the hands of groups of varying degrees of responsibility, for whom the exercise of our deterrent, backed up by the threat of massive reprisals, would run the risk both of being unacceptable to international public opinion, and of being ineffective. The same would apply, we believe, to any "troublemaker" located outside Europe who, armed with a few primitive weapons and suitable ballistic vehicles, would hide in some kind of "aggressive sanctuary," or even perpetrated nuclear blackmail.

In the face of such possible threats, two schools of thought are taking shape here. The first holds to the above doctrine,

restricting it to the instance of major aggression, actually directed against our national territory, for which it feels the present arsenal is adequate. The second considers there is a need for a limited "nuclear counterthreat," capable of deployment overseas and intended to "inhibit" the destructive capacity of a terrorist state, and if need be to "decapitate" it. This would require, in the view of this school, very accurate mobile weapons with reduced collateral effects, with adjustable power, and the capability to penetrate the ground, and would thus mean new programs, and hence the need to carry out tests. In contrast, a rapprochement seems to be emerging between the two schools over the possible benefits, in the face of these new threats, in possessing a system based on ballistic theater antimissiles, or in other words a mobile system, even though during the Cold War France was opposed to any global system. Some consider that the disadvantage of establishing such a system is that it could give the "South" the impression that it is about to replace the "East" as the Western world's enemy.

The expiry in 1995 will therefore force us to formulate a view on all these matters. As for doctrines, we do not feel it is desirable to specify too closely the future conditions in which our nuclear deterrent could be used, or particularly to say what will not be done, so as to keep all our options open. It appears obvious that this deterrent will not be able to remain the absolute priority it was during the Cold War; but, as is amply proved by the present debates over nonproliferation and also those over the future course of the Security Council, it will certainly retain its political dimension. As it is no longer possible to "disinvent" the nuclear weapon, France must protect itself from its human know-how and its technical capabilities in this area, as these are largely what will ensure its future status as a "major medium power," and, if necessary, its survival if it were to be the object of any major aggression.

#### **Officials Say Government Launching New Defense Strategy**

AU1602134594 Paris AFP in English 1334 GMT  
16 Feb 94

[Text] Paris, Feb 16 (AFP)—France's conventional forces will have a new role independent of nuclear weapons under a defence white paper being prepared by the government, officials said Wednesday.

A meeting of the country's defence council attended by President Francois Mitterrand, Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, other top ministers and senior officers was set to approve the white paper later Wednesday [16 February].

Since German reunification, France has carried out partial nuclear disarmament, reorganised its command structure and reduced its troop numbers.

The purpose of the white paper was to define post-Cold War strategy for the next 20 years, the officials said.

Up until the collapse of the Soviet Union, French strategy was founded on a single scenario—a massive French conventional engagement alongside NATO allies in Central Europe, most likely in former Czechoslovakia.

The white paper sets out six scenarios for the commitment of French forces, the officials said, starting with "major conflict", implying use of nuclear weapons.

Others range through use of force to protect sovereignty of overseas possessions and the French sphere of influence in Africa and French action in a regional conflict developing from the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The white paper also states the need for French forces to be capable of sustaining long-term and distant operations, as in peace-keeping in Yugoslavia and Cambodia, and as in the Gulf war.

Mitterrand resisted pressure for change in nuclear strategy, informed sources said, and his views prevailed.

Sections of the Gaullist Rally for the Republic (RPR) lobbied for a resumption of nuclear testing in order to develop small warheads that could be used in limited operations in a "madman" scenario.

Instead the strategy remains that of "the weak against the strong", as during the Cold War when the French deterrent was aimed against tens of thousands of Soviet warheads, the sources said.

Mitterrand has ordered an acceleration in the development of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the M5, scheduled to succeed the M45 in the year 2005.

The white paper will be presented to parliamentary defence and foreign affairs commissions ahead of debate in the National Assembly next June on financing new weapons over the five years 1995-2000.

#### **M5 Project Expected To Thwart Nuclear Strategy**

BR1802161794 Paris LE MONDE in French 18 Feb 94  
p 8

[Column by Rene Galy-Dejean, chairman of the National Assembly's Defense Commission and Rally for the Republic deputy in Paris: "Mr. Mitterrand's Trap"—first paragraph is LE MONDE introduction]

[Text] After the ministerial meeting in the Elysee [presidential office] on Wednesday 15 February to discuss the Defense White Paper, Rene Galy-Dejean, author of two parliamentary reports on nuclear testing and the armaments industry, accused Francois Mitterrand of setting a trap for the majority concerning the M5 strategic missile.

One of the particularly tough problems in the military planning law is to be found in the fate reserved for the future M5 missile. Between 2005 and 2010, this missile could replace the M45, which is currently under development for the new generation of submarines. The M45 will carry the latest nuclear warhead, the TN75. Thus renovated, the French strategic ocean force will comprise, by unanimous opinion, a tool for deterrence whose reliability can be guaranteed for the next 10 years.

In this context, what question should the politicians in charge be asking? In my opinion, the immediate development of the M5 is the most serious mistake that could be made in the drafting of the planning law. Not only would

it be a mistake in technological terms, but also in budgetary, strategic, and therefore political terms.

Technologically, the gain in performance attributed to the future missile—and the gain which is likely to be achieved—concerns range, accuracy, payload, and stealth. So far, however, this improved missile is felt to go hand in hand with a new warhead, the TN100, which is already in the design stage at the Atomic Energy Commission. This load will yield enhanced performance in terms of penetration and accuracy.

Is all this so very urgent? This does, it is true, represent decisive progress, but in only one area: The enhanced range "gives water" to submarines, i.e., it allows them to patrol in warm waters and to increase their potential and safety. However, as for the rest, there are a great many contradictions and uncertainties in the process!

#### Contradiction

We are increasing the surface of the targeted objective, while at the same time a consensus is emerging for moving away from a "city-oriented" doctrine of deterrence toward a doctrine based on the destruction of forces, in other words one that is more "targeted" and sophisticated. We are increasing the volume and payload of the missile's warhead, while every indicator points to a constant move toward nuclear warheads which are smaller in volume and weight, but which have equal strength. This is even one of France's specialties. Moreover, we are implementing a new armaments system based on the TN100—a warhead that is innovative in terms of design and operation—at a time when we are suspending nuclear tests and when, as a result, we are banning the validation of its design and development, and therefore the verification of the sought-after results.

To get around this contradiction, it is said that the current TN75 warhead, which will soon be in service, can be improved and adapted to the new M5 missile. This weakens the rhetoric and the deterrence. We find ourselves involved in an approach based on opportunity and not efficiency. Such opportunism has characterized the M5 missile since its birth and places a terrible financial burden on the defense budget and planning law.

It is estimated that the M5 missile alone, without its nuclear warhead, will cost around 65 billion francs. Its launch was announced to the Aerospatiale group in January 1992—two months before the last legislative elections—in a letter from the defense minister (Pierre Joxe). This baptism may appear blighted with some suspicion of electioneering, even if I do not ignore the problematically low order load of Aerospatiale's "strategic missiles" division.

Yet, was the military staff in favor of this? Was a decision made in the Defense Council?

At the same time, the Defense Ministry published a "reference document" on planning, the stand-in for the law that was not discussed in Parliament. This "reference document" clearly showed that merely pursuing the irreversible programmes already under way would put too

much pressure on the budget capacity in the medium term. Of course, funding allocated to the M5 missile in the 1993 budget was low, and it will be equally low in 1994. However, what will become of the new planning law if program authorizations have to be increased in the short term? We thus deprive the law of any maneuvering room, unless one major ongoing project is canceled. And who will take that risk?

#### Deterrence Thwarted

Consequently, we are blocking the development of our deterrence strategy. This development, which now enjoys broad consensus within the Armed Forces and the majority, is imposed by geopolitical upheavals.

We know the broad outlines of this consensus. Submarines are an important—if not key—strategic element in our defense apparatus, but the search for greater flexibility and improved adaptation to the new context has led to the implementation of a second airborne "component" fitted with the LRAS (long-range air-to-surface) missile. This "component" would have strike capacities for a second and final warning.

At the same time, the discussion of the implementation of antimissile protection is necessary in our country. From now on, Aerospatiale—despite the defection of the British over the LRAS—is in a position to develop missiles capable of stopping ballistic missiles at mid-altitude. In addition, the company alone can equip France with a long-range air-to-surface missile.

All this will be made financially impossible by the further development of the M5 missile. This missile will destroy what little flexibility a sustained budgetary effort could give to the planning law.

It is here that we meet up with politics again. The trap which the president of the republic has just set for the government and its majority was laid out in a sentence spoken in an interview given to AFP by Francois Mitterrand (LE MONDE of 11 January). He spoke of a "new missile which comprises a major improvement, namely in terms of range, and which could also be installed on the Albion platform."

So here is the M5 destroying the entire planning with all its might. Here is the compromised strategic development, the second weakened nuclear "component," and the antiballistic protection system postponed indefinitely. Here, lastly, is the Albion platform put back in the saddle and the "sanctuarization" of the reactivated territory.

Such a regression in our nuclear strategy is inconceivable. Or perhaps we are to think that Mr. Mitterrand, who came to power with a strong prejudice against deterrence, will leave his post by depriving his successor of this powerful tool, after he himself made use of it. The halting of nuclear testing and the fate of the M5 make one wonder. My feeling is that it would be desirable to stagger the implementation of the M5 in order to give France some latitude in adapting its strategy and equipping its forces for a new and dangerous world that is now emerging.

## SWITZERLAND

**Crashed Cessna Reportedly Scheduled To Go to Beijing***AU1702122194 Munich FOCUS in German 14 Feb 94 p 33*

[Report by Christian Sturm and Thomas Scheuer: "Flying Dealers"]

[Text] The mystery surrounding the obscure Cessna crash into Lake Constance continues. The police intend to continue the search for the dead bodies of the five missing passengers presumed to be at the bottom of Lake Constance. The investigators rule out that survivors might have been able to save themselves from the ice-cold water. Radar recordings do not give any information about a secret stopover between Prague and Lake Constance.

The business deals of the passengers also continue to remain mainly in the dark. According to research by FOCUS, one thing, however, seems to be the clear: Berlin businessmen Josef Rimmele, 54, and Klaus Eichler, 53, along with their two Czech companions, intended to fly to Beijing two days later.

In their appointment book a note was found of a planned meeting with three-star General Jin Kang Wang from the PRC Foreign Ministry. The two men from Berlin had been planning a dubious deal with him for months: The Chinese general wanted to get rid of 6 kg of the extremely rare metal Osmium 187 and 365 kg of the controversial phantom substance Red Mercury—at the steep price of \$493 million. The following route had been requested for the trip to Beijing and already approved by the Russian and Chinese authorities: Prague, Moscow, Novosibirsk, Ulaanbaatar, Beijing.

Embarrassing for Bonn: Only five weeks before the disaster at Lake Constance, the trade delegate of the FRG Embassy in Beijing had sent a diplomatic note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry requesting flight and landing rights for an earlier flight of the dubious black marketeers.

Josef Rimmele, against whom Berlin judicial authorities issued an arrest warrant on the grounds of fraud, played false. He intended to carry out the adventurous million-dollar deal via his letter-box firm "Housebuilders-Service-Establishment" in Vaduz, Liechtenstein. Yet the company was deleted from the trade registered there as early as November 1993. The two Liechtenstein trustees withdrew from their mandate because Rimmele wanted to establish "dubious business constructions," as legal agent Hans Gassner confirmed for FOCUS.

The head of an officially recognized test laboratory in Saxony had already been hired for the trip to Beijing. He would have analyzed the exotic metals.

It remains unclear what Rimmele wanted to do with that stuff. In the view of expert Tomas Tamberg of the Federal Institute for Material Research (BAM) in Berlin, such transactions do not make any commercial sense. The demand for the valuable Osmium 187 for scientific and

research projects was "in the area of fractions of milligrams." As far as the legendary Red Mercury, a harmless mercury compound, is concerned, Tamberg does not see any use at all. The alleged demand in the armament industry is regarded by the BAM scientist as "absolute and total nonsense."

A Berlin state prosecutor suspects completely different motives behind such activities as those of Rimmele. Pure money laundering may be behind such fictitious transactions.

## UNITED KINGDOM

**Details on Arms-to-Iraq 'Scandal' Suppressed***94WP0058A London THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH in English 9 Jan 94 pp 1, 2*

[Article by Mark Watts and Bill Goodwin: "UK Clamp on Iraqi Bomb Clues"]

[Text] Key documents containing potentially the most embarrassing details about Britain's "arms to Iraq" scandal have been suppressed, THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH has learned.

The papers, part of a United Nations dossier which was passed to the British Government more than two years ago, related to the role of UK industry in building Saddam Hussein's nuclear bomb.

Since the Gulf war, UN inspectors have found that UK-made computers, electronics and machine tools were used in Iraq's nuclear bomb production line.

The findings imply that British companies were not only exporting arms to Iraq, but were also supplying parts for the country's nuclear programme. Yet Customs has not prosecuted any of the companies alleged by the UN to have been involved.

Six members of the defence team in the "nuclear triggers" case, the only "arms to Iraq" trial in Britain where people have been jailed, have obtained copies of the crucial UN papers from Customs and Excise in preparation for an appeal that is due to be heard within the next two months.

Customs has persuaded the Lord Chief Justice to make an order banning the six from divulging the contents of the papers.

Lord Taylor granted an application at a secret special hearing, and any breach would be a contempt of court punishable by up to two years' jail.

The UN papers have been kept secret during the time of John Major's government, and blame cannot be laid on Margaret Thatcher's administration as other "arms to Iraq" fiascos have been.

Sources suggest that civil servants have tried to avoid further embarrassment for the Government by deciding not to volunteer to disclose the documents to the Scott inquiry, which is due to hear evidence from the Prime Minister next week.

A DTI spokeswoman would say only: "The Scott inquiry has been set up to look at all these matters and it is for the Scott inquiry to consider all questions related to this subject."

Lady Thatcher told the Scott inquiry last month that when she was Prime Minister, she was "particularly concerned" that no exports for Saddam's nuclear bomb programme should leave Britain's shores. She told Lord Justice Scott: "The thought of anything nuclear getting into the hands of a government in Iraq, who would have no scruples about the use of the ultimate weapon, was absolutely horrific."

*The Sunday Telegraph* has not asked any of the "gagged" six to defy the banning order. An 18-month undercover US-UK customs operation—which was praised at the Scott inquiry by Lady Thatcher—resulted in the conviction of Ali Dagher and Jeanine Speckman in 1991 for trying to export capacitors allegedly destined for the detonation device of Iraq's nuclear bomb.

Senior Customs figures were so concerned about keeping the embarrassing UN documents secret that they discussed seeking an injunction to prevent the broadcast last month of an ITV programme about the nuclear triggers case, in the mistaken fear that it would disclose the contents of the papers.

A producer at the programme "The Big Story" said: "There was even a call to the office on the day of transmission from someone claiming to be from Customs who said we were about to have several injunctions served on us. A newspaper newsdesk was then tipped off that we were being banned. But it never happened."

Dagher and Speckman were sentenced to five years and 18 months respectively, and Speckman has completed her sentence. Both are appealing on several grounds.

Two years ago, THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH revealed that a secret Iraqi report seized by UN inspectors cast doubt on the convictions. The report suggested that electronic components intercepted by British Customs officers in a highly publicised "sting" at London's Heathrow

Airport in 1990 had nothing to do with Saddam's nuclear bomb project. On the strength of this, Dagher was released from jail on £200,000 bail pending appeal.

Other evidence in our possession points to their innocence. This includes covertly recorded tapes of conversations suggesting US Customs undercover agents set up Dagher and Speckman.

After obtaining the Iraqi report, an expert witness for the defence sought more of the three-volume UN dossier to see if there was more evidence in it to support the defence claim of wrongful conviction. Dr. John Hassard, a nuclear expert at London's Imperial College, was given more documents by the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency and yet more by the DTI—with no conditions attached. He and the defence team obtained further sections from Customs.

While claiming that they were irrelevant to the case, Customs lawyers agreed to hand over to the defence team, on a confidential basis, the sections from the UN dossier listing the British manufacturers which allegedly sent exports for Iraq's nuclear programme in breach of sanctions.

UN inspections of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme found that UK companies supplied computers and built a semiconductor manufacturing plant. Inspectors also found machinery in Saddam Hussain's bomb production line from nine British machine tool companies.

It is understood that the suppressed papers are viewed by the defence lawyers as another crucial part of the new evidence on which they will seek to rely at their appeal because the lists do not include their export company, Euromac. In view of the basis on which the gagging order was obtained, and the fact that their appeal will be heard in public, they are likely to meet stiff opposition from Customs.

The Customs' position is that no comment can be made on any matter related to the Dagher and Speckman case while their appeal is pending and the Scott inquiry is still running.

## Reporting on IAEA Inspection of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

### DPRK Accepts 'Full-Scope' Inspections

SK1502230894 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
2100 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Report by correspondent Cha Man-sun from Vienna]

[Text] North Korea officially notified on 15 February that it will accept full-scope [chonmyon] inspection of seven nuclear facilities as demanded by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. Therefore, full-scope inspection on North Korea is expected to be resumed from early next week at the earliest.

North Korea held working-level contacts with the IAEA on two occasions on the afternoon of 15 February, and officially notified that it will accept the IAEA's full-scope inspection of its seven nuclear facilities.

The IAEA revealed that the resumption of the full-scope inspection on North Korea is to closely examine whether North Korea diverted the nuclear material of its seven nuclear facilities for military purposes since normal [chongsang] inspection on North Korea has been suspended since February 1993. The inspection team plans to carry out a series of inspection activities including the overall replacement of monitoring devices and replacement of sealing devices to safeguard the continuity of the inspection which has been damaged.

With the acceptance of the full-scope inspection by North Korea, the IAEA notified the North Korean side by letter that it will launch the inspection team as soon as procedures are completed for the team to visit North Korea. If North Korea actively cooperates in the inspection team's preparations to visit North Korea, the inspection team consisting of six or seven people will be able to go to Pyongyang sometime this weekend and thus carry out inspection activities in Yongbyon from early next week when the IAEA Board of Governor's meeting takes place.

Counselor Yun Ho-chin, the working-level delegate of the North Korean side, said that the decision to accept the full-scope inspection was made with utmost flexibility by the North Korean side to achieve denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and was achieved by making concessions with the IAEA.

### 'Undeclared' Yongbyon Sites Not Included

AU1502180994 Paris AFP in English 1739 GMT  
15 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Vienna, Feb 15 (AFP)—North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reached agreement here Tuesday on resuming inspections of Pyongyang's nuclear facilities after a year-long standoff, the agency's spokesman said.

The agreement eased international tensions which had been tightened another notch a day earlier by the most unequivocal in a series of claims that Pyongyang has an active nuclear weapons programme.

But the accord makes no provision for inspection of the two Yongbyon sites where the suspected nuclear arms facility is based.

IAEA spokesman David Kyd said the two sides had reached an accord on inspecting seven identified sites and that a six- or seven-strong IAEA mission of two to three weeks' duration would enter North Korea as soon as visa formalities had been dealt with.

Welcoming the accord, Kyd said that, if all went well, the mission could get under way in the next few days, adding that Pyongyang had accepted all IAEA demands concerning the nature of the inspections.

He stressed the agreement did not cover the two undeclared sites at Yongbyon, where the IAEA suspected that Pyongyang was illegally stockpiling liquid and solid nuclear waste.

He said those sites would be the subject of future negotiations.

The accord comes six days before a meeting of IAEA governors at which future relations with North Korea are due to be discussed.

Kyd added that the aim of the inspections at the seven declared sites was to "verify that nuclear material in these facilities has not been diverted since earlier inspections."

"In addition, inspectors will take certain measures, such as reloading of cameras and changing of seals, to facilitate future verifications." [passage omitted]

Earlier Tuesday in Tokyo, Japan's Jiji Press quoted official South Korean sources as saying Pyongyang's absolute leader Kim Il-Sung had proposed a meeting with U.S. President Bill Clinton over the nuclear issue.

Kim made the proposal through U.S. Southern Baptist evangelist Billy Graham, who met the North Korean president and party chief when he visited Pyongyang in late January, the sources said.

Russian researchers told Jiji Monday that the former Soviet Union had been engaged in a joint plan with North Korea to build a nuclear bomb until 1985, and that Russian scientists continued to provide clandestine assistance to Pyongyang.

### Team Will Not Inspect Reactor's Fuel Rods

SK1702044094 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
0400 GMT 17 Feb 94

[KYODO, YONHAP report from Vienna]

[Text] An International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] source revealed that the IAEA will not inspect fuel rods at the experimental atomic reactor during nuclear inspections in North Korea this weekend. This source explained that this is because the inspection of the fuel rods is only possible when fuel rods are changed. This source also added that the IAEA inspection team will only inspect the monitoring camera and the sealing of the atomic reactor.

**DPRK Possesses More Plutonium Than Admitted**  
*AU1702111094 Vienna KURIER in German 17 Feb 94*  
*p 4*

[Report by Ingrid Steiner: "North Korea's Pawn Continues To Be Well Hidden"]

[Excerpt] When the delegation of experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspect the North Korean nuclear facilities on Yongbon, every step will be carefully observed. They will not be allowed to deviate a single inch from the determined route or take a closer look at an earth mound or a tree at the giant plant. The strictly communist North Korea will not allow any inspections of the site where the IAEA expects underground secret nuclear plants to be located.

"We know that the two plants exist," IAEA spokesman David Kyd told KURIER. "They are clearly recognized on satellite pictures. They are located right in the center of the Yongbon site."

However, North Korea denies everything categorically. The plants in question are merely "military facilities."

In the seven declared nuclear plants to which the IAEA will be granted access, North Korea cannot build an "atomic bomb" but rather fissile material. "North Korea started its nuclear program 20 years ago. We are absolutely certain that it possesses more plutonium than Pyongyang admits," Kyd stressed. Only 5-8 kg are needed to produce a single atomic bomb.

According to Kyd, the required pressure to ensure the inspection of the two secret plants can only be exerted by the United States. "The IAEA does not have any instruments; only Washington has something to offer"—that is economic aid for the extremely poor North Korea or the U.S. promise to renounce the large-scale maneuver, planned together with South Korea. [passage omitted]

**Yongbyon Nuclear Facilities Inspected**  
*SK0403051794 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean*  
*4 Mar 94 p 1*

[Report by Yu Chae-sik from Vienna]

[Text] Hans Meyer, a spokesman of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], said on 3 March that the UN nuclear inspection team conducted the first inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities in a year.

He said: "The UN inspection team inspected nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, North Korea for the first time. After the inspection, the inspection team returned to the state guest house and reported this to the IAEA over the telephone."

Avoiding mentioning the details of the nuclear inspection, Meyer said: As I understand it, the six-member inspection team did not face any obstacle [otthohan changae-edo chikmyonhaji anon kosuro algo itta] in the course of the inspection of the nuclear facilities in North Korea.

**Inspection Reportedly 'Not Proceeding Well'**  
*SK0803055594 Seoul MUNHWA ILBO in Korean*  
*8 Mar 94 p 2*

[Text] It has been learned on 8 March that the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspection team for North Korean nuclear facilities, which began its activities on 3 March, is not proceeding well with inspections.

A high-ranking government official said on 8 March, "North Korea is objecting to some of the IAEA's inspection activities. Particularly, it is rejecting the extraction of samples from a radioactive chemistry laboratory in Yongbyon which is estimated to be a nuclear reprocessing facility."

The official continued, "North Korea and the IAEA agreed in Vienna to the extraction of samples from the radioactive chemistry laboratory although the extraction of samples from the five-megawatt reactor is not possible because it is not a replacement of a fuel rod. There can be no concession because this is the core of the IAEA inspection."

The government authority added, "However, we have to wait and see to judge whether the IAEA inspection team's activities are successfully concluded. That will be around this weekend or early next week."

**Official Says Inspections 'Going Smoothly'**  
*SK0903005994 Seoul YONHAP in English 0049 GMT*  
*9 Mar 94*

[Text] Seoul, March 9 (YONHAP)—Seoul denied reports Wednesday that International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspections were being hampered in North Korea.

"The inspections are going smoothly so far," said a Foreign Ministry official. "IAEA activities are expected to conclude around March 14 or 15."

The IAEA inspectors who arrived in Pyongyang on March 3 have just about finished checking five of the seven declared facilities, the official said. However, the remaining two installations—a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor and a radiochemical laboratory used for reprocessing—are critical in determining whether North Korea diverted any nuclear material for non-peaceful uses.

The vernacular daily TONG-A ILBO reported that North Korea was restricting IAEA access to these two facilities. The story came out on the same day South and North Korea were to meet at the truce village of Panmunjom to arrange an exchange of presidential envoys.

**'Differences of Opinion' Between IAEA, DPRK**  
*AU1003114194 Paris AFP in English 1124 GMT*  
*10 Mar 94*

[Text] Vienna, March 10 (AFP)—Differences of interpretation over an agreement on inspection of nuclear sites have arisen between North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], sources said here Thursday.

They were commenting on a disclosure by a U.S. State Department official in Washington that "difficulties" were

being experienced by agency inspectors who went to North Korea a week ago to vet seven declared facilities.

They are trying to determine whether North Korea has diverted plutonium from its Yongbyon reactor since the IAEA's last full inspection in February last year.

Agency spokesman David Kyd refused however to go into detail about the reported difficulties. The inspection was continuing, with some tasks accomplished and others still to be carried out, he said. The team hoped to wind up the mission as scheduled by next Tuesday, and there was no plan to recall the inspectors any earlier.

"It is half-time now and there is no use in speculating how the game will end," Kyd remarked.

**Seal Damage at Yongbyon Facilities Discovered**  
*SK1003073894 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean*  
 10 Mar 94 p 1

[Report by Washington-based correspondent Sin Chang-uk]

[Text] It has been learned that during inspection of Yongbyon, which began 3 March, the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspection team discovered that some seals, which were installed by IAEA to confirm nuclear safeguards of nuclear facilities in North Korea, were destroyed. As a result, it is highly likely that considerable controversies will be touched off concerning the guarantee of transparency of North Korean nuclear development.

In the course of inspecting seven nuclear facilities in North Korea on six occasions in 1993, the IAEA inspected six monitoring cameras, 40 seals, and three radioactivity sensor facilities. In the event that damage of these facilities is confirmed, suspicion that nuclear material was transferred from North Korean nuclear facilities to some other place will be raised. Thus, there is a possibility that the continuity of safeguards of North Korean nuclear facilities may not be recognized.

A source in Washington said that with discovery of such seal damage, the conclusion of the results of IAEA's inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities will be the focus of people's attention. The likelihood that the third round of North Korean-U.S. high-level talks slated for 21 March in Geneva will be held as scheduled is doubtful.

It was reported that in the course of IAEA's inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities, disputes arose between IAEA and North Korea over the issue of continuing the inspection and the damage to the seals.

The team has to leave Pyongyang on 14 March as the IAEA inspection team was granted two-week entry visas upon its arrival in Pyongyang on 1 March.

This being the situation, this week will likely be the climax of IAEA's inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities, and the possibility of resolving the issue of the exchange of special envoys between the North and the South before 21 March is very slim because North Korea has continually showed an attitude of rejection.

Another source observed that North Korea will likely drag on the controversy surrounding the inspection and the issue of North-South special envoy exchange even after 21 March when the third round of high-level talks are scheduled to be held. Thus, the possibility of high-level talks being held on the scheduled date is slim.

Meanwhile, Christine Shelley, a U.S. State Department spokesperson, on 9 March said that the U.S. Government regrets the fact that the IAEA nuclear inspection of North Korea is not proceeding smoothly and expressed the hope that North Korea will keep its promise to sincerely allow IAEA inspections until the inspections are concluded. Commenting on friction between North Korea and IAEA over nuclear inspections, Shelley said that she hopes the IAEA can settle the inspection issue and that the inspections will be concluded. Shelley stressed that regardless of progress in North-South working contact, the exchange of North-South special envoys, with satisfactory nuclear inspection results, are a precondition for holding the third round of high-level talks agreed to by North Korea.

#### **Hint That Seal Damage Problem Solved 'Smoothly'**

*SK1003111294 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean*  
 1015 GMT 10 Mar 94

[Report by Chong Chang-won]

[Text] An International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] reliable source said: In the course of its inspection of nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, North Korea, the IAEA inspection team discovered today that some seals of main nuclear facilities were damaged and is taking follow-up measures.

The source said that seals for reactors of five megawatt and over, which had been used for extracting plutonium, were not damaged and that some seals in the radiochemical laboratory—a nuclear waste reprocessing facility—and in the nuclear fuel producing plant seemed to have problems.

The source explained: It is a convention for an inspection team to confirm if nuclear materials in containers with damaged seals are identical to those listed in the first report submitted by a country that is subject to IAEA inspections, as soon as seal damage is confirmed. This enables the inspection team to determine if nuclear materials have been diverted to other purposes.

David Kyd, information director of the IAEA, said: I am unable to comment now on the question about seal damage in North Korea's nuclear facilities. I will report the details of the result of the ongoing inspection on North Korea to the next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.

Saying that the inspection team is now smoothly conducting inspections at Yongbyon, Director Kyd hinted that the question about the seal damage, which caused arguments between the inspection team and the North Korean authorities, has been solved smoothly.

The inspection team will continue to inspect nuclear facilities in Yongbyon until this weekend and will leave Pyongyang around 15 March after winding up its inspection early next week.

#### **Difficulties Faced by IAEA Team Described**

*SK1303000494 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
2300 GMT 12 Mar 94*

[Report by correspondent Cha Man-sun from Vienna]

[Text] It has been learned that North Korea had trouble with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspection team from the beginning of the inspection because it did not comply with the agreement to allow IAEA's full-scope inspection [chonmyon sachal] but only allowed limited inspection [chehan sachal], including the replacement of surveillance devices.

It has been learned that the IAEA will closely review the inspection results as soon as the inspection team returns early this week to decide whether or not to call a special Board of Governors meeting.

According to information from a well-informed IAEA source obtained today, during the 10-day inspection, which began on 3 March, North Korea did not allow the checking of the points for the full-scope inspection required by the IAEA and only allowed limited inspections, including the replacement of surveillance devices.

The source said North Korea only allowed limited inspections, including the replacement of surveillance devices, and that inspections on North Korean facilities did not go smoothly from the beginning. It seemed that the inspection team and the North Korean authorities had considerable disagreement regarding the broken seals in the radioactive chemical laboratory, in particular.

The source said the inspection team considered returning earlier than the original two-week schedule because North Korea did not immediately allow follow-up steps for the confirmation of the contents resulted from the broken seals in the radioactive chemical laboratory.

The inspection team finished their preparations to leave on 11 and 12 March and will return early this week. The IAEA established a policy to call an emergency special Board of Governors meeting if it comes to a conclusion that the inspections required by the IAEA were not conducted after receiving a more accurate inspection report from the inspection team.

#### **Refusal To Allow Extraction of Hot Cell Samples**

*SK1203041894 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean  
12 Mar 94 p 2*

[Text] A relevant government official said on 11 March: During the course of the nuclear inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]—which started on 3 March—North Korea has so far refused to allow the IAEA inspection team to take samples from the "hot cell," which is a facility to extract or process plutonium from the

radiochemical laboratory, one of the key objects of the nuclear inspections. Therefore, North Korea has been in conflict with the IAEA.

Taking samples from the hot cell is an important means for the nuclear inspection to check North Korea's plutonium processing. Also, this is an important clue in determining the differences between the amount of plutonium extracted as declared by North Korea and the amount of plutonium North Korea has really processed.

A relevant government official said that "the ongoing conflict between North Korea and the IAEA regarding the nuclear inspection is due to North Korea's refusal to allow the extraction of the samples from the hot cell," and that "the IAEA and the United States are very dissatisfied with its refusal."

He said that "despite its agreement with the IAEA in the course of nuclear negotiations regarding the sample extraction from the hot cell, necessary for guaranteeing nuclear safety, North Korea had refused an actual inspection."

Concerning this, a relevant Foreign Ministry official said that "whether the North Korean refusal to allow the inspectors to obtain samples from hot cells has threatened the objective of the inspection is a matter that the IAEA should decide on" and that "we need to watch the other processes of the inspection because there are some other means to check the plutonium extraction without the extraction of samples from the hot cell."

#### **Some IAEA Inspectors To Stay Longer**

*SK1303024694 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean  
13 Mar 94 p 1*

[Report by Pak Tu-sik]

[Text] It was learned on 12 March that the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] has made partial changes on its inspection plan, in which the agency was to begin inspections on North Korean nuclear facilities on 3 March and finish them around 14 March, and decided to have some members of the inspection team remain in North Korea for additional inspections.

Since North Korea postponed inspections on the radioactive chemical laboratory in Yongbyon, contrary to what it had promised to the IAEA, and sufficient inspections cannot be completed by 14 March—deadline for scheduled inspections—the IAEA decided to extend the schedule and have some members stay there for one or two more days to inspect the facility. It has been learned that the IAEA had already made a tentative agreement with North Korea on the inspection method of the radioactive chemical laboratory, which is believed to be a nuclear reprocessing facility. The IAEA plans to have inspection members, aside from the ones who will stay longer, return to the IAEA's secretariat office in Vienna on 15 March as scheduled.

A well-informed diplomatic source in Seoul explained: "The IAEA actually finished inspecting the North Korean nuclear facilities during the past inspections and is eager to

have the results back at the IAEA headquarters for analysis. Some members will stay for a more thorough inspection of the last radioactive chemical laboratory and all of them will be back by the middle of next week." Regarding the broken seals, the IAEA verified the information and accepted North Korea's explanation that "those were because of careless handling."

The source said: "North Korea intended to test the will of the ROK and U.S. Governments by deliberately creating obstacles to the exchange of North and South special envoys, however, the IAEA appraises that North Korea accepted comparatively easily the IAEA inspections, which are directly connected with UN sanctions."

### IAEA Considers Special Meeting

SK1403042794 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
0310 GMT 14 Mar 94

[Text] It has been learned that the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] will decide this week whether it will convene a special Board of Governors meeting to intensively discuss the North Korean nuclear issue after hearing the precise report of the inspection team's activities in North Korea.

North Korea did not allow the inspection team to immediately confirm whether some seals, which are the core target of the current inspection, were broken or not. Thus, North Korea restricted the team's inspection activities. The IAEA regards this as an act of breaking the agreement.

Accordingly, the IAEA inspection team was going to leave earlier than the originally scheduled period of two-weeks. However, the inspection team abandoned the early departure idea in consideration of China's reaction.

The IAEA inspection team is going to leave Pyongyang around 15 March after completing its inspection activities.

### General Reza'i Denies DPRK To Test Missiles in Iran

NC0303194594 Tehran TEHRAN TIMES  
(INTERNATIONAL WEEKLY) in English 24 Feb 94  
pp 1, 14

[Report by staff correspondent]

[Text] Tehran—Major General Mohsen Reza'i scoffed at Western media reports that claim Iran is for nuclear weapons saying "Political logic, morality, our own culture and above all the situation in today's world does not allow us to have such deadly weapons. [quotation marks as received]

The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps head said, "Political wisdom asks us not to go for weapons which could cause devastation for humanity."

"Of course, we are for traditional weapons and that too just for self-defense...and that's all," he said.

The eight-year Iraqi imposed war is proof of the real nature of our combatants who never violated the internationally recognized norms concerning war Major Gen. Reza'i recalled.

He was referring to the Iraqi forces who left no stone unturned violating the basic tradition of war using chemical bombs against both civilians and military personnel. The Iraqi forces also frequently bombed purely civilians areas during their 1980-88 imposed war.

"That Iran is trying to acquire nuclear weapons...is just baseless rumor," Reza'i refuted.

Western media repeatedly say Iran will or has already provided the necessary facilities to Communist North Korea for testing missiles with ranges up to 1,000 kilometers. What is Reza'i's explanation?

"No, a firm no," Major Gen. Reza'i told the TEHRAN TIMES in an exclusive interview at his office.

"By now the entire world should know that Iran is very sensitive as far as our soil and military facilities are concerned and we will never allow others to use it...no matter how friendly 'others' are," he said referring to the friendly ties with North Korea.

"As long as I'm talking about the real nature of the Islamic combatants and the officials of the Islamic Republic, it will not be out of place to mention the Russian requests which Iran turned down without a second thought," Reza'i, 41, said.

"Despite our animosity and enmity against the United States we rejected repeated requests from Moscow to deliver to them the F-14 fighter plane and the wire-guided anti-tank missile, TOW," he said.

He disclosed that even the U.S. through various channels tried to obtain a Soviet-made T-72 tank which we seized from the Ba'athist forces during the Iraqi-imposed war.

The United States once more received 'a firm no' from the Islamic Republic despite a number of tempting offers from the Pentagon, he said.

Maj. Gen. Reza'i, head the IRGC for the last 13 years, comes from Masjed Soleyman, Khuzestan Province.

In answer to another question, Reza'i said the Kurdish problem in Iraq is under our observation and our forces are ready to counter any sort of terrorist activities launched from there.

Referring to the agreement signed by Iran and Turkey he said, "It has eased the situation."

He denounced Iraq for sending terrorists and taking undue advantage from the present situation in the region underlining the fact that that itself was a violation of the 1988 ceasefire and against the traditional practice of friendly neighbors.

Reza'i is married with five children and currently studying economics at the post-graduate level. He has a glorious record of revolutionary activities against the now defunct Shah's regime.

Commenting on the Persian Gulf he said, "The geographical situation of the waterway is such that the deep water is on Iran's side which enables the Islamic forces to keep alien warships under observation."

Without going into details he said there was a plot engineered by Britain, Israel and the United States designed to keep regional tensions high.

"I think," he said, "the plot proved to be a mouse trap for the United States.

"It's my view that no country should think that they can take undue advantage from the differences between Iran and another Persian Gulf country," he warned.

He pointed out that the Iraqi regime made the same mistake in 1980 and "we all know the consequences of that."

"I tell my friends in the UAE to listen to my advice as Iran wants to continue friendly relations with all the shaykhdoms there," Reza'i said.

The IRGC played a vital role during the Iraqi-imposed war and received compliments from the Leader of the world's deprived, the late Imam Khomeyni.

Commenting on the post-war era Reza'i said the IRGC is busy with extensive construction projects in the country. He said IRGC personnel, popularly known in Iran as 'Sepahis,' are constructing a major dam, Karkheh, in Khuzestan Province. For the last two years, the Sepahis have been building the dam which is 3 kilometers long, 150 meters high with a capacity of 7 billion cubic meters of water.

So far Rls. 600 billion have been spent on the project and it is estimated that Rls. 1 trillion will be spent before it is completed.

The IRGC personnel are also working on the 100-kilometer Tehran- Saveh highway to provide a natural gas supply network for the nation.

#### **South Africa, Israel in 'Nuclear Partnership'**

PM1502130894 London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL  
in English 4 Feb 94 pp 1-3

[Unattributed article: "South Africa: A Nuclear Nightmare"]

[Text] New details of the government's nuclear partnership with Israel and its efforts to design sophisticated nuclear weapons capable of devastating civilian populations as far away as Lagos and Nairobi are contained in a series of official documents in Africa Confidential's possession. The documents—transcripts from the secret trial of a South African Air Force officer and from the government's classified submissions to the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA)—show that much vital information has been kept from the public. They also show that President Frederik de Klerk's statement to parliament on 23 March 1993 that the government had built then destroyed just six crude nuclear devices fell far short of the whole truth.

The sophistication of the securocrats' nuclear ambitions in the 1970's and 1980's was grotesquely at odds with the disarray and venality among the government officials involved in the project, as evidence given in the secret trial

of Air Force Brigadier Johann Blaauw in 1987-88 at the Supreme Court in Capetown makes clear.

Classified documents from the trial obtained by Africa Confidential trace how Brig. Blaauw, who negotiated a deal with Israel for the supply of tritium (a key ingredient required to make thermonuclear weapons) fell out with former Minister of Labour and Mines Fanie Botha. Blaauw claimed that Botha had promised him diamond concessions in Namaqualand, on South Africa's western seaboard, in return for his work on the nuclear programme but then failed to deliver. Botha denied this but said that Blaauw had threatened to make public details about the nuclear programme and the alleged improprieties linked to it. By the time of their falling out, Botha had incurred substantial debts and had his assets sequestered following his resignation from ministerial office and parliament on 15 November 1983 after some highly critical press reports.

In November 1984, the police in Pretoria arrested Blaauw on charges of attempted extortion against Fanie Botha and possession of secret data concerning the Koeberg nuclear power reactor. However, Blaauw was acquitted in September 1988 and he is still pursuing his claim for the allegedly promised mining concessions through the civil courts.

Blaauw had an exemplary Air Force career which began in World War II and included service with Western forces in Palestine, the Korean War and the Berlin airlift. Following his retirement from the Air Force in 1975, Blaauw was the messenger in some of Pretoria's most sensitive military transactions with Israel.

It is difficult to see how De Klerk, who took over the mining portfolio from Botha, would not have been briefed about the tensions between Botha and Blaauw and the nature of Blaauw's work on the nuclear programme with Israel.

In fact, De Klerk testified at Blaauw's trial, saying that Fanie Botha, a political rival, approached him after a cabinet meeting and told him he had been in the process of awarding a mining concession to Blaauw and asking if a way could be found to grant it. There is absolutely no evidence linking De Klerk to the illicit transactions surrounding the nuclear programme and sources close to the highest levels of government have told Africa Confidential that De Klerk got in and out of the ministry as quickly as possible. By the end of the 1980's, De Klerk was said to be unable "to come to terms philosophically" with the securocrats' plans to develop thermonuclear weapons whose primary target would be African civilians.

However, De Klerk's apparent "road to Damascus" on the nuclear weapons programme still has not facilitated a full admission of the extent of the government's nuclear programme. This lack of frankness about the nuclear programme concerns senior officials in Western governments particularly at a time when South Africa is negotiating a delicate transition where the loyalties of some senior officials in the security forces appear uncertain.

Blaauw's errand to secure tritium from Israel is significant: Tritium is a gas used to boost the power of nuclear weapons creating fusion or thermonuclear bombs. In information submitted to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], which monitors compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for the United Nations, the government admitted that its weapons programme had involved lithium-6 separation, a means of producing tritium. So sensitive is this information that senior African National Congress (ANC) officials, some of whom will be holding ministerial office after the April elections, have been refused access to it.

According to a September 1993 IAEA document obtained by Africa Confidential, the programme had also progressed by the early 1980's to planning a 150 megawatt reactor capable of producing tritium and plutonium. The reactor, which was to have been built at Gouriqua, near Mossel Bay, never got beyond the basic engineering preparations. But Pretoria continued to work on developing thermonuclear weapons until 1985 or 1986, according to Wynand de Villiers of Pretoria's Atomic Energy Corporation and Roger Jardine, the ANC's science policy coordinator. Pretoria began dismantling its nuclear weapons programme in 1990, in preparation for signing the NPT the following year.

In his 24 March 1993 speech De Klerk also insisted that "at no time did South Africa acquire nuclear technology from another country." Apart from United States intelligence reports attesting to Israeli-South African nuclear collaboration, additional information would have been available to De Klerk, during his tenure at the Mines Ministry, to indicate that tritium production is the result of a highly sophisticated technology, one which South Africa had not mastered.

At his trial, Blaauw testified that he negotiated for the supply of 30 grammes of tritium from Israel in exchange for 600 tonnes of "yellowcake" (uranium oxide). The tritium-yellowcake exchange deal is described in some detail in a recent book by William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem.

#### Footnote

"Critical Mass" by William Burrows and Robert Windrem (Simon and Schuster) 1994). They write that the sensitive arrangements were jointly overseen by South Africa's then intelligence agency, the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and the Israeli intelligence division Lish Ka le-Kishrei (Lakam) which specialised in nuclear and technological procurement and came to public attention when it was linked to the Jonathan Jay Pollard spy scandal in the USA in 1985.

Blaauw testified at the trial that he had established South Africa's Israeli connection through a South African who had emigrated to Israel. In this way Blaauw was able to make high-level military contacts in Israel. Initially the two men arranged the emergency supply of South African spare parts for Mirage aircraft, needed by Israel after the 1973 war.

Then Blaauw arranged a deal with an Israeli front company in Wiesbaden, Germany, through which he obtained British tanks and Browning machine guns for South Africa, according to the trial documents. Finally, Blaauw said he was approached by one "Benjamine" of Lakam (almost certainly Benjamin Blumberg, chief of Lakam between 1957 and 1981), who asked if South Africa would sell Israel yellowcake which can be enriched to make fuel for nuclear weapons or power reactors.

Through his service in South African military liaison during the Rhodesian war, in which he took part in many joint covert activities with Salisbury and helped set up a meeting between white leader Ian Smith, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and South African Prime Minister John Vorster, Blaauw became a confidant of General Hendrik van den Bergh, then head of the security police—and subsequently the head of BOSS. He told the court that he then approached Van den Bergh with Lakam's request and Van den Bergh got the go-ahead for the deal from John Vorster. In April 1976 Vorster visited Israel and signed a comprehensive set of military and economic cooperation pacts.

According to Burrows' and Windrem's book, Israeli and South African officials, including director of Lakam Benjamin Blumberg and then Information Ministry Secretary Eschel Rhodde travelled as escorts on the twelve flights which brought the tritium—2.5 grams at a time—to South Africa. Small as the quantity was, it would have been enough to make one bomb every six weeks.

Piet Koornhof, Minister for Mines at the time the yellowcake deal was struck, was replaced by Fanie Botha in a Vorster reshuffle. Fanie Botha's interest in the Defence portfolio was known by Vorster: Blaauw testified that arrangements were made for Botha to tour secret Israeli military installations in preparation for his elevation to the defence portfolio. Blaauw said he handled the details of Botha's itinerary and accompanied him to Israel.

Botha was a hit with the Israelis. "Look after Fanie Botha," Blaauw's contact in Israel told him. He explained to the court that Israel wanted to keep Botha at the Mines Ministry until the yellowcake shipments were complete. After that, they were eager for him to become Defence Minister, hoping that he would be more cooperative than Pieter W. Botha, who held the post at the time.

Blaauw testified that he began diverting funds to Fanie Botha from a US\$1 million "gift" he had received from Israel. The objective was not to sweeten Botha, Blaauw explained, but to keep his political career from being destroyed by mounting personal debt.

Botha's trusted administrative secretary Frances Peter van Ravensway Whelpton, however, was an outright crook. He pocketed all but Rand [R] 110,000 (\$34,000) of the R. 420,000 that Blaauw provided for Botha between 1977 and 1980. The funds were channelled through Whelpton so that Botha would not know the source and to distance him from the source, which was kickbacks from Pretoria's arms deals with Israel, according to Blaauw. Additionally, Blaauw admitted making small payments to Whelpton,

who apparently conceived and facilitated the grant of mining concessions on state-owned land (Sea Areas 1 and 2 on the West Coast) to Blaauw's company Ondombo Beleggings which precipitated the fall out with Botha. Whelpton pleaded guilty to extortion and illicitly possessing state secrets and was sentenced to five years in prison. It was several months before Blaauw realised that Botha was slow to hand over the mining leases because those areas had already been promised to others.

As an interesting sidenote, two senior officials from Anglo-American submitted testimony to the trial. According to the presiding judge's interpretation of the testimony of Harry Oppenheimer (Chairman of Anglo-American from 1957 to March 1983) was that Oppenheimer undertook to do what he could to assist Fanie Botha and in fact had an interview with Tertius Myburgh, the editor of the Sunday Times, as a result of which no information about Fanie Botha's financial position was published in that newspaper [sentence as published].

However, the judge's interpretation is at variance with Oppenheimer's recollection of his testimony. Oppenheimer told Africa Confidential on 2 February 1994 that although he had no control over what was published in the English press in South Africa he had "said he would pass on to Myburgh what Botha had told him. He subsequently told Myburgh the substance of his conversation with Botha, but he did not ask Myburgh whether he intended to publish any story relating to the Minister's affairs. Myburgh did say he was aware of rumours surrounding Minister Botha's affairs, and that these were being investigated by his reporters. Oppenheimer did not ask, nor did Myburgh undertake, not to publish any information regarding Botha's financial position." According to Oppenheimer, nothing was published about Botha at that time for fear of libel.

The current Chairman of Anglo American, Julian Ogilvie Thompson, has given his version of the events surrounding the applications for the mining rights on Namaqualand sea areas 1-5. Blaauw testified that he had disputed with Ogilvie Thompson about which concessions Anglo American should pursue. Ogilvie Thompson has told Africa Confidential that he first met Blaauw in June 1979 in Anglo American's offices where Blaauw "advised De Beers (Anglo American's sister company) of a change in the Namaqualand sea areas from discouraging to encouraging applications for rights to prospect for diamonds." De Beers subsequently applied for mining rights in sea areas 1-5 but the forms were mislaid. Ogilvie Thompson says that the last time he met Blaauw, who he says was trying to negotiate the concessions for himself, was in March 1980 at a rendezvous on the N1 highway, when he gave Blaauw a duplicate set of the mining rights applications which were to be delivered personally to the Minister. Ogilvie Thompson added: "No payment was asked for or made by De Beers to any person in connection with these applications."

The Namaqualand sea areas 1-2 were awarded to State Alluvial Diggings and UK-based Selection Trust Company respectively, and sea area 3 to US-based Sedco. Areas 4

and 5 went to De Beers: Setrust, Sedco and De Beers have subsequently joined together in a joint venture.

In 1981, after attempting to secure the promised leases by legal action, Blaauw joined by Whelpton began to pressure Botha, who in turn began lobbying the Van Winsen Committee which had begun reviewing the leases. According to the court documents, Blaauw and Whelpton also began threatening to expose how, during the power struggle sparked by John Vorster's fall in the 1978 information scandal, Fanie Botha, a weak contender for the succession, agreed that Blaauw should eavesdrop on the phones and conversations of some of his rivals including Foreign Minister Pik Botha, De Klerk, I.S.J. Schoeman, A.J. Raubenheimer, and A. P. Treurnicht.

Blaauw and Whelpton also planned to allege publicly that Fanie Botha plotted with them to implicate two National Party MPs in illegal diamond transactions, according to testimony in the case. Another alleged plan, to circulate stories in Parliament about a sex scandal involving Pik Botha, also made its way into the court record. More seriously and perhaps a harbinger of the corruption exposed in the 1990s, the court entered as evidence a document, which according to Blaauw testimony, contained a list of Swiss bank accounts opened by senior officials in the government. The document passed through the hands of Whelpton and Blaauw, although it is not clear for what purpose.

When Blaauw threatened to release this information, Botha called in the police, who began taping telephone calls and meetings. Botha, who never flatly confirmed or denied that he had granted the concessions, later admitted to Judge G. Friedman that he had erased parts of the tape of his meetings with Blaauw.

Friedman cleared Blaauw of extortion and appeared convinced that Fanie Botha had promised him the concessions in July 1979. It was proper for Blaauw to have the classified document concerning Koeberg's fuel requirements, ruled Friedman, because he was working closely with Wynand de Villiers, director of the Atomic Energy Corporation, to obtain enriched uranium for the reactor.

**Report Notes RSA-Israel Joint Testing of Missile**  
*MB1802151094 Johannesburg WEEKLY MAIL & GUARDIAN in English 18-24 Feb 94 p 6*

[Report by Paul Stober and Jane Hunter, the American-based editor of ISRAELI FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "an independent publication on Israel's activities outside the Middle East, and the author of many articles on Israeli-South African military collaboration and Israel's nuclear weapons"]

[Text] Testimony in the trial of South African Air Force Brigadier Johann Blaauw, and South African submissions to the International Atomic Energy Agency, leave no doubt that President F.W. de Klerk is still lying about key aspects of his government's nuclear weapons programme.

First disclosed in AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, Blaauw's evidence was the subject of a MAIL & GUARDIAN front

page story last week, which called into question De Klerk's assertion last year that South Africa had not acquired nuclear weapons technology or material from another country, or provided another country with nuclear materials. Reacting to the expose, De Klerk insisted that South Africa's procurement of 30g of tritium from Israel, and its provision of yellow cake uranium to Israel, were not part of collaboration between the countries on nuclear and conventional weapons.

His statement was endorsed by Atomic Energy Corporation chief Waldo Stumpf. Cape Supreme Court documents make it clear that Blaauw was the government's key intermediary in sensitive military deals with Israel, including those involving tritium and yellow cake.

It was General Hendrik van den Bergh, head of the Bureau for State Security (Boss) who personally asked Blaauw to get tritium, according to the documents. They note that the 30g Blaauw ultimately secured "was sufficient for the manufacture of 12 atomic bombs."

The tritium shipments were so sensitive that ranking South African and Israeli officials accompanied the 12 air shipments of the gaseous substance, and the heads of both governments were notified each time a shipment was successfully completed, according to the newly published book CRITICAL MASS by U.S. journalists William Burrows and Robert Windrem.

Much of what South African officials withheld from the public was told to the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is charged with verifying the government's compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. According to a confidential IAEA document—it bears the identifying numbers GOV/2684 and 93-03174—South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation "received some tritium in 1977, but after the withdrawal of a small sample for the verification of its quality, the material remained in store until 1987."

During that time, according to the IAEA document, South Africa was engaged in "theoretical and practical" research on "lithium-6 separation for the production of tritium for possible future use in boosted devices."

The government also did the preliminary engineering work on a reactor—"to be built at a site at Gouriqua, near Mossel Bay"—to produce and recover plutonium and tritium, says the IAEA, repeating information provided by the De Klerk administration. It adds: "In September 1985 the South African government decided to .. stop all work related to possible plutonium devices and to limit the production of lithium-6, but to allow further development work on implosion technology and theoretical work on more advanced devices."

The 1985 date seems compellingly to coincide with the refusal of international financial organisations to roll over their loans to South Africa. It is reasonable to infer that if sanctions had not started to bite, the South African Government would have built an advanced nuclear device

whose only purpose could be to attack—or threaten—nations within range of its surface-to-surface ballistic missiles.

Even after putting its advanced weapons programme on ice, South Africa kept the tritium for another two years. With extensive Israeli help, it worked on developing its own versions of Israel's Jericho missiles.

After the two countries jointly tested a South African Jericho clone from the Overberg test range in July 1989, U.S. officials told reporters that one of the several missiles Israel was helping South Africa develop was intended for delivering nuclear warheads. Last year De Klerk asserted that South Africa only planned to make seven crude nuclear weapons and only intended the six which were actually made as a "deterrent". This purportedly meant testing a bomb in order to blackmail Washington to save the established order from "total onslaught".

At an international conference last weekend to discuss future nuclear policy for South Africa, the head of the ANC's [African National Congress] science and technology department, Roger Jardine, slammed De Klerk's "list of lies" about South Africa's nuclear weapons programme. He called for the nuclear industry to be opened to full public scrutiny.

#### **Finnish-Israeli Plan To Build Nuclear Power Plant in Negev**

NC2202110694 Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 18 Feb 94 p 10

[AL-SAFIR report from Cairo]

[Text] Officials at the Egyptian Nuclear Energy Agency have stated that Finnish officials, in cooperation with the Israeli Atomic Energy Organization, are currently examining a site in the Negev Desert, a few kilometers away from the al-'Awja' area in Egypt, for a 400-megawatt Russian nuclear plant.

The Egyptian officials pointed out that Finland had bought a number of Russian nuclear reactors and agreed to supply Israel with one of them after upgrading it and introducing Western technology to it. It will be used to generate electricity.

#### **Report Claims Iran Seeking Nuclear Cooperation With Spain**

##### **Deal With Spanish Company**

PM1402165494 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 12 Feb 94 pp 1, 4

[Walid Abi-Murshid report: "After Failure of Its Endeavors With German Siemens And Czech Skoda, Iran Is Concluding Contract With Spanish Nuclear Company To Divert Two Reactors to Military Use"]

[Text] London—Tehran is currently negotiating with a Spanish company for engineers and nuclear technology to supply it with the technology needed to divert four nuclear reactors in Iran from civilian to military use.

Iran turned to a Spanish company to supply it with the diversion technology known as "Diversion" [word in English] after it failed in the past to obtain this technology from the German company Siemens and the Czech company Skoda. Iran accuses the German and Czech companies of submitting to U.S. pressure in their withdrawal from the project to offer their nuclear engineering services. As is known, the Spanish company dealt in the past with the German company Siemens and it has the nuclear engineering expertise available to the German company. The Spanish company participated with Siemens in building the Bushehr reactors in Iran.

After the failure of its previous attempts to obtain Western diversion technology, which is more advanced than Russian and Chinese technology, Tehran was eager to submit its new order for Spanish technology in the framework of its endeavors to improve safety levels for the two nuclear reactors it is building with Russian expertise in Gargar and the two reactors (300 megawatts) it is building with Chinese expertise in al-Ahvaz.

Nearly a month ago the Iranian Nuclear Energy Commission signed a contract with the Spanish company, under which the latter undertakes to provide engineering services for one of the two Chinese reactors in al-Ahvaz, and a similar contract to provide the same services for the Russian Bushehr reactor, after signing a contract with the Russians to rebuild it. The deal concluded with the Spanish company totals \$80 million.

In the first stage Iran hopes that the Spanish company will resume building the Bushehr reactor, 80 percent of which has been completed, before the German company Siemens pulls out of the project.

As is known, the capacity of this reactor is 1,000 megawatts.

However, Tehran expects now to obtain technology from Spain to divert the Bushehr and Gargar reactors from civilian to military use.

Tehran's great interest in these negotiations is reflected in the level of its negotiating delegation, which is headed by Reza Amrollahi [as transliterated], assistant to President Rafsanjani for nuclear affairs and chairman of the Iranian Nuclear Energy Commission, his deputy Mahir 'Alizadeh, and Mohammad Kazem Rasuli, director of the Nuclear Technological Center in Esfahan (ENTC).

In charge of the negotiations from the Spanish side are the director general of the Spanish company and his assistant. The director general of the Spanish company participated with Siemens in building the Bushehr reactor.

It is worth mentioning that 300-megawatt nuclear reactors are technologically capable of being diverted from civilian to military use.

### Iran Denies Allegations

LD1602203894 Tehran IRNA in English 1835 GMT  
16 Feb 94

[Text] Tehran, Feb. 16, IRNA—A spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Ali Shirzadian, here Wednesday strongly denied the recent allegations by London-based Arabic daily AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT on Tehran-Madrid nuclear cooperation for military purposes.

Interviewed by IRNA, Shirzadian stressed that Iran's nuclear program aims at peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and its activities are within the framework of the rules and regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The daily which is simultaneously published in London and Beirut, in its Monday edition alleged that a Spanish nuclear firm is to provide Iran with necessary technology to transform its two nuclear installations for peaceful utilization of that energy into plants with military purposes.

The daily claimed that the Spanish company is to sell diversion technology to IRAN under a 80 million dlr [dollars] contract signed by an Iranian nuclear delegation in Madrid last month.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has repeatedly announced its firm adherence to it.

The official noted that Iran has always proclaimed that its nuclear facilities are open to the IAEA and the agency's inspection teams have repeatedly confirmed that Iran's nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.

Despite the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran has repeatedly rejected such wild reports, some segments of the western media are trying to portray Iran as a country which is in quest for nuclear arms, regretted Shirzadian.

In a separate statement today, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also rejected rumours circulated by AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT daily accusing Iran of seeking nuclear weapons.

The statement dismissed as "baseless" the daily's allegations and called it part of the psychological war against Iran by the arrogant countries and the Zionist regime.

Certain media often lauch such fabrications of Iran's cooperation with a third party, in a bid to poison world public opinion against Iran's peaceful nuclear program and the peaceful ends of its foreign policy and they want to undermine its friendly relations with Spain, the Foreign Ministry said.

On December 2, Iran's permanent representative at the United Nations, Kamal Kharrazi, announced at the general assembly meeting that Iran is firmly committed to the establishment of the Middle East as a nuclear free zone (NFZ).

**Belgian Energy Plant Equipment Bound for China**  
*BR1602151994 Antwerp GAZET VAN ANTWERPEN*  
*in Dutch 11 Feb 94*

[Unattributed article: "Spectacular Transport From Ghent To China"]

[Text] Yesterday, 16 moduli [modulus] began a long journey to China from the NV Mannesmann Carnoy plant, a subsidiary of the German Mannesmann Anlagenbau AG. The moduli are bound for energy plants in China to be used in boilers [ketel] in which electricity is produced. Mannesman has been working on this order for seven months. The moduli, with a total weight of 2,000 tonnes, were loaded on four pontoons which will transport the moduli from the Ghent-Terneuzen canal to Vlissingen [Netherlands]. There the parts will be loaded onto a ship which will sail to Hong Kong. Finally, ships will transport the freight to the cities of Shunde and Fushan [placenames as published] in Guangdong Province.

**Malaysian-Made Tanks for Libyan Nerve Gas Plant Disappear**

*PM1702131094 London THE INDEPENDENT*  
*in English 17 Feb 94 p 1*

[Report by Raymond Whittaker: "Libyan Nerve Gas Tanks Go Missing in Malaysia"]

[Text] Equipment for a Libyan poison gas plant, made by a British-owned company in Malaysia and returned there last year after the United Nations Security Council blocked delivery, has disappeared.

The issue has resurfaced as the Pergau dam affair has put British dealings with Malaysia under intense scrutiny. It could complicate government attempts to remain on good terms with a country sensitive to any perceived interference in relations with fellow Islamic states.

Concern over Malaysia's Libyan connection was renewed recently when the government auctioned eight steel reactor tanks which had been returned from Singapore, where they were seized last March on the orders of the Security Council's sanctions committee. The buyer was a small local trading company whose only contact is a mobile telephone number. The equipment left a Malaysian customs warehouse a few weeks ago, though other governments have been told it is in the country and will not be permitted to reach Libya.

But one Western diplomat said: "We are not 100 per cent happy, and won't be until we see this equipment in the hands of a non-Libyan end-user who actually wants it."

Britain has co-ordinated efforts to keep the tanks out of Libya since becoming aware in 1989 of Tripoli's attempts to obtain them. It says the equipment could produce hundreds of tons of mustard gas and nerve gases. Kuala Lumpur refused to stop the first delivery attempt, saying they were for civilian use.

The telephone number of the buyer, Wargamas Management, is unobtainable, but investigators who have spoken

to the company's directors say they claim to be trying to sell the vessels to Petronas, Malaysia's state oil company, or an American company. Another source said the equipment had been tailor-made for Tripoli and could not be adapted easily for other uses.

A spokesman for the Malaysian High Commission in London declined to comment, saying he would have to check with Kuala Lumpur.

Libya first tried in 1989 to order reactor vessels from a British engineering company, APV, saying they would be used to produce drilling mud for the oil industry. Western agencies suspected that they would be used to make chemical weapons. When the order was rejected, the Libyans turned to an obscure Malaysian company, Pacificwide Management, which again has only a mobile number. Pacificwide ordered the equipment from APV's Malaysian subsidiary, APV Hill and Mills, and went to court to obtain completion of the contract after the British-owned company, having become aware of the destination of the vessels, tried to back out.

With the Malaysian government refusing to intervene, Britain went to the sanctions committee. The shipment was declared to be a violation of the embargo imposed on Libya to force the handover of two intelligence agents accused of the Lockerbie bombing.

**Libyans, Russian N-Power Station Agree on 'Joint Experiments'**

*PM1402154194 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA*  
*PRAVDA in Russian 12 Feb 94 p 1*

[Correspondent Nikolay Yefimovich report under "Well I Never!" rubric: "Qadhdhafi Reaches Kursk AES [Nuclear Electric Power Station]"]

[Text] The Kursk AES has been visited by a group of specialists of the "Tajura" Libyan nuclear research center. Al-Qadhdhafi's envoys suggested that the Kursk power engineers carry out research on the core—the center—of a working reactor. But they received a firm refusal.

However, the AES press center reported that a protocol of intent to conduct certain joint experiments and to implement a number of projects was nonetheless signed with the Libyan nuclear power workers.

The Kursk AES management flatly refused to reveal the sum being received for cooperation with the Libyan Jamahiriyyah. It is a commercial secret. But it has been learned from certain sources that it is many times more than \$100,000.

Al-Qadhdhafi's envoys were able to convince both "Atom-energoekspert" and the Kursk AES management that they have no intention of using nuclear power for anything other than peaceful purposes.

**Burgeoning Trade in Russian Nuclear Material  
Alarms Germans**

*PM1602121194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
16 Feb 94 First Edition p 3*

[Report by Boris Lysenko: "German Police Fear Nuclear  
Terror"]

[Text] Berlin—The police are leaning toward the conclusion that the Lake Constance air crash (see IZVESTIYA Nos. 23, 24, and 26) was probably just a clever trick by criminals trying to cover their tracks.

The Cessna's passengers—Josef Rimmele and Klaus Eichler—were in cahoots with the "Russian nuclear mafia." But the Cessna could not have been carrying 70 kilograms of cesium-137, since it would have required a four-tonne lead container in order to prevent radioactive emissions. A Cessna-425 cannot lift that kind of load.

The federal police and intelligence service are warning of a new threat from the east. The intelligence service submitted a report to the FRG chancellor entitled "Nuclear Black Market—Nuclear Terror."

German specialists are particularly concerned about the increasing flow of radioactive materials from the CIS countries. Germany is acting as a staging post in the nuclear trade. In 1990 the police recorded four instances of "nuclear trade." In 1992 the figure was 158, while in 1993 there were exactly 200 attempts to sell radioactive materials.

What kind of wares are the businessmen from the CIS offering? From plutonium and uranium-235 to cesium-137, cobalt-60, and strontium-90.

One-half of the 300 people suspected of trading in radioactive materials are from East Europe. The vast majority are citizens of Poland and Russia. According to German intelligence data, Kaunas and Vilnius are centers of "illegal nuclear activity."

German citizens, mainly from the former GDR, are also involved in all these attempts to organize the trade in radioactive materials. For example, the Cessna's missing passenger, Josef Rimmele, had connections with Klaus-Peter Nedvig [name as transliterated], son of the former chief of the GDR police. His successor, Klaus Eichler, caught Interpol's eye after he had attempted to buy a consignment of osmium from a Hungarian.

The Russian mafia has spread throughout Germany, the German papers write.

The German police frankly admit that, unbeknownst to state institutions, Russian emigres have been able to establish an entire network of firms as a front for illegal business. These firms are in close touch with criminal groups inside the CIS.

**Russian Enterprises To Reprocess Iraqi Nuclear  
Fuel**

*LD1602173894 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service  
in Russian 0956 GMT 16 Feb 94*

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Tkachenko]

[Text] Chelyabinsk, 16 Feb—By the end of the year, Iraqi nuclear fuel will be reprocessed and, in accordance with agreement, will be completely returned to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], which has taken on the financial compensation for the expenditure. This was stated today by Viktor Fetisov, director of the leading enterprise of the national atomic industry—the Mayak chemical combine. He was commenting on a media report that the enterprise had accepted for reprocessing the whole batch of enriched uranium from the research reactor in Iraq as planned.

We succeeded in winning the competition for effecting the project for rendering services to the IAEA, the Mayak chief said. It was a question of transporting from Iraq and reprocessing the nuclear fuel from the research reactor in fulfillment of the decisions of the UN Security Council resolution. In this connection, relevant instructions were taken from the Russian Government. This work is to our advantage since it makes it possible to take up unused production capacity and provide work for highly qualified staff.

**EP Approves Project To Employ Russian Nuclear  
Experts**

*BR1102154994 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD  
in Dutch 10 Feb 94 p 4*

[Unattributed article: "New Work For Russian Nuclear Experts"]

[Text] Three thousand Russian nuclear experts, previously working on nuclear weapons, could soon be employed at an institute for scientific and technological research in Moscow, paid for by the West and Japan. They would thus be switching to projects for the peaceful use of nuclear power and better protection for Russia's nuclear power stations.

Yesterday evening the European Parliament in Strasbourg gave the go-ahead for the founding of such an institute, by unanimously voting for a provisional protocol. This was required because the Russian Parliament, the Douma, was not able to ratify the agreement with the European Union, the United States, and Japan as a result of the stormy political events in Moscow.

During a debate in Strasbourg yesterday, the Dutch member of Parliament Jessica Larive (VVD [People's Party for Freedom and democracy]), European Parliament rapporteur on founding the new center in Moscow, referred to an urgent need to stop the braindrain from Russia of nuclear scientists who were all employed under the Soviet system on the production and maintenance of

nuclear weapons. So far 500 have already left, possibly to suspected countries such as Iraq, Libya and Iran, plus the nuclear power China.

Between 1971 and 1993 some 700,000 people lived in the 10 secret nuclear towns. Larive believes most of them are still there. But they no longer enjoy the former privileges such as high wages, free housing and education, and there are problems with food supplies. There is no other employment for the nuclear technicians, as they are bound to secrecy by the Russian Government. The hard core of 500 scientists with knowledge of the Soviet system for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons can now be employed on peaceful projects in Moscow. The European Union, the United States, and Japan have so far set aside some 126 million guilders for the center. Russia has even made a Moscow building available.

#### **Tunisian Science Official Seeks ROK High Technology**

SK1602063594 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD  
in English 16 Feb 94 p 3

[Report by Choe Sang-hun]

[Text] Tunisia is seeking South Korean expertise in the high-tech fields of biotechnology, nuclear research techniques and computer and information technology, said a top science administrator from the North African country.

"South Korea has done a lot in acquiring advanced Western technologies and we want to learn from their experience and see what Koreans could do for our high-tech efforts," said Monji Safra in an interview with THE KOREA HERALD yesterday.

The Tunisian secretary of state to the prime minister in charge of scientific research and technology is here on a three-day visit to prepare a general agreement on science and technological cooperation with South Korea.

He met with Science and Technology Minister Kim Si-chung and other South Korean officials and heads of research institutes to discuss such an agreement yesterday.

Safra named biotechnology, nuclear research and computers as potential sectors for bilateral technological cooperation.

"We want to see what our biotechnology centers could do in joint efforts with their South Korean counterparts to improve seeds and increase agricultural productivity," he said.

Tunisia also has an ambition of becoming the chief provider of computer software for Arab and African countries, especially software adopted for the needs of small businesses.

The country is investing heavily in telecommunications. For example, it is interested in developing software needed to monitor satellites because one of the Arabsats is monitored from Tunis, Safra said.

The Tunisian official also said his country is planning its first nuclear research center to promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology for medical, agricultural and industrial purposes.

"And we hope South Korea will help us by sending experts to give us advice on building nuclear laboratories, which are urgently needed," he said.

Although some private South Korean companies are already operating in Tunisia, Safra's visit marks the first big commitment to establish bilateral technological ties at an official level.

During his stay here, Safra visited Taedok Science Town and six research institutes, including the Korea Institute of Science and Technology, to discuss an exchange of researchers.

Korea International Cooperation Agency has agreed to offer three scholarships for Tunisian researchers to attend seminars and study in research institutes here.

"This cooperation on the official level will certainly help lay the foundation for more cooperation in the private sector," Safra said.

Samsung is already in Tunisia assembling microcomputers and Goldstar is producing household electric appliances there.

For foreign investors, there could be little doubt about the importance of Tunisia's geographical location, Safra said. The North African region has 60 million people and Europe is directly across the Mediterranean Sea.

"By being in Tunisia, foreign companies will be in a position not only to expand into the North African market but also to use it as a gateway to the European market," Safra said.

Tunisia plans to open two free trade zones this year where foreign investors can work without any taxes and use cheap local labor on a contract basis so that they will not have to pay social taxes or comply with local labor regulations.

As long as the local value added is more than 40 percent of the value of a product, the product is considered Tunisian, and almost all Tunisian products get free access to the European market except for a few agricultural products.

Safra leaves the country today. His visit here included a meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Hong Sun-yong, where he said he made clear his country's position that every country in the world, including North Korea, must allow nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Tunisia is a member of the board of IAEA.

#### **France Offers to Revive Nuclear Power Plant Agreement With Pakistan**

BK2102031094 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network  
in Urdu 0200 GMT 21 Feb 94

[Text] France has offered to revive the agreement for a nuclear power plant. The offer is under consideration at the highest level. This was stated by Shahid Hasan, the prime minister's special assistant on economic affairs, at a news conference in Islamabad yesterday. He said that the French Government had started talks in which an offer was made to revive an agreement on the nuclear power plant, which was signed during the previous Pakistan People's Party government.

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